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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I define and defend the philosophy of critical philosophical 
anarchism and show it to be superior to alternative (anarchist and non­
anarchist) approaches to the problem of justification of political institutions. In 
general I argue that the anarchist position within the contemporary debate on 
political obligation has been dismissed too easily and that the value of an 
anarchist approach to an understanding of (and solution to) the problem of 
political authority is underestimated in current thought.
In particular, my thesis sets out and defends the critical philosophical 
anarchist approach to the problem of political obligation and contrasts this 
approach with traditional treatments of the problem. I advance a clearer 
statement of the critical philosophical anarchist position than those currently 
available and demonstrate the continued value of taking an anarchist approach 
to the problem of political authority.
This thesis has seven chapters. In the introductory chapter I set out the 
basic problem of political obligation and the anarchist position I want to 
defend. The first chapter presents the main aspects of the central problem and 
the main argument for its solution to be developed in the following chapters.
Chapter two provides an analysis and restatement of anarchist arguments
against consent and contract theories of political obligation. Chapter three offers 
considerations against a natural duty theory of political obligation. Chapter four 
addresses a reciprocity-based theory of political obligation, to wit: the principle 
of fairness as formulated by Hart and Rawls. The fifth chapter provides a 
general illustration of the distinctive contribution of critical philosophical
anarchism to the problem of political authority. It develops the argument set 
out in chapter one and references to that argument in the preceding critical 
chapters on alternative approaches to the problem of political obligation. In the 
concluding chapter I tie together my argument for critical philosophical
anarchism, as developed over the course of the thesis, and set out the main 
aims of an anarchist approach to society in light of this discussion.
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Introduction.
According to Anarchism the coercion of individuals is immoral. The 
coercion of one individual by another is wrong, as is the coercion of the 
individual by a collective such as the State. For anarchists the value of 
freedom is paramount. A strand of anarchism expresses these positions within 
the philosophical debate on political obligation. And this has distinctive impact 
on our approach to political institutions. This is my thesis.
The unifying premise of anarchism is opposition to political authority.1 
Opposition to the state’s right to rule is common to all forms of anarchism 
and its proponents, despite the variety and division among them. The rejection 
of the state’s right to rule relates to the stronger anarchist challenge to its
right to exist. The upshot of political anarchism is that the state must be
resisted as an evil and a new social form must emerge which succeeds the
state and constitutes an improvement on societies organised around the state. 
Thus, in order to pave the way for a complete evaluation of anarchism, it is 
helpful to examine first the philosophical anarchist rejection of political 
authority, and to detail the positive views, if any, that it expresses. My
strategy throughout this study will be to examine this challenge as formulated 
within the debate on political obligation.
In this chapter, I begin with some general considerations on the problem 
of political obligation. Then, I briefly describe the four basic forms of 
anarchism by way of preface in order to clarify the theoretical perspective of
lrrhe traditional expression o f the anarchist challenge is its opposition to the authority o f  the 
state, which focuses on the state’s special characteristics as ‘a specific form o f government’, 
namely its being a ‘sovereign’, '‘compulsory', ‘monopolistic’ and ‘distinct body’ (see Miller 
1984, p.5). But anarchism’s opposition to the state reflects its more general opposition to 
political authority and the institutionalised coercion which characterises it (for these, see ibid. 
and my characterisation o f  the ‘political’ below), although not necessarily to a looser sense o f  
political society as a form o f social organisation. So, in its core, anarchism objects to the 
authority o f all political institutions which involve institutionalised coercion. In the rest o f  this 
thesis I will use the term ‘state’ interchangeably with ‘political institutions’ (or, ‘political 
constraints’) and ‘institutionalised coercion’ to designate the object o f  the anarchist opposition 
to political authority.
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critical philosophical anarchism that I defend. Finally I discuss a number of 
underlying ideas which help us assess the general contribution of philosophical 
anarchism to the problem of political authority.
I.The problem of political obligation.
i.The correlativitv thesis.
The problem of the existence and justification of political obligation is 
usually taken to be identical to the problem of justification of political 
authority. Justification of political authority involves establishment of the state's 
(claim to the) right to rule. This right is taken to be the logical correlate 
partly o f an obligation to obey (i.e., of political obligation).2 Alternatively, 
correlativity can be conceived as a normative doctrine, according to which 
political obligation is understood as either a normative condition or a 
normative consequence of political authority (depending on the perspective one 
adopts), although not identical to it.3 Theorists divide as to whether to accept 
correlativity in any of the above senses.4 To the extent that political authority 
is understood as a complex right to exclusively and coercively make 
regulations, impose duties and demand compliance (i.e., command and be 
obeyed), then it is properly taken as correlative to a complex set of
2The ‘doctrine o f ‘’logical correlativity” : Simmons 1979, pp.58 and 195-197; 1996, pp.21 and 
36, note 11.
3This means that either authority or obligation is already independently justified and becomes 
the ground o f the other; and that it reflects ‘a substantive [...] thesis about the state, namely 
that it is properly the instrument o f its citizens’ aims’ (Green 1988, p.236).
4Defenders o f political obligation and philosophical anarchists usually adopt correlativity (for 
example: Anscombe 1978; Horton 1992; Simmons 1979; 1996; 1999; Raz 1979b; 1985; 1990; 
Green 1988). This perspective might be explained to a significant extent by the fact that 
these theorists conceive political authority, or, the right to rule, as something more than mere 
permission to coerce. For example: ‘What we really have in mind is a right to make laws 
and regulations, to judge and to punish for failing to conform to certain standards, or to 
order some redress for the victims o f such violations, as well as a right to command’ (Raz 
1990, p.2); and, ‘Political authority has coercive powers, but its authority extends beyond its 
use o f those powers. It appeals to people’s recognition o f  their moral and civic duties, while 
being ready, in many or even most cases, to use coercion if  the appeal fails’ (ibid. p. 15); 
also, ‘Authority on the part o f those who give orders and make regulations is: a right to be 
obeyed. We may say, more amply: authority is a regular right to be obeyed in a domain o f  
decision’ (Anscombe 1978, p. 144). Characteristically, defenders o f  non-correlativity conceive 
authority as mere liability or permission to coerce, which is justifiably distinct from, and does 
not necessarily entail, a duty to obey, that is, political obligation (see, Raphael 1976; 
Ladenson 1980; Wellman 1996). For a useful discussion o f objections to logical and to 
normative correlativity, see Green 1988, pp.234-240.
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obligations among which is the (perhaps most) important obligation to comply 
(i.e., political obligation).5 Such a correlativity is adopted in this thesis as one
central sense of legitimacy and it can make sense either in its logical or in
its normative form. But, it is enough to focus on normative correlativity, 
which involves substantive considerations about the nature of political 
authority and our relation to it, in order to remember that it is in the nature
of the state’s claim-right to rule to generate obligations attached to it.
ii.The two main aspects of the problem of political obligation.
Thus the problem of political obligation is primarily the problem of 
finding a special justification6 of the various obligations imposed on citizens by 
their political institutions, which are correlative to a complex right of those 
institutions to rule those citizens.7 Political obligation has traditionally been 
regarded as that notion through which we must understand a special 
relationship between individuals and the political institutions of their country of
sThis description is closer to the Lockean account o f the right to rule. But it is meant to 
capture the elements o f conceptions such as those presented in note 4 above to be given by 
defenders o f  correlativity.
6Horton seems right that this problem involves in fact a range o f  questions and that, in
addition to the question o f  justification, the questions o f  the author and o f the scope o f
political obligations are also central (1992, pp.12-13). But this thesis concentrates on the 
question o f justification, which, as Horton correctly points out, is presupposed by the other
two and in general ‘has been taken to be the kernel o f the philosophical problem o f political
obligation’ (ibid.). It is with regard to this question that I evaluate the anarchist position. 
Moreover, the traditional philosophical discussion o f political authority is discussion of 
attempts to account for de jure  political authority, that is, authority which has the right to 
rule, rather than o f de facto  political authority, namely one which claims to have this right 
and has this claim acknowledged by its subjects (for this distinction see, e.g., W olff 1970, 
p.2; Simmons 1979, pp.41-42, 196 and 206; 1999, pp.746-751; Raz 1990, p.3). In relation to 
these points, see the discussion o f the moral feature o f  the nature o f the problem o f political 
obligation below.
7In this form, it has been also identified as the problem o f ‘state legitimacy’, morally 
understood (Simmons 1999; for my focus on normative conceptions, see note 6 above). And 
in this thesis I use state legitimacy interchangeably with state authority and political 
obligation. But this use o f  legitimacy should not be confused with other, proper yet different, 
uses o f the notion. For example, within contemporary contractualism the focus is on deciding 
the content o f  legitimacy (or o f  justice), on examining what demands political institutions 
should satisfy in order to be legitimate (or, otherwise: on formulating legitimate principles for 
institutions), a question different from an explicit defence o f their right to exist and their 
right to rule (e.g., Rawls 1971; Scanlon 1982). Simmons sees the contractualist approach as a 
special conception o f  ‘justification’ o f the state and opposes its being drawn together with the 
question o f state legitimacy which corresponds to the problem o f political obligation, namely 
o f legitimacy as the right to rule (1999, 758-769). He himself conceives the justification o f  
the state as the question concerning which institutions, if  any, have the right to exist and 
takes it to be separate from the question o f  state legitimacy as one about justification o f  the 
right to rule (ibid. pp.739-751). For other senses o f legitimacy, see Simmons 1979, pp.40-41 
and 197. For non-normative accounts o f political legitimacy, see Weber 1947; Barker 1990.
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residence. Below I present the two main features of the nature of the problem 
of political obligation:
(a) The state, the law and political institutions in general have a special 
character and status. This is described by four theses.8 The sources thesis: 
political institutions take their own validity from within the political/legal 
structure, from legally defined criteria and standards. The particularity thesis: 
citizens are taken to have a special relationship with their own government as 
it itself determines its conditions of membership within its territory. This 
means that political institutions have a particular constituency to which they 
apply and any justification of political obligation should provide a basis for 
obeying particularly one's own government with its own criteria for 
membership.9 The coercion thesis: institutional requirements can be backed by 
coercion. The state is sovereign and monopolistic in the sense that it 
determines the rights and duties of its citizens in an authoritarian and 
exclusionary way. In respect of this function, legal sanction, or coercion, is its 
primary means. The independence premise: an account of political obligation 
should include criteria which show the independent nature of the ‘political’ (as 
this nature is reflected in the elements of the three previous theses), and it is 
by appeal to this essentially political nature of institutions that political 
obligation should be justified. That is, the special commitment which such an 
obligation is supposed to express needs to be shown to be necessarily 
connected to its political nature. I will be referring to these four premises as 
‘the theses on the political’.
(b) The commands o f  political authorities are directed at the actions o f  
individuals in the public domain. This means that such commands have a direct 
effect on the beliefs of individuals but also on their actions (such commands 
guide their practical reasoning and behaviour). In this way they are reasons for 
action (normative requirements) in the same way as moral or prudential 
reasons. More importantly, for those who accept and discuss the problem of 
political obligation, political obligations are understood to be moral in 
character.10 They are the defining terms of a special moral relationship between
8For these theses, see Meckled-Garcia 1998, pp. 14-18.
9‘The particularity requirement’: Simmons 1979, pp.31-35; Green 1988, pp.227-228.
10See, e.g., Horton 1992, pp.13-15; Raz 1979b, p.244.
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citizens and their polity. Yet, the most convincing reason for requiring a moral 
ground is that it provides the most appropriate way of filtering political 
requirements in order to decide which of them can properly be attributed the 
status of obligations. That is, it works as a criterion for distinguishing 
unacceptable requirements from those which can be accepted as valid laws. 
When, for example, individuals are presented with laws against bodily harm 
and laws discriminating against a specific group of people (such as women), 
they need to be able to assert the acceptability of the former and exclude the 
latter by reference to a stable testing ground. Such filtering is necessary and 
valuable since institutions affect considerably our freedom and our lives more 
generally, because it demands that they need to be sufficiently motivated in 
their doing so. That is, it demands that there are convincing reasons in favour 
of their interference. A moral ground provides the strongest basis for normative 
requirements and creates a distance from our institutions, beneficial to a critical 
assessment of their function and quality. These points express the second 
important aspect of the issue of political obligation as traditionally understood: 
a justification of political obligation must involve the provision of moral 
grounds for supporting political institutions, if it is to be acceptable.
Together (a) and (b) say that an adequate justification of political 
obligation involves the recognition o f the legitimacy o f  political authority qua 
political, on the basis o f  moral reasons."
1'Following philosophical anarchists, I see as inevitable the need to defend the existence o f  
special obligations o f the political domain on moral principles and arguments for them. This 
is so mainly because o f  the direct and dominant role that political institutions, with their 
requirements and present practices, play in our social lives and because they claim the right 
to do so. The demands o f  political institutions affect primarily individual self-determination 
and this raises a constant requirement to put limits on them and conditions on how they do 
so, rooted in individual life and morality. As the anarchist reminds us, coercion can never be 
desirable in itself, without proper motivation for it. It is always a defect and needs to be 
counterbalanced by merits sufficiently strong to qualify the agencies which incorporate it. The 
very fact that obligations are requirements and that it is characteristic o f  the latter that they 
involve a ‘pressure to perform’, makes explicit the tie between obligation and coercion and 
thus pressing a demand for a proper justification (Simmons 1979, p.7). These points relate to 
the other central feature in the traditional understanding o f  the debate on political obligation: 
the appeal to a moral reason as a ground o f  the political qua political. To appeal 
occasionally (or even frequently) to moral reasons as justifications o f compliance with 
particular laws does not constitute a moral recognition o f  the authority o f  the law. (For the 
meaning o f such a recognition, in comparison with other kinds o f  reliance on moral reasons, 
see Miller 1984, pp.16-18 and Raz’s view discussed below).
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iii.Oualitv-based and interaction-based evaluations of political institutions.
Two central elements of evaluation of states which are found in 
discussions of political obligation are: quality and specific interaction. The 
former involves general positive qualities or accomplishments of institutions 
(such as justice and the supply of important goods), and it is commonplace in 
moral arguments for their existence. The latter refers to ‘morally significant 
features of the specific histories of interaction between individual persons and 
their polities’ (components such as actually giving one’s consent).12 Judgements 
about the nature of political institutions, the qualities which might make them 
morally acceptable, provide a basic condition that institutions must satisfy and 
in this respect affect judgements about political obligation.13 Some of the 
theories of political obligation employ them more centrally, as grounds of that 
question. But the general moral relationship based on the nature of a state 
overall differs from the particular moral relationship which is the focus of the 
problem of political obligation.14 These are some preliminary points which will 
play an important role for the main argument of this thesis and will be further 
clarified in the course of the development of it.15
12Simmons 1999, p.764. These elements ground Simmons’ distinction between ‘generic’ and 
‘transactional evaluations’ (ibid.). In this thesis I also apply, in relation to the first kind o f  
evaluation, the term ‘institutional morality’, which is drawn from an analogous distinction 
between ‘theories o f institutional morality’ and ‘theories o f emergence’ (Meckled-Garcia 1998, 
chapter 2). Schmidtz makes a distinction similar to Simmons’, between ‘teleological’ and 
‘emergent’ justifications (1996). But his account is less satisfactory.
13Quality is the factor that Simmons ties to the question o f justification as he understands it 
(see note 7 above), which is considered to precede arguments for political obligation (1999). 
The basic idea here is that we cannot morally bind ourselves to immoral institutions.
14It will be part o f the argument o f this thesis to see whether the one can ground the other 
and, in general, to assess the role o f institutional qualities in justifying political obligation. 
This thesis follows a classical perspective in seeing the problem o f political obligation as 
about grounding a special bond between individual and government through understanding ‘the 
relationship or transaction which could create’ such a bond (Simmons 1979, p.4, emphasis 
mine). Also, this thesis stresses the fact that political obligation is a special bond between a 
particular government and each particular citizen. Having such a particularised character, it 
seems more likely to be created by very specific relationships, which are characterised by 
actual and particular features o f direct transaction and which it is doubtful that can be 
captured by more generally described connections between states and subjects (in relation to 
these points, see on the ‘particularity requirement’: ibid. pp.31-35 and the discussion o f  the 
political above). In the light o f  these points, political obligation seems more relevant to the 
category o f  transactional evaluation, which Simmons considers to be the proper for assessing 
the question o f  political obligation (1999). The arguments o f the following chapters will help 
decide the force o f these considerations.
15Whether or not justification and legitimacy are separate dimensions o f  evaluation of 
institutions and whether or not justification in terms o f institutional qualities (or: o f  generic 
evaluation) is directed primarily to the existence o f  the state, anarchism challenges political 
institutions with regard to both existence and obligation. This thesis concentrates on its
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iv.The conditions of political obligation.
The four theses which define the political and the demand for a moral 
ground are accompanied by certain formal conditions which have traditionally 
been used to determine theories of political obligation and which are pressed 
by anarchists. In the next few pages I will clarify which of these conditions 
remain operative and introduce their role within the debate on political 
obligation.
The particularity thesis, which defines a central part of the nature of the 
political, provides itself a first condition on how to attempt to assign moral 
weight to the bond of political obligation, namely that we show the moral 
significance of citizens being bound to their own states. Being coherently in 
the nature of political institutions to address their requirements to a specific 
constituency, particularity is a natural and inevitable condition within the 
debate. Two other general assumptions of a justification of political obligation 
involve the demand of ‘universality’, namely that moral justification applies to 
all subjects with regard to all laws; and the demand of ‘singularity in ground’, 
namely that all obligations are based on one and the same moral reason.16 
Both these assumptions have been questioned.17 The first because of the 
possibility and appropriateness of excluding some people from having political 
obligations. The second because of the possibility and appropriateness of 
appealing to more than one reason to explain different individuals’ obligation 
to obey the same law and to explain the same individual’s obligation to 
different laws. Many theorists are content with seeing reasons for political 
obligation as prima facie reasons; with appealing to a plurality of grounds; and 
with establishing political obligation for many of the citizens but not for all.18 
Even philosophical anarchists such as Simmons recognise that universality and
position with regard to the particular relationship o f political obligation. But one o f my main 
objectives is to show how the anarchist perspective makes the problem o f  political obligation 
central for a broader evaluation o f political institutions, thus ultimately a challenge to their 
very existence. The fundamental question which motivates anarchism is: if  and why we 
should have institutions at all. In the debate on political obligation this question is vindicated 
in a challenge to the very possibility o f obligations. These issues are central for the 
distinctive contribution o f philosophical anarchism to the debate on political obligation which 
I attempt to demonstrate.
16W olff 1995b, p. 10.
17For this see Simmons 1979, pp.35-37. Particularly for arguments against ‘universality’, see 
Green 1988, pp.240-247.
18W olff 1995b; Gans 1992.
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singularity are not necessarily features of political obligation.19 Thus, I do not 
adopt these two conditions as appropriate constraints on accounts of political 
obligation.
Nevertheless, what should be drawn from the above considerations is the 
recognition that, in order to justify political obligation, a sufficient amount of 
generality is necessary.20 Klosko (1987) and other defenders of the state 
recognise this, and it is in fact this aspect that has created the most difficulties 
for them. As I will argue, all accounts of political obligation proposed so far 
fail to justify political obligation for most of the people. Thus, the justification 
of a general political obligation has not yet been given.
The other two conditions which work as proper formal constraints on 
accounts of political obligation become very explicit in a last factor of the 
problem of political obligation to which I want to draw attention, namely our 
understanding of the character of the notion of political obligation. A good 
example is Raz's proposal. Political obligation ‘is a general obligation applying 
to ... all the laws on all occasions to which they apply’.21 It is not an 
‘incidental reason’.22 It is a reason to obey the law because it is the law, that 
is, ‘to obey the law as it requires to be obeyed’ .23 It involves the acceptance
19Simmons 1979, pp.35-37. And yet Simmons and other anarchists have been criticised for 
posing ‘particularly rigorous and demanding standards o f  moral justification’ o f the state 
(Horton 1992, p.134).
20This, not because o f the worry claimed to generate the demand o f  universal application o f  
political obligation (namely, that without political obligations certain people will become a 
threat to the rest o f those obeying; for an expression o f this worry see W olff 1995b, p.97). 
Beyond such a worry, I insist on ‘generality’ and on the other three conditions o f political 
obligation offered by philosophical anarchists (namely, ‘particularity’ as reflected in the 
particularity thesis above, ‘bindingness’ and ‘content-independence’: see next note and the 
paragraph to which it refers) because they provide an appropriate (and perhaps the most 
suitable) way o f  ascribing to the traditional understanding o f the problem o f political 
obligation the significance that, I argue in this project, it has (see note 11). Also, generality 
corresponds to the centralised and monopolistic character o f political institutions. And it 
captures a central characteristic in the anarchist approach to accounts o f  political obligation, 
namely that we be interested ‘in describing all moral requirements which bind citizens to 
their political communities’ (Simmons 1979, p.37. For his support o f generality, see ibid. 
pp.55-56).
21Raz 1979b, p.234.
22Ibid.
23Ibid. p.236. I agree with Simmons that political obligation is not only obligation to obey 
the law but involves much more, such as the duties o f citizenship, which involve supporting 
political institutions in other ways, for example, by participating in the defence o f one’s 
country (1979, p.5). This point is suggested also by the analysis o f  correlativity at the 
beginning o f  this chapter. Yet, in the present paragraph I use Raz’s discussion to make a 
different point about the character o f  political obligation and I adopt his terminology only as 
part o f  that discussion.
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of the directives of the law, not only with regard to their content but also as 
far as the conditions or criteria by which they may be overridden are
concerned. The law is not absolute, but the considerations under which it is 
defeated should be recognised by the law itself; such considerations might be 
strong moral reasons which override the obligation to obey the law, but one’s 
acting according to them irrespectively of any recognition of their application 
by the law itself constitutes a violation of the law. Thus, although the 
application of the law does not imply that reasons other than those recognised 
by the law are less important, the law is ‘exclusionary’; and ‘its rules and
rulings are authoritative’.24 It is in the very nature of the law and it is its
point that it functions as a conclusion of practical reason, already excluding 
certain considerations; this is what the law is. Only by understanding that
political obligation is the obligation to obey the law because it is the law can 
we avoid losing sight of the demand that any suggested justification should be 
a ground for exactly this kind of requirement. Given this understanding of 
political obligation it is possible to recognise that what anarchists deny is a 
general obligation to obey political institutions as they require to be obeyed.25
Thus, theories of political obligation, which attempt to justify morally a 
specially political kind of requirement, are constrained by four formal 
conditions as clarified above: namely, particularity, generality, bindingness and 
content-independence. I call them ‘the conditions of political obligation’. These 
conditions appear as merely formal requirements which a theorist of political 
obligation might find reasons to dispense with, against the anarchist standpoint. 
But one task of this thesis is to make explicit how their role is indispensable 
in the debate on political obligation and how these conditions characterise the 
anarchist perspective, which ultimately helps decide the anarchist contribution 
within this debate. The input of the above discussion is that it makes obvious 
that these conditions provide already defining features of the political nature of
24Raz 1979b, pp.236-237.
25These considerations are represented in the following chapters by the terms ‘content- 
independence’ and ‘bindingness’, which designate the last two conditions o f  political 
obligation (Green 1988, p.225-226). The recognition o f these features as characteristic o f  
political obligation is not incompatible with the claim that political obligations are not ‘all 
things considered’ reasons for action (Simmons 1979, pp.7-11). They are also reflected in the 
special nature o f the ‘political’ as defined in the four theses presented above. Similar 
considerations about the character o f political obligation are echoed in Friedman’s analysis o f  
the notion o f authority (Friedman 1973).
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such obligations, which is a central aspect of the debate.26 This thesis is aimed 
at confirming that they are justifiably offered as determinants of the link 
required between this aspect and the second one, that of moral justification.
In sum, the problem of political obligation concerns fundamentally an 
ethical relationship between people and the political community of which they 
are members, that is, one involving moral grounds for a special relationship to 
our polities, which are strong but neither absolute nor exhaustive. Also, this 
issue is political in the sense that membership of a polity is characterised by 
the special features of the political as defined by the theses on the political 
and reflected in the conditions of political obligation. The arguments to be 
examined in the main part of the thesis are approached on the basis of an 
acceptance of the debate over political obligation in these terms.27
2.The variety of Anarchisms. Defining Critical Philosophical 
Anarchism.
At this point, I turn to the discussion of different forms o f  anarchism. 
There are two main sides of anarchism: political and philosophical. The first 
is further divided into individualist and communal anarchism and the second 
into positive (a priori) and negative (a posteriori) anarchism. We thus have 
four main forms of anarchism. The discussion below consists in a brief
description of each form in order to arrive at a basic account of the anarchist 
position that I discuss throughout this thesis.
Political Anarchism is primarily devoted to the task of demolishing the 
state. It sees this task as an immediate implication of rejecting political
authority. But it also views the state as a very bad form of social
organisation, a reason for opposition which is, for this form of anarchism, 
additional to its belief that the state’s existence and authority remain
unjustified. Correspondingly, this critique of the state is premised on a vision
26Another way o f  rejecting universality and singularity o f  ground as conditions o f political 
obligation is observing that none o f the two has a direct and relevant connection with the 
features that make the requirements o f  political institutions political. That is, none o f them is 
necessary for the authoritative, monopolistic and coercive character o f political institutions.
27See also notes 11 and 20 above.
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of social life without political institutions. Philosophical Anarchism, on the 
other hand, concentrates on the critique of political authority and does not 
necessarily require the abolition of the state. This latter characteristic is 
reflected in the fact that negative philosophical anarchism is compatible with ‘a 
wide range of alternative political outlooks’28 as will become clear below. 
Many anarchists are both philosophical and political, but a philosophical 
anarchist may remain non-political.
Political Individualist Anarchism is marked by the way in which it points 
out a central aspect of anarchism: the commitment to individual autonomy, or 
freedom,29 as a primary value. It promotes the idea that each individual has an 
‘inviolable sphere of action’ with absolute sovereignty.30 It views social 
relationships as contractual interactions among independent beings, able to lead 
their lives abstracted from their social environment and its impacts.31 This leads 
individualist anarchists to indicate the importance of voluntariness in any 
relation to and interaction with others and to attack political obligation on the 
grounds that states are not based on voluntary relations. They thus see them as 
coercive, exploitative and evil.32
Political Communal Anarchism has roots in socialism but it nonetheless 
differs from other socialist ideologies, especially in the latters’ devotion to 
politically centralised forms of organisation and control (if not always as ends, 
at least as means towards an ideal society).33 Communal anarchism points out 
‘the social character of human life’: the value of community, mutuality, free 
co-operation and, in the general case, social arrangements of a reciprocal
28Horton 1992, p. 132.
29In the sense that each individual has a capacity and right to be ‘self-legislating’ (W olff 
1970, p .14), to make and act on his/her own decisions - as long as these do ‘not violate the 
similar rights o f others’ (Horton 1992, p. 115) and ‘avoid causing dramatic social harm’ 
(Simmons 1993, p.267). At a basic level freedom can be conceived as ability to make 
choices on various issues o f one’s life under circumstances o f  lack o f  coercion o f any kind, 
adequate knowledge and unimpaired capacity for rational deliberation. All anarchists construe 
freedom in striking opposition to coercion. In individualist anarchism absence o f coercion is 
seen primarily as lack o f  interference with a private sphere o f individual life. More generally, 
anarchism is committed to the ideal o f  self-determination understood best as self-development 
under conditions o f  proper social relationships, where subordination o f some to others is 
replaced by mutual respect, equal active participation and common flourishing. Here absence 
o f coercion becomes a matter o f denials o f submission which engage with aspects more 
comprehensive than the negative demands o f  individualist anarchism.
30Miller 1984, p.30.
31‘Self-made’ and ‘self-sufficient’, see Horton 1992, pp. 116-117.
32Ibid.
33See, for example, the split between Marx and Bakunin (Joll 1964, chapter IV).
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character.34 Its proponents have devoted themselves to developing visions of 
society which involve a series of co-operative enterprises in every aspect of 
social life (economic, cultural, educational, etc.)35 and which are offered as 
alternatives to views of society which essentially involve the state. These 
visions are accompanied by the (anarchist) rejection of coercive schemes and 
are based on reasonably optimistic views of human nature36 and accounts of 
morality.
Moving to Philosophical Anarchism. I begin with some terminological 
points in order to arrive at the view I want to defend. Horton distinguishes 
between positive and negative philosophical anarchism.37 Positive anarchism is 
the stronger, since it provides an explanation of the moral impossibility of the 
state and thus of political obligation. Negative anarchism is weaker for it relies 
merely on ‘justification by default’, that is, the failure of all attempts to 
provide supportive accounts of political obligation is taken to be reason enough 
for denying the existence of such obligation even though no ‘positive’ analysis 
of why such attempts are bound to fail is provided.38 These terms correspond 
to a certain extent to Simmons’ notions of ‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori’
anarchism. A priori anarchism states that the impossibility of legitimacy is
inherent to the nature of the state, that some essential feature of the state 
makes it impossible for it to be legitimate.39 In contrast, the claim of a
posteriori anarchism that ‘all existing states are illegitimate’ is defended mainly 
by empirical observations of actual states and is not based on an argument 
that there is some inconsistency, or incoherence, in the possibility of a
34For these notions, see, Horton 1992, pp.l 19-120; Miller 1984, chapters 4 and 12.
35For example, Kropotkin 1892; 1899; 1902; Bookchin 1980; 1997.
36For an approach to the notion o f human nature, its use in the anarchist tradition and its 
role in the anarchist theory, see Marshall 1989. His proposal o f  abandoning the idea o f  
human nature as a ‘fixed essence’ (p.138), and o f viewing human species in an evolutionary 
way, taking into account the continual interaction o f many aspects in it and their capacity for 
‘self-regulation’ within open possibilities (pp.139-144), expresses a view o f  human nature 
which is compatible with the position o f  this thesis.
371992, p.124.
38Ibid.
39For example, for Robert Paul W olff state authority is necessarily incompatible with 
individual autonomy (1970). In general, a priori philosophical anarchists are moved by prior 
commitments - e.g., to voluntarism, to egalitarianism or to communalism - which they see the 
state to contradict fundamentally (see Simmons 1996, pp.20-21).
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legitimate state, though this form of anarchism is pessimistic about it.40 That is 
a central reason why a posteriori anarchism does not necessarily lead to 
political anarchism, why its project is presented as mainly one of theoretical 
criticism and of enlightenment, and why it leaves room, in many cases, for 
obedience to particular laws and for the justification of particular obligations of 
different individuals.
In this thesis I focus on the negative side of philosophical anarchism and 
set to evaluate its contribution to the debate on political authority. For this, I 
adopt an alternative terminology, using it to structure the debate. I focus on 
what I call ‘critical philosophical anarchism’41 and define it through a 
combination of the features of the definitions just explained (those of Horton 
and Simmons above) which I find the most characteristic of the anarchist 
position which is to be assessed. From negative philosophical anarchism I 
keep the characteristic that it is a theoretical view, based on criticisms of the 
failures of accounts of political obligation. Yet I do not move on to say that 
it involves no prior analysis of what is involved in an adequate justification to 
determine its criticisms. From a posteriori philosophical anarchism, I take this: 
Simmons argues that a posteriori anarchism is not based merely on justification 
by default. It is based ‘either in an ideal of legitimacy (which existing states 
can be shown not to exemplify) or in some account of what an acceptably 
complete positive attempt [to justify political obligation] would look like’.42 
This feature works as a normative horizon for estimating theoretical defences 
of political obligation, a prior standard in reference to which a posteriori 
anarchism derives its negative conclusions about political obligation from the 
failures of those defences and about political institutions from what these 
failures reflect about reality.
Given the above two features, I define ‘critical philosophical anarchism’ 
as the view which examines the best candidates for moral theories of political 
obligation and derives from their failure, as a constructive conclusion of its
40Simmons 1996, p.21. For this and other distinctions applying to philosophical anarchism, see 
ibid. pp. 19-39. See also next chapter.
41This term is used by Gans for the anarchist position which he explains as ‘the denial o f  
the duty to obey the law which is based on a rejection o f  its grounds’ (1992, p.2). But the 
sense in which I use it in this thesis is different from his, more technical and specific. I 
give my own definition in the next paragraph.
421996, p.36 note 9.
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own, the result that there is no general political obligation and that in this 
respect political institutions remain unjustified. Operative in this approach is a 
prior standard of theoretical criticism merged with some idea of what an ideal 
legitimate society should be like and philosophical anarchism considers all 
existing states to be illegitimate insofar as they fail to meet this ideal.
My aim is to closely examine this anarchist position as it figures within 
the debate on political obligation in order to demonstrate that it offers
something valuable to the perspective we have towards political institutions and
our relation to them and what this contribution is. I stress both its critical 
perspective and its ideal of legitimacy because I see them as defining features 
of this position and that they incorporate those elements which are of essential 
value in the arguments of philosophical anarchism against political obligation. 
These parameters are also envisaged as compatible with certain valuable 
features of communal anarchism.43
The anarchist enters the debate on political obligation with a concern 
about freedom. He concentrates on the importance for individuals to be self- 
governed, to be able to have a say on and determine the main aspects of their 
own lives. But how can this be compatible with external constraints? The
respect for self-government and the rejection of constraints are characteristic
anarchist arguments, each of which might take, and at times has taken, priority 
over the other within the anarchist tradition. Yet, an anarchist can insist on the
43In fact, such a compatibility is not limited to communal anarchism. It is, to my mind, 
necessary in any anarchist vision which displays two features o f  communal anarchism, namely 
its recognition o f the social dimension o f  human beings, and its idea o f  free social 
relationships and decentralised, co-operative forms o f social order along with the attention to 
matters o f economic equality and distribution. (Such perspectives are found in contemporary 
writings o f  anarchist conviction such as Bookchin 1997, Carter 1993 and Marshall 1989). The 
essentially social character o f  human life is reflected both in anarchist proposals o f  free social 
relationships and in the claims regarding the defects o f relations o f  power. These claims have 
important implications for defences o f the state in the light o f its coercive character and the 
corruption underlying it. (For issues which highlight the independence o f ‘state actors’, see 
Carter 1989; 1993, esp. p.51 note 12; 1995). Communal anarchism contains a positive project, 
namely the establishment o f human co-operative relations free o f  both domination and 
exploitation. But its relation to coercion appears unclear and problematic (Horton 1992, 
pp. 122-123). The most demanding project o f anarchist theory would consist in a combination 
o f  the communal anarchist ideal with the attack on coercion reflected in the exacting 
perspective and standard o f legitimacy which critical philosophical anarchism defines. This 
thesis will therefore attempt to prepare the way for this combination. In particular, I will aim 
at understanding what the implied perspective o f philosophical anarchism is, and to indicate 
how it might be applied to the positive horizon o f political communal anarchism. For a 
development o f these points see my conclusion. See also note 48 below.
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priority o f freedom and criticise political institutions without any prior rejection 
of constraints in general. The anarchist is sensitive to the fact that political 
constraints create problems for self-determination. It is with this realisation that 
the critical philosophical anarchist criticises the way traditional defences of 
political institutions work. What he wants to point out is that if these defences 
start with a different perspective on political institutions, one which involves 
centrally the task to require and show a positive relation between them and 
self-determination, they will address more successfully the difficulties which 
they face in their effort to justify political reality. The debate, and with it our 
relation to the state, can then develop in a different light, which will provide 
more fruitful ways of accessing political institutions. It is these features which 
are significant in the position of critical philosophical anarchism and which is 
the task of this thesis to explain and defend.
3.Underlying Ideas.
In the rest of this chapter, I present the main considerations which 
underlie my programme as just stated.
(a) Critical philosophical anarchism has been criticised as mere scepticism: 
as a purely negative view, which works as a denial of positive 
defences of political institutions without offering an alternative positive 
proposition of its own.44 One of my main concerns is, without denying 
its theoretical function (which I keep and stress in my definition of 
critical philosophical anarchism), to argue that this view involves 
something more positive than it first appears to involve: I aim at 
showing that the critical arguments of philosophical anarchism express 
a prior perspective. Such a perspective is characteristically anarchist in 
its motivating concerns and its proposals. And is also indispensable for 
theorists of political obligation to adopt and for the evaluation of 
institutions more generally. A closer analysis of anarchist arguments 
against defences of political obligation is the first step towards this
^For example, W olff 1996b. This criticism is anticipated by the usual understanding o f  
critical anarchism as a view relying merely on justification by default (see the presentation o f  
negative anarchism above).
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objective. The four conditions on theories of political obligation which 
the anarchist employs in his arguments play a central role within this 
analysis in understanding the anarchist perspective. As I suggested in 
the presentation of them earlier in this chapter, these formal 
requirements define characteristic features of the political nature of the 
obligations to be examined. In fact, together these conditions express 
the political nature itself, that is, the particularistic, coercive, centralist 
and exclusive character of the institutions that these obligations relate 
to. This nature is defined by ‘the theses on the political’ presented in 
section 1 above. In my effort to explain the anarchist perspective, I 
use this point to make explicit how ‘the conditions of political 
obligation’, being difficult to dispense with, become useful vehicles of 
very valuable yet neglected elements of the anarchist position; that 
their formality leads nevertheless to wide-ranging moral conclusions. In 
part, the examination of anarchist criticisms of political obligation 
serves to establish (the role of) these conditions as definitive of the 
link between the political and the moral feature of the problem of 
political obligation. I employ this point to demonstrate the value of the 
philosophical anarchist perspective.
(b) The anarchist ideal of legitimacy provides another aspect of the 
anarchist view that I attempt to evaluate which will play a central role 
in arguing for the positive contribution of that view. Philosophical 
anarchists defend voluntarist, communitarian and egalitarian visions of 
ideal society as indications of the proper relations which institutions 
must involve in order to be legitimate and justified in the eyes of 
human beings.45 Characteristically, these ideals are also in constant 
interaction with the social visions of political anarchism. The fact that 
such ideals underlie the arguments of critical philosophical anarchism 
provides another factor which explains the positive character of this 
form of anarchism. Both the anarchist social visions and the anarchist 
attacks on the state aspire to a better understanding of human nature 
and society and to an assessment of human actions, relations and
450 n  such ideals, see Simmons 1996, pp. 19-21; 1999, p.769-770.
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achievements which is compatible with the most commonly shared
moral values.46 This is a ground that can be shared by many anti­
authoritarian theorists, with or without anarchist convictions.
Furthermore, arguments which bring the defenders of the state and
anarchists into conflict are those which refer to issues of an explicitly 
social character.47 The positive horizon defined by political communal 
anarchism provides a suitable background for addressing these
concerns. But I want to argue that such a horizon is compatible with
and in fact already incorporated within the challenge of critical
philosophical anarchism.48 In examining different theories of political 
obligation in their dialogue with the anarchist perspective, I will
approach them in respect of different instances of the anarchist ideal 
o f legitimacy. A related aim is to carry the role of the ideal of 
legitimacy further: I will examine how, more generally, it can make 
the task of justification of political institutions harder. I will consider 
how the debate as defined by the anarchist and its results about 
political obligation might affect further defences of coercion even 
within a background presupposing that we need, and remain with,
political institutions. The extension of the role of the anarchist ideal of 
legitimacy in this thesis is an analysis of the effect of the anarchist 
perspective on any justification of constraints. Thus the anarchist 
contribution to the political debate will be estimated both with regard 
to what it offers to the debate on political obligation itself and with
46I endorse the claim that anarchists are concerned with ‘the quality o f  relations between 
people’, namely with defending and realising within society direct and many-sided relations, 
characterised by reciprocity and equal authority and participation (Taylor, 1982, p.3; Raz 
1990, pp. 16-17).
47A good example is provided by the argument from public goods. This argument focuses on 
the importance o f co-ordinating activities in order to secure the production and distribution o f  
goods vital for a decent life, and reveals conflicting intuitions - those o f  anarchists on the 
one hand and those o f  their opponents on the other. For this issue see, e.g., Sanders 1996, 
pp.266-271; Olson 1965.
48Political anarchists oppose the state not only because o f its illegitimacy but also because o f  
its essentially coercive, corruptive and, thus, evil character. But this characterisation o f the 
state as evil is not an essential element o f  philosophical anarchism although it may play a 
part in certain philosophical anarchist views. It is necessary to combine a diagnostic o f  what 
goes wrong in coercion, as expressed in philosophical anarchist views, with an explicit 
prescriptive horizon o f  harmonious social relations. The required link might be found in a 
theoretical account which includes a properly articulated ideal o f  legitimacy which will set a 
standard, elements o f  which must be met by any vision o f society.
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respect to the implications of the results of this debate for more 
general evaluations of political institutions. In these functions, the ideal 
of legitimacy and the anarchist criticisms become two expressions of 
one comprehensive view.
(c) The conditions of political obligation become themselves reflections of 
the relation between these two expressions: if these conditions reflect 
the political nature of obligation and help in determining the positive 
character of the anarchist conclusions against political obligation, this is 
parallel to the function of the ideal as a standard of moral relations
which institutions, with their political character, fail to meet. This
standard is merged with a theoretical account of what an acceptably 
complete defence of political obligation needs to involve, which may 
be identified as a successful combination of the four formal conditions 
with the different moral bases of political obligation.49 Thus one could 
say that, the elements of the debate on political obligation as provided 
by anarchism and its ideal of legitimacy become alternative expressions 
of a unique outlook.50 If the anarchist conclusions about political
obligation are correct, both the four conditions which constrain
accounts of political obligation and the ideals reflecting proper social 
relations which states do not meet, indicate something about the
49This anarchist understanding o f ‘an acceptably complete positive attempt’ to defend political 
obligation involves also two narrow criteria o f success: that the accounts are ‘accurate’, 
namely they offer plausible principles o f  obligation in ‘their most defensible form and appl[y] 
them correctly’ and that they are ‘complete’, namely they ‘identify as bound all and only 
those who are so bound’ (Simmons 1979, pp.55-56). In his criticism o f accounts o f political 
obligation, the anarchist first recommends the most plausible ones, then tries to render them 
accurate and then asks whether they are complete in meeting the four conditions o f political 
obligation (ibid.). Thus the anarchist participates in the development o f defensible theories o f  
political obligation and the anarchist conclusions against political obligation are derived on the 
basis o f distinctive criteria o f success when applied to defensible theories. This already shows 
the approach o f critical philosophical anarchism to be much more than a justification by 
default (see Simmons 1996, p.36, n.9).
50The category o f transactional evaluations o f institutions which was introduced in the first 
section o f this chapter is relevant to the combinations presently suggested. In the following 
chapters, it will become clear that anarchist ideals o f legitimacy reflect the relations that 
would be involved in a society which met transactional evaluations. And the anarchist’s prior 
idea o f  an acceptably complete positive attempt to justify political obligation is that o f one 
which would successfully combine the four formal conditions with a moral principle, a 
combination which is no more than a theoretical reflection, defining the anarchist criticisms, 
o f an application o f proper social relations. Thus transactional evaluations, the ideal o f  
legitimacy and an account o f a comprehensive theory o f political obligation may be seen as 
three different expressions o f a very positive perspective already underlying the anarchist 
challenge.
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political which every theorist needs to attend to, and provide the way 
for doing so. Together these features comprise the anarchist position 
which I aim at explaining and defending.
(d) Critical philosophical anarchism is mainly engaged in what Miller calls 
the ‘subversive campaign’ of philosophical anarchism.51 As Simmons 
highlights, it encourages a substantial revision of our conception of 
ordinary political life.52 More specifically, it questions the common- 
sense conception of the relationship between governments and their 
citizens in terms of political obligation. While philosophical anarchists 
accept the traditional understanding of political obligation as a special 
relationship with our own governments, they deny its existence. This 
entails the rejection of a general moral attitude towards the state and 
adoption of a critical stand from which the propriety of obedience to 
the law is assessed on a case by case basis.53 Raz, who also denies 
the existence of general political obligation, proposes another possible 
attitude, namely ‘respect for law’, which can apply in the absence of 
such an obligation, and supports a possible special relationship between 
institutions and those who adopt that attitude.54 But even the anarchist 
denial of a special political relationship and an insistence on a critical 
stand does not for philosophical anarchists, such as Simmons, result in 
widespread disobedience and Simmons claims that our political lives 
will not change radically at the practical level.55 Horton makes a 
crucial point with regard to the last claim. He argues that change of 
our ordinary thinking of ‘political relations’, i.e. that which construes 
such relations in terms of political obligations, will have ‘radical' 
effects on the way we usually talk about our relation to our 
governments as ours and, through this, on our ‘political relationships’ 
and lives.56 Thus, he conceives the challenge of philosophical 
anarchism as a dangerously radical one: it is ‘the subversion of
511984, p.18.
52For example, in 1979, p.200; 1987, p.279; 1993, p.263; 1996, p.29.
53For example, Simmons 1993, p.269; 1996, p .31.
54Raz 1979a, pp.94-99, 104-105; 1979b, chapter 13.
55Simmons 1987, pp.275-279; 1993, pp.261-269; 1996, pp.31-32.
561992, pp.135-136.
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political relationships through undermining the shared understandings 
which are constitutive of such relationships’.57 That is why Horton 
wants to undermine philosophical anarchism. I disagree with Horton’s 
attempt and, following Simmons, also reject the claim that a shift in 
our conception of our political relationships will entail widespread 
disobedience and chaos. Yet, I agree with Horton that such a shift can 
affect radically our political relationships and lives. In my opinion, 
philosophical anarchism both requires drastic revision of our thinking 
of political relations and entails radical change in our political lives. 
However, I see this as a positive effect of the anarchist perspective.
I proceed, then, as follows: in the next chapter I present the overall aim, 
structure and content of my argument in this thesis. More precisely, the role 
of the first chapter is to present the problem and the main arguments which 
will be developed in the following chapters. Then in chapters Two to Four, I 
provide an examination of the arguments for political obligation as scrutinised 
from the perspective of critical philosophical anarchism. This task must be 
completed in order to understand the anarchist criticism. In chapter Two I will 
examine the anarchist criticisms of voluntarist theories of political obligation. In 
Chapter Three the object of criticism will be a justice-based theory. Chapter 
Four will examine the anarchist dialogue with a reciprocity-based theory, to 
wit: the principle of fairness as formulated by Hart and by Rawls. The main 
strategy is to extract from anarchist arguments valid claims which will form 
the basis of my analysis of the anarchist contribution. The focus of this 
strategy will be the perspective and ideal as well as the arguments about self- 
government and political constraints which characterise critical philosophical 
anarchism. I will then move in Chapter Five to a direct defence of the 
distinctive contribution of critical philosophical anarchism as exhumed from the 
debate on political obligation. I will analyse the character and claims of the 
special perspective involved in the anarchist position and I will examine the 
role of this perspective and of the ideal of legitimacy in improving accounts 
of justification of constraints more generally. In the final chapter, I will
57Ibid. p.135.
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conclude with an overview of the anarchist contribution as defended in this 
thesis along with some remarks on the tasks of both philosophical and political 
anarchism in the light of this contribution.
27
Chapter One. What the Problem Is.
In this chapter I set out the central problem and argument developed in 
the thesis. For this I focus on three theorists, each of whom relates in a 
significant way to the critical, philosophical anarchist position. I discuss 
Rousseau as a traditional theorist whose view is a basic inspiration for the 
anarchist approach to political institutions. Joseph Raz’s theory is analysed as 
a view largely compatible with critical philosophical anarchism. I use it to 
illustrate how accounts of the state motivated by the anarchist perspective can 
be understood and improved. Finally, I discuss Simmons as a representative 
critical philosophical anarchist, from whose approach, however, I depart and 
which I criticise on central points in my defence of critical philosophical 
anarchism.
l.l.The paradox of authority.
We live in a world dominated by political institutions. We find our lives 
ruled and controlled by them. We mostly take this situation for granted. How 
did we get to such a state of affairs? And is it how it should be? In many 
other areas of our lives we feel that things should be under our own control. 
We feel that it is important to be able to decide and make choices for 
ourselves. We feel it important that we become free to act within a 
background of various options and be free to track the best options for 
ourselves in life. We don’t want other people to tell us what to do and take 
control over what concerns us. So why in the case of the state do we take 
rule for granted? Even within the state, the desire for self-government survives 
in the form of a dissatisfaction, when there comes a point that political 
interference feels unbearable. Why, then, do we so readily accept political 
power? Should we do so?
We can attempt to answer the philosophical question of justification of 
authority by answering first the question of its genesis: why did centralised 
power arise? And how? And why does it continue to exist now? A good 
explanation about how this happened is the hybrid approach defended by
28
Michael Taylor.1 This view focuses on the development of gross inequality 
and the weakening of community and says that these are both the 
concomitants and the consequences of state formation. More specifically, state 
formation is based, firstly, on the enhancement of the leadership of 
acephalous2 primitive societies. Leadership was enhanced by the provision of 
services to the members of the community through the arbitration of a system 
of redistribution; and by the existence of threatening conditions, such as 
ecological pressures and external enemies, which led to the need for 
concentration of power for the arbitration of redistribution of goods to be 
possible. The second reason for the formation of states is the inhibition of 
fissioning, that is, the prevention of a continual separation of large groups 
into small, self-sustained ones. This happened due to the threatening 
circumstances mentioned above, which, by their nature, tend to promote 
coherence of a group. Such a coherence led, in turn, to the weakening of 
community, since fissioning helped people to live in the decentralised and 
self-sufficient way which community requires. In other words, state formation 
is explained as follows: when there is surplus of goods, redistribution creates 
efficiency and the leader’s capacity to discharge it makes his authority 
acceptable. Also, geographical circumscription and the threat of enemies make 
people leave small communities and concentrate under the protection of a 
beneficial, and thus already accepted, leadership within an enriched, growing 
community. This, in turn, leads to the concentration of force and to political 
specialisation. This latter is the hallmark of the state and involves inequality 
of power, or, political inequality. Also, the specialisation and exchange of 
goods which effective production and redistribution under a centralised 
leadership involve, lead to economic inequality, which functions in favour of 
the rulers and is thus maintained by them. So inequality is both the 
concomitant and the consequence of state formation and it is ‘the integrative 
role of the emerging central power’ that led to this formation.3
'For the analysis o f the origins o f  the state which follows, see Taylor 1982, section 3.3.
2‘Acephalous’, or ‘acephalos’ in Greek, means ‘without a head’ (<a- (without) + ‘cephali’ 
(head). Here it means without a formal leader.
3Taylor 1982, p.133.
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This explanation of how the state arose is, however, more important 
because of what it says about why the state was created. This opens the way 
to addressing our central concern with why it seems justifiable. The answer 
lies in the integrative role of the emerging central power because this means 
that the leadership was beneficial to the people, good in providing them with 
services, and thus voluntarily accepted by them.4 This is a good reason for 
wanting the state: it is justified as long as it is at the service of those who 
are ruled; as long as, that is, the state serves as an instrument to the means 
of the individuals who make up the societies governed by it. Being created 
for their own good, it can be seen, for this reason, as their choice, which 
means that political power is compatible with the capacity of, and desire for, 
self-government. Even better, it is a good way for individuals to preserve and 
enhance this capacity. Traditional, state-of-nature-based defences of political 
authority make exactly this argument and their case for the existence of the 
state seems strong. But, paradoxically, this means that we decided to be ruled 
because we don’t want to be ruled.
The appearance of this paradox, is the starting point in this thesis for 
examining the anarchist position and its approach to the problem of authority. 
The paradox reflects the idea that the best way to justify rule to individuals 
who can be, and have the right to be, self-ruled and thus find constraints 
undesirable, is to show that the rule is their own decision. That government 
is the result of self-government in the sense that we put constraints on 
ourselves. To decide to be constrained seems the most promising and 
comprehensive account of political constraints. What is required is to 
demonstrate how this can happen: the preceding explanation of the origins of 
the state outlines the answer, but we need to make sure that this is indeed 
what happens. This view shows that the paradox is not in fact a paradox.
Yet its seeming paradoxical character helps reveal a mistake in the 
defences of political institutions. The problem lies in that showing the state to 
be good for us does not amount to showing that it is voluntarily accepted. 
The former can be a reason for the latter, and a good one, but it is not the
4Ibid. pp.133-134.
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latter. Unless it is our own actual appreciation of the beneficial character of 
the state that leads us to accept the state, the state cannot be seen to be the 
result of self-government, namely the result of the participation and control of 
those who want to survive and live together freely. One could say that 
“ being in our benefit”  makes it a reason fo r  us to want the state. And a 
reason for us is our own reason and thus our choice. But, again, we need to 
prove that the state is beneficial on the basis of reasons that are actually for 
us and thus can be, or is, our choice. The mistake of the state defenders lies 
in that by demonstrating the merits of the state they also thought that they 
demonstrated its legitimate authority. But a benefit which is proved merely to 
be likely to be a benefit for some is not such a benefit unless it is based on 
their choice. Also something that has been a benefit for some in the past, is 
not a benefit for those concerned at present. For the latter to be the case, it 
needs to be actually a benefit at present and to be seen as such by those it 
concerns.
The defenders of the state (those who adopted the theories which will 
be examined in the following chapters: for example, social contract theories of 
political obligation)5 committed themselves to a correct starting point when 
they attempted to defend the state on the basis of self-government. But this 
involves a continual assertion of choice. Instead, they provided reasons for 
seeing institutions as desirable and thus deserving acceptance, which could 
motivate choice but which themselves are not choice. And they thought that 
such reasons can be given once and for all, which neglects the continual need 
for the expression of choice. By giving an argument for the benefits of 
political institutions, defenders could motivate their existence. Yet they could 
not motivate their authority. And they could not motivate their existence once 
and for all. But they thought that their argument does exactly this. The result 
is that, in addition to showing that the state is necessary to provide order and
5When I refer to ‘defenders o f  the state’ I mean all those theorists who defended accounts o f  
political obligation that reflect the approach I criticise in this thesis from the perspective o f  
anarchism. Such theorists range from traditional political philosophers, such as Hobbes, to 
contemporary theorists, such as George Klosko. But their approach might be adopted by any 
theorist or individual. So, the argument presented here and developed in the rest o f  the thesis 
concerns the accounts which I discuss in the following chapters and addresses whoever might 
adopt them as views on justified authority, rather than a specific and complete list o f  
theorists.
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safety, they started facing the state as a good in itself and/or an entity over 
and above individuals, with independent existence. This might be described as 
a romanticised view of the state, and such a view may be what lies at the 
bottom of our unreflective acceptance of it as an inevitable reality and what 
makes us forget its defects and our initial dislike of constraints. It has not yet 
been proved that constraints are beneficial for us as constraints we choose 
ourselves to impose on ourselves and on one another. Showing constraints to 
be self-imposed is the only way to show that the state exists for the sake of 
those it constrains and not at their expense.
The philosophical anarchist presses this point within the debate on
political authority. In order to explain this position better, I want to illustrate 
the above argument about the seeming paradox. There is an effective 
argument for the state which is based on the point that autonomy is
extremely important and that for the state to be justified it needs to be shown
to protect it. But, the argument goes, for this the state need not be
autonomously chosen.6 People make mistakes in their choices and the right 
kind of choice cannot be derived from the universal consent of actual 
individuals. Rather there are concerns that are primary for us, good reasons 
that apply to us, whether or not we are able to see them. When the agents 
of the state are sensible enough to find and serve these reasons, then we are 
better off if we let them do so. We should make sure that a state serves 
good reasons that apply to us, whether or not we can actually choose them. 
In this way we have our capacity to be autonomous protected and enhanced, 
through a good government built on such reasons. So a good government is 
justified because it protects autonomy but it is not the case that we choose it 
autonomously.
This is a good starting point for approaching our relationship to the 
state. It asserts the value of autonomy without facing the difficulties arising 
when we try to defend it through individual consent.7 And it clarifies why the 
protection of important benefits is essential for our self-government even if 
we don’t actually choose them.
6See Raz 1979a; 1985; 1990. This argument constitutes Raz’s theory o f  the state, which is 
explored in the works just cited and is analysed below in this chapter (in section 1.3.).
7For these difficulties, see chapter two.
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This argument the anarchist will eventually concede as a basis for 
defending the state. Yet, in order for the defender to make proper use of this 
perspective, he needs first to see the point of an insistence on choice which 
the anarchist represents. The anarchist claims that for the state to be 
legitimate, it needs to be shown to have been chosen. He finds a point in a 
perspective which argues that a good government is good because we choose 
it; it is our choice that makes it that it protects us. This idea implies that we 
are self-governed through the state: rather than being that the state is justified 
because it allows us to be self-governed and enhances this capacity, the 
argument is that the state can be justified only if it is a way through which 
we govern ourselves. The difference between these two approaches is that 
while the former sees autonomy to be respected because it is protected and 
served through a good government, whether or not we choose that 
government, the latter claims that autonomy is respected only if we choose 
the state so that it becomes positively a way through which we govern 
ourselves; the state is good because we choose it.
This difference is important, because each view has a different criterion 
of justification. For the one view, the respect of autonomy which government 
is expected to show consists in finding and serving what is right; freedom is 
realised through the realisation of good reasons. For the other view, autonomy 
is shown to be respected by government only if government becomes itself a 
way through which we exercise autonomy, and maybe the best. This 
distinction is crucial also because it points out a confusion that needs to be 
avoided in evaluations of the state. The romanticised view of the state 
exhibits this confusion: it emerges from an illegitimate move from unjustified 
identification and slide between one criterion and the other. It sees the service 
of good reasons on the part of the state as a way in which the state makes
us autonomous instead of just allowing us to be autonomous. It identifies
rightness, or merit, with individual authorisation. It is this assumption that 
leads defenders to see the state as an independent good in itself, as inherently 
connected with and as expressing the value of persons and of the interaction 
among them.
As a new alternative, the critical philosophical anarchist accepts the
approach which focuses on good reasons with regard to some justifications of
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the state and yet insists on the value of choice for the purpose of political 
relations. Anarchism returns to choice in a way different than that of the 
second approach and with a criterion which becomes less problematic: it 
reminds us that it is important that through the state we remain free, rather 
than becoming free. What is the importance of such an insistence on choice?
At the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that in many areas 
of our lives we care mostly about being self-governed and about preserving 
this capacity and right for ourselves, because it is the only secure way 
through which we can survive and flourish. We do not want our lives to 
depend on others. The defenders of the state follow this natural way of 
thinking when they begin to show that the state is at our service. The idea 
then is generated that the state can be justified because it is created for the 
sake of, and on the basis of, our very capacity to be self-ruled. Yet now a 
paradox seems also to be generated: we create a condition in which we are 
ruled by others in order to remain self-ruled. That is, we do exactly what we 
care not to do in order to secure what we care about mostly. As explained 
above, the paradox is not really a paradox but its seeming paradoxical nature 
helps reveal the confusion in the defenders’ argument. It is not a paradox 
because in order to be self-ruled in some ways we need both ourselves and 
others to be constrained in some other ways. But, most importantly, it is not 
a paradox because it is a consistent and reasonable idea that in order to be 
self-ruled we need to be self-constrained: it is possible and sensible that self- 
imposed constraints constitute appropriate conditions for individuals to enhance 
their capacity for choice. When, for example, one decides to cut smoking 
because it is better for one’s health, one puts a constraint on oneself not to 
smoke again. This constraint enhances one’s freedom by helping one to apply 
the decision with which one chooses to rule one’s life in this respect. If the 
state is a way of our being self-constrained then it can serve as a way of 
our being self-ruled. The impression of a paradox arises from the fact that it 
is in the nature of the state that some rule others and so the state is offered 
as a way of our becoming self-ruled that involves being ruled by others.
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1.2.Dissolving the paradox. Rousseau as a paradigm of state 
justification.
There is a way through which the seeming paradox is dissolved and it 
lies in Rousseau’s intuition that the state is justified only as a way of our 
being governed by ourselves. As Rousseau states in his Social Contract, ‘[t]he 
problem [of political justification] is to find a form of association which will 
defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of 
each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still 
obey himself alone, and remain as free as before\ 8 For such a civil society 
to be created, individuals must unite under an agreement the conditions of 
which are unanimously accepted and with the intention to hold each other to 
those conditions.9 By becoming a member of a community created by such an 
agreement, each individual identifies with the general will, which is the united 
will of all self-legislated citizens and expresses the choice applied within 
political society. Thus in order to be free the citizen always needs to hold to 
the general will, ‘to will impartially with all the others’.10 So if he or she 
disobeys this will, others have the right, based on their mutual agreement, to 
coerce him to be free}1 ‘Coercion is legitimate on grounds of freedom 
because the agent has chosen to be coerced’.12 The idea defended here is that 
having others to decide for us and serve us with regard to some matters is 
not a denial of freedom or choice if the nature of their decisions and the 
content of their choices represent our own choice. We are the legislators, thus 
the creators of the ways through which we are to be constrained and thus 
self-constrained and thus free. Yet in order for the defenders of political 
institutions to preserve this argument they need to attend to it properly as the 
only way of defending the state in terms of self-government. They need to 
attend to the proof and preservation of this kind of choice.
8Rousseau 1762, book 1, chapter 6 (emphasis mine).
9A s  Ripstein puts it: ‘Rousseau’s claim is that a community consists in a group o f people in 
agreement both about the conditions o f  their interaction and their intention to hold and be 
held by each other to that agreement’ (1992, p.224).
10Ibid. p.231.
nRousseau 1762, chapter 7: ‘...whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to 
do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced  to be free ’ 
(emphasis mine).
12Ripstein 1992, p.231.
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As set out in the previous section, there is a difference between seeing 
something as being justified because it is rightly discovered to causally 
promote our autonomy and seeing it to be justified because it constitutes a 
consequence of our autonomy. The anarchist insists on the need for the latter,
which captures Rousseau’s idea of self-government, to make the argument for
the state a defence based on the idea of being free through being self­
constrained. But the defenders of the state do not stay consistent in their use 
of this argument. By focusing on benefits of the state which make it good 
for us they gradually change the initial argument from choice into an 
argument for the protection of choice through benefits. They are right to see 
the fact that the state provides safety as a strong reason to support it but in 
the end they also see this to make the state a good in itself. Thus their 
defences end up saying that we are ruled by others in order to be self-ruled. 
That their view allows the rendering of a paradoxical form to the defence of 
the state is an indication of the mistake the defenders make in the process. 
The problem is reflected in the failure of accounts of political obligation 
which the anarchist stresses.13
But there is a way of correcting the state defenders’ mistake. By staying 
clear and insisting on the form that Rousseau gave to state-defence we might 
come to realise that at one level it is unachievable for the state. And then we
may legitimately move to the other argument - still in light of the importance
of choice indicated by the argument we cannot achieve in a direct form - 
which gives an alternative view of legitimacy in terms of autonomy yet is 
seen clearly as not to be choice-based, and we can pay attention to its 
specific implications for the state.
If, with Raz, we try to determine what we can tell about how the state 
works and focus on it as protecting our capacity for autonomy through its 
service of good reasons, we need to see what direction such a defence takes. 
It cannot prove political obligation, nor can it justify the state once and for 
all. It can, rather, concede to the continual instability of the state and
13And it is telling o f the fact the anarchist observes and indicates with worry: that, by nature, 
the state involves subjugation in the disagreeable sense o f  some ruling others with the 
intention to subject them, which creates inappropriate relations among individuals. See the 
discussion o f Raz in section 1.3. below.
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concentrate, as the most important, on the attempt to justify the reasons for 
which they are subjected to individuals themselves, not through actual choice 
but through reasonable testing and evaluation in the light of the lack of such 
a choice (which is facilitated, for example, by the enforcement of law through 
transparent and accountable mechanisms; and which, at some level, is an 
expression of continuing choice). This is a demanding approach yet one which 
is consistent as a recognition of the value of choice, not departing from the 
initial argument in a destructive way. The two arguments come together 
through a fair compromise: we assert the value of choice while realising that 
we cannot base the state directly on choice and, in the light of this 
impossibility, we insist on the importance of finding acceptable ways of 
justifying reasons to the individuals subjected such that make the defence of 
the state in terms of goodness a recognition of self-government. The idea of 
basing government on ethical concerns that we all share begins to arise as the 
prominent task of justification for the defenders to pursue.
1.3.Raz’s theory as an illustration.
Raz’s position helps illustrate the preceding discussion. I will use it as a 
representative example to show how the views on the state offered by those 
motivated by the anarchist position can be better understood and improved.
Starting from the central anarchist intuition that there is a puzzlement 
with the idea that ‘one person has the right to rule another’, i.e., that the right 
to rule is deeply disturbing as a notion,14 Joseph Raz sees this puzzlement to 
be rooted in the fact that authority involves a ‘dimension of subjugation’ 
which is distinctive of it, namely it involves duties which are ‘deliberately 
imposed by one human being on another with the aim of subjecting that other 
to a duty’.15 Thus, he sees the anarchist complaint to be ultimately about ‘the 
problem of subjugation’, namely of subjection o f one person to another,16 
where unequal dependence is the main aim and is facilitated by giving 
dependence a specific form. Essentially this ‘is a problem of the relations
14Raz 1990, pp.3-4.
15Ibid. pp.16-17.
16Ibid.
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between one person and another’, which, as will be illustrated throughout this 
thesis, concerns the anarchist most and remains vivid with regard to political 
authority.17
Given this problem, one should at least concede to the idea that ‘no 
unlimited authority can be legitimate’ and thus that ‘[w]e need a doctrine of 
limited government, i.e. of the principled limitations on the possible scope of 
governmental authority’.18 As we will see later in this chapter, this requirement 
is not a demand simply and primarily to limit the scope of authority as much 
as possible. Rather, it is a demand to find reasons and principles which 
determine the nature and functions of authority in a manner such that they 
make it justifiable to all reasonable, grown-up individuals subjected to it. The 
suggestion I shall develop, to apply an ideal of legitimacy to further 
justifications of constraints in view of the results of the debate on political 
obligation, sets such a background as a primary condition. And the defences 
provided by various contemporary political theorists, such as Rawls and 
Dworkin, may be seen to work within these boundaries, in fact to work 
adequately only within them. Within this framework, Raz’s reply to the 
anarchist challenge is that ‘[t]he basis of legitimacy is relative success in 
getting people to conform to right reason’.19
To explain: Raz’s defence of ‘practical authority’, that is, ‘authority with 
power to require action’,20 involves three main normative theses.21 These work 
within the background of his general approach to the analysis of authority, 
which involves the idea that authority necessarily involves obligations to obey.22 
Also it involves the claim that the indispensable feature of authority is 
‘surrender of judgment’, which is not taken to mean that obedience erases 
personal deliberation but rather that it is not conditional on personal
17Ibid. I explain this concern throughout the thesis.
I8Ibid. p. 12.
19Ibid. p. 13.
20Raz 1985, p.115.
21For the following account, see Raz 1985.
22Because a justified use o f  force would not be authority unless it included an appeal to
compliance, which is meaningful only if there are things to comply to; in short, legitimate
authority is usually exercised by giving directives, issuing instructions, it is much more than 
use o f  coercive threats, it imposes duties and confers rights and thus involves an obligation 
to obey (ibid. pp.115-118; see this in contrast with Ladenson’s view o f  authority as merely
permission to use coercion, all discussed in the introduction, section 1).
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examination of the thing prescribed: when individuals follow authoritative
prescriptions they do it on the understanding that, whatever their opinion is
about the thing prescribed after they have acknowledged the authority, they are 
expected to follow its directions as given.23 Finally it involves an account of 
the nature of authoritative instructions, as ‘dependent’ and ‘preemptive’ reasons 
for action, namely reasons meant to reflect the balance of reasons on which 
they depend instead of being added to them and reasons meant to replace the 
original reasons on which they depend, yet not absolute.24
Accordingly, Raz’s first thesis is the dependence thesis, which concerns 
‘the general character of the considerations which should guide the actions of 
authorities’25 and is the position that authorities should act on dependent
reasons in order to meet an ideal exercise of authority.26 The second thesis is 
the normal justification thesis, which ‘concerns the type of argument required 
to justify a claim that a certain authority is legitimate’27 and is the position 
that for authority to be justified it should be shown to be the best way for 
individuals to conform to reasons that apply to them, reasons that they are 
themselves committed to.28 This thesis says that 'the normal and primary way 
to establish that a person should be acknowledged to have authority over
another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to 
comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative
23Ibid. pp.l 18-122. For this idea, see also Friedman 1973: the first distinctive feature o f  
authority is ‘surrender o f private judgment’, which means that with regard both to conduct 
and to belief an individual who accepts authority recognises that someone else’s prescription 
is to be followed simply because it comes from one ‘acknowledged by him as entitled to 
rule’, that that person is entitled to decide for him or her on certain specified areas without 
any need for persuasion through further argument whenever a relevant issue arises (pp.63-68). 
The second distinctive feature o f authority, which is relevant to the present discussion, is the 
‘mark’ o f authority, namely the need to provide the sign or credential o f  authority through 
‘some public way o f  identifying the person whose utterances are to be taken as authoritative’, 
which regards ‘the recognition and acceptance o f  certain criteria  for designating who is to 
posses this kind o f  influence’ (ibid., pp.68-71, emphasis mine). It is also important that we 
concentrate on the source o f  authority, the source o f the special sort o f  reason for action that
authority is meant to denote, rather than its content (ibid. pp.60-61), and that we find this on
the person  and their status (pp.65-67).
24Raz 1985, p.121.
25Ibid. p.115.
26Ibid. pp.122-129. Namely, that i[d\ll authoritative requirements should be based, in the 
main, on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects o f  the directives and are 
relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive’' (ibid. p.125). Yet, 
while they reflect reasons that apply to the subjects o f  authority, authoritative reasons still
‘make a difference to what [the] subjects ought to do’ (p.126).
27Ibid. p.115.
28Ibid. pp. 129-133.
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directives) i f  he accepts the directives o f  the alleged authority as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow 
the reasons which apply to him directly',29 This is the crux of Raz’s defence 
of authority. Together the dependence and the normal justification theses 
‘articulate the service conception of the function of authorities, that is, the 
view that their role and primary normal function is to serve the governed'?0
And this leads to the third normative thesis that Raz adopts. That is, to the
preemption thesis, which ‘concerns the way the existence of a binding 
authoritative directive affects the reasoning of the subjects of the authority’31 
and is the position that such requirements pre-empt the reasons they are to 
serve, when they guide action they replace their underlying justifying reasons.32 
The resulting idea is that because authoritative reasons should, in order for 
authorities to be justified, be dependent on already existing underlying reasons, 
authorities ‘should have the right to replace people’s judgments on the merits 
of the case’.33
Here let me note that the contractualist approach to authority, which will 
concern us extensively in this thesis, adopts the service conception of Raz and 
the ideas reflected in the two theses which compose it: according to it, 
authority can be justified on the basis of reasons which represent, apply to and 
are the best for the individuals subjected. Yet this approach departs from Raz’s
third thesis. In contractualism the central idea is that in the case of practical
justifications such as those concerning political authority the relevant reasons 
have to be explicitly justifiable to those they concern, thus in the social world 
it is important that individuals actually see the reasons that apply to them. 
Practical reason differs from theoretical reason and in the case of the former 
individual judgement can never really be replaced. This is because in 
theoretical reason the point is to find the truth as it applies irrespectively of 
individual opinion (as is the case with axioms in mathematics), but in practical
29Ibid. p. 129.
30Ibid. p. 131, emphases mine.
31Ibid. p.115.
32Ibid. pp. 133-137. The thesis claims that l [t]he fact that an authority requires performance o f  
an action is a reason fo r  its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant 
reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place o f  some o f  them'’ 
(ibid. p. 124).
33Ibid. p.135.
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reason the truth is determined on the basis of individual evaluation and 
interaction itself. As we will see in the main part of the thesis, this position 
leads the contractualist to a distinctive method of justification which gives a 
special role to choice, and is of great importance for the debate on political 
authority.
In contrast, within the context of his own theory as described above, Raz 
sees ‘theoretical’ authorities, referring to ‘authority for believing in certain 
propositions’, to more likely have the same structure with practical authorities
and to be supported in the same way by his dependence thesis.34 And it is
crucial to note that he relates his account strongly with the idea of theoretical 
authority when he focuses on authority in terms both of ‘its expertise (or that 
of policy-making advisers)’ and, more importantly, of its ‘ability to secure
social coordination’.35 This assimilation seems to sit well with his normal 
justification thesis and the service conception as well as with further general 
ideas which motivate his view and which I will discuss in my criticism below. 
But it also brings to the fore the concept of ‘an authority’ with its special 
characteristics.36 More precisely, this notion of authority maintains that 
deference to someone as authority is based on their special knowledge and the
presupposition that others are debarred from such knowledge. The idea of
authority here is one putting ‘the person prior to the system’ (the latter 
concerning established procedures for creating authority, which are prior 
according to the idea of ‘m authority’37) and focusing on special capacities and 
the quality of one’s decisions as what sets one apart from others, irrespectively 
of whether they accept that person or not, and as what makes one an
intermediary between the world and the rest of us who adds something to it 
for us to take - it centres on differential access.3* Also, this notion of
authority presupposes a kind of inequality, namely that there are personal 
differences (unequal capacities) and a hierarchy prior to the authority
34See, for example, ibid. p. 129.
351990, p.6.
36For the following analysis o f this idea, see Friedman 1973, pp.74-85, emphasis mine.
37Ibid. pp.77-80, emphasis mine.
38Ibid. pp.75 and 80-81.
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relationship on which that relationship is based.39 Given the involvement of 
these features in the idea of theoretical authority, its use within Raz’s account 
must be approached carefully. I will explain how in the following paragraphs.
Finally, Raz sees his account to make the surrender of judgment, 
characteristic of authority relations, compatible with keeping one’s moral 
responsibility.40 And he situates his position in relation to the liberal theorising 
on authority. He explains that the liberals focus on the Rawlsian ‘duty to 
support and uphold just institutions’ as a proper way of justifying limited 
government, while his own account is offered as an attempt to answer the 
prior question of an ‘understanding of which institutions are just’ - or, to be 
‘setting the question in a certain way. One has a duty to uphold and support 
authorities if they meet the conditions of the service conception’.41
Given the preceding analysis, we can examine now how central aspects 
of Raz’s view bear on our argument.
Raz’s normal justification thesis respects the anarchist idea that 
authorities, if they are to exist, can exist justifiably only if they are shown to 
be for  the people and not vice versa. This is already claimed by the service 
conception. And the position reflected in the combination of all his theses, that 
it is only on the basis of the independent reasons which determine the moral 
responsibility of people that relations of authority can be accepted, meets the 
anarchist perspective on justification. In the debate on political obligation 
anarchism establishes a demand for justification which has been neglected and 
this demand activates an ideal of legitimacy as a constant test on any account 
of constraints. This throws new light on Raz’s account. His account is offered 
to be explaining which institutions are just. Such an approach can be seen as 
functioning within the background of justification established by the anarchist:
39Ibid. pp.82-85. A second condition, which however does not concern us primarily here, is 
that the knowledge available to the person o f  authority should be ‘in principle available - at 
least to some humans’, i.e., that there exists an “ epistemological” framework’, a ‘class o f  
things capable to be known’, this involving the second-order ‘belief that the mind o f man can 
have contact with the reality on which [the relevant] authority speaks’ (ibid. p.83).
40Raz, 1985, p.139.
41Ibid. p.138. Raz’s account also becomes a basis for the attitude o f ‘respect for law’ (it is 
actually what grounds its application, meaning and validity), which he sees as an acceptable 
expression o f  the morally desirable sense o f identification with our societies and thus one 
which binds to the authorities o f their societies those who adopt it (see 1979a, pp.94-99; 
1979b, chapter 13).
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Raz’s theses set the terms of the moral acceptability of constraints. And his 
claim that the dependence thesis articulates a condition for the legitimate 
exercise of authority can be read in the language of the anarchist ideal of 
legitimacy: only institutions which serve moral values that are generally 
acceptable are justifiable. This correlation will be understood when we will see 
how the anarchist ideal of legitimacy arises.
Also, it is important that Raz recognises that ‘a complete justification of 
authority has to do more than provide valid reasons for its acceptance’, as is 
the case with the normal justification thesis.42 Such an account ‘also has to 
establish that there are no reasons against its acceptance which defeat the 
reasons for the authority’, namely that the justifiable ways in which it 
functions are not accompanied by aspects which defeat their acceptability, an 
important kind of reasons against its acceptance being that concerning ‘the 
intrinsic desirability of people conducting their lives by their own lights’.43 This 
recognition meets the fundamental anarchist idea that our approach to political 
institutions needs to start from a prior consideration of the undesirability of 
constraints, of the need to consider both the defects of political institutions and 
their merits rather than focusing only on the latter, which, as will be argued, 
helps reformulate the debate. And the focus on people’s initiative, which is a 
strong motivating reason for such an outlook, expresses the very anarchist 
concern with the primacy of freedom and the importance of creating a
background of appropriate relations between them which enables people to 
control meaningfully their lives. In the light of these considerations, Raz’s
justification thesis qualifies to be one that functions properly within the
background of justifications of limited authority as determined by the anarchist 
ideal. The whole account of Raz then is thoroughly characterised by the
anarchist perspective and the way that perspective determines our approach to 
political institutions. And each of the specific elements of this account acquires 
a clear meaning and position within the framework established by the anarchist 
as one settling the tasks of political theory and action.
421985, p.132.
43Ibid. pp.132-133.
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However, in order for this account to work properly, there are certain 
aspects that should be approached with caution. The considerations shown in 
the previous paragraphs to be recognised by Raz can apply to his view 
provided it satisfies certain conditions. Although the idea that the justification 
of political authority lies in its being an efficient vehicle of the reasons of 
individuals as moral agents is intuitive, its real force within political reality 
lies in making sure that authority is actually and continually proved to be such 
a vehicle. We need methods of applying the ideals of legitimacy such that 
make sure that people understand their reasons, that they see how those 
reasons apply to them, and understand authorities to serve them properly and 
also feel capable of overthrowing them the moment they cease to do so. The 
view that authority may do well in helping us satisfy reasons that apply to us 
is valuable when used in the critical spirit that the anarchist encourages with 
regard to political obligation, and which extends to every evaluation of 
constraints, rather than in a spirit of confidence which leaves authority 
unquestioned in these respects. In the end, the relation of the anarchist position 
to accounts of limited authority is a natural consequence of the central 
anarchist thought that it is extremely difficult to legitimise political institutions.
Against such a background, the idea of ‘an authority’ is not helpful. The 
critical outlook which we need to adopt and apply with regard to political 
institutions contrasts with this conception. The concern with proper relations 
between individuals and with a sincere exercise of moral responsibility and 
control over their affairs, which makes active participation indispensable, 
opposes a view of expertise based on exclusion and differentiation. It is the 
importance of rejecting the idea cultivated throughout history that there are 
areas of exclusion and groups of agents who can entirely and constantly decide 
for the rest, with its resulting differentiation among people and the 
subordination of some to others, that motivates the anarchist challenge in the 
first place. The notion of ‘an authority’ encourages that idea and raises 
expertise to the level of an exceptional capacity and a higher goal. Its 
connotations to differential access obscure the crucial understanding of social 
life as a practice which concerns us all equally and for which we are all 
qualified. When we accept that the anarchist challenge expresses a legitimate
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and valuable concern, we cannot attempt to meet it by applying such elements, 
which it itself falsifies.
Raz’s view constitutes a representative way of how to account for claims 
of authority within the framework of justification defended by the anarchist, 
but his understanding of theoretical authority must not contain the connotations 
indicated above. To avoid this it is important not to identify practical authority 
with theoretical authority. In practical reason it is not enough to find and 
follow the right answer. Rather it is crucial that we participate in formulating 
and applying such answers to ourselves. Individuals must be able to see the 
reasons that are served by authorities as justifiable to them. This is the 
impulse involved in the contractualist rejection of Raz’s pre-emption thesis and 
in the anarchist insistence on the role of choice. Ultimately, it is the idea that 
political institutions can be an authority because they are based on an authority 
which we all are that Raz’s theory facilitates and should be interpreted to 
account for. And it is the task of ensuring in every case and at every level 
that authorities qualify as ways of discharging our social responsibilities and 
goals that the anarchist forces on us, which is what makes justification a hard 
process.44 Thus the idea of expertise, if used at all, must be seen as a difficult 
exercise rather than a prior ideal - something for political institutions to be 
actually and continually proved to qualify as and to become, by approximating 
to the ideals of legitimacy in the way the task of justification demands. It 
itself becomes an issue of constant evaluation which concerns all of us.
1.4.The argument for Critical Philosophical Anarchism.
In the rest of chapter one I outline the main argument developed in this 
thesis in defence of critical philosophical anarchism. This argument takes two 
directions. On the one hand, it examines how critical philosophical anarchism
44We should remember that in fact the anarchist critical impulse rejects the ‘surrender o f  
private judgment’, and sets to confine it to the largest possible extent when it is inevitable 
that we live with authorities, o f which this aspect is a central characteristic. It is the 
importance o f  making this feature as compatible as it is possible with the basic inalienable 
capacity which freedom is and with the kind o f social relations which it requires that 
characterises the demand o f justification established by the anarchist. This makes a central 
concern o f this demand that the surrender o f judgment, whenever it occurs, genuinely reflects 
an aspect o f  our authority.
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helps improve our perspective on the state by presenting an alternative to 
dominant positions on it (section 1.4.1). On the other hand, it focuses on a 
way of understanding critical philosophical anarchism which departs from, and 
improves on, the perspective of its theoretical defenders (section 1.4.2).
1.4.1.An alternative to prominent positions on the state.
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the positive character and 
contribution of critical philosophical anarchism, an anarchist view which argues 
that there is no adequate defence of political obligation and concludes that in 
this sense the state is illegitimate. This position helps us see that the reasons 
on the basis of which we set initially to justify the state are correct. And they 
are exactly those motivating the anarchist in the first place. But the method 
sought by the defenders of political institutions for satisfying these reasons is 
wrong. The anarchist reminds us and focuses on what it leaves behind. In fact 
it involves a perspective which we can all share. Anarchism is the only 
perspective which holds consistently the view that we want to be self-governed 
and that the only way to be so within the state is to prove it to be a self- 
imposed constraint. An analysis of the dialogue between the philosophical 
anarchist and the defender within the debate on political obligation is critical 
for this purpose and will be the central part of this thesis. Its result will be 
that we have no political obligations and this, I will argue, can be treated by 
the anarchist as showing that we don’t have a comprehensive argument for 
such a special relationship to the state and as a good reason explaining why 
we can’t have such an argument. This, in turn, will open the way for seeing a 
higher challenge to the enterprise of justification as a whole: maybe we chose 
the wrong argument altogether. Does this lead to the conclusion that there is 
no way to ground the legitimacy of the state? In terms of political obligation, 
the probable answer is no. The state offers no additional ethical concern over 
and above the ones that we can share with one another. Self-government 
cannot be expressed by consent within the state.
Yet there is a way of looking at the state which may be helpful. We can 
bracket the question of political obligation - take into account its results but 
leave aside any effort to change them - and concentrate on something else:
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ethical reasons that we share are expressive of self-government and it is those 
we should try to prove the state to be based on. It can be legitimate in terms 
of not violating such ethical concerns and of being compatible with them. We 
can see the state as an association which we create for goods that we see 
ordinary associations not to provide for. We are social beings. Yet our 
societies are the result of our collection and interaction. The state is not
something mysterious, an entity over and above us which raises special 
demands. Once we say, as the traditional defenders did, that the state frees us, 
we enter a romanticising thought about it. Instead we need to remember that 
the state is not a good in itself and it does not have an independent existence 
and value of its own. We need to see that dominant defences of the state 
have gone too far in attempting to identity beneficial order as a source of 
choice. Constraints are always constraints and being good for us does not
change that. The real challenge is to see whether the political world in which 
we found ourselves to live and which we might not want to abandon, is one
that deserves to continue to exist, on the basis of reasons that apply to us.
This sense of legitimacy is our aim.
Political anarchism says the state is an evil. And, naturally from this, it 
rejects any effort of justification of coercive institutions: of their existence and 
legitimacy and our obligation to them. Critical philosophical anarchism does 
not reject the state in such an absolute way (note that strong philosophical
anarchism such as the view of Robert Paul Wolff is more directly connected 
to the strong demands of political anarchists, but this is not the view I
examine). What it does is to reject the legitimacy of existing political 
institutions by proving that there is no adequate moral defence of political
obligation and in view of an idea of what a legitimate state would be like
that it has. Also, it stresses the distinction between different kinds of 
evaluation of political institutions. In the face of these characteristics, critical 
philosophical anarchism has been criticised as a purely negative view, one that 
is sceptical of any positive effort of justification without providing its own 
alternative solutions to social problems. I disagree with this criticism. Most of 
the argument of this thesis is an attempt to show dissatisfaction with the 
defenders of the state, whose method does not address the fundamental 
question about the very existence of political institutions.
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There are two prominent, opposing positions on the state that are mainly 
defended. And they seem to be the main options available. On the one hand, 
the defenders of the state focus on the fact that it can provide the necessary 
peace and order. From this they move further to assert the state as an end in 
itself, as having an independent ethical status of its own and, for some, as 
being over and above individuals. We are urged to believe that we should 
have it as a matter of moral necessity. On the other hand, the second position 
starts from the idea that we are rational adults who do not need the state to 
tell them what to do. Its advocates are motivated by an opposition to extended 
state interference, even for reasons of welfare. And they aim at rolling the 
state back, creating an as much as possible minimal state, which uses just the 
army and the police to protect individual property. The first is the
romanticising approach to the state, or, an idealism about it, which obscures 
the fact that the state is created by individuals and is a collection of people 
who come together in a particular way for their own good. The second is the 
libertarian position, which focuses on undermining the state and limiting its 
role to practices that can elicit individual consent. It nevertheless sees 
autonomy only as the independent interest of self-contained individuals and 
understands human relations only in terms of negative rights and duties, 
neglecting thus the sociability and interdependence of human beings and
tending to endorse great inequalities. But, are these the only defensible options 
we have? Should we either consider the state as an imperative moral ideal or 
try to reduce it as much as possible or even reject it completely?
The argument of this thesis is that there is a third option which has been 
neglected by these two perspectives. And that this is the position offered by 
the critical philosophical anarchist. This anarchism agrees with the libertarian 
that we are self-ruled and we don’t need the state to decide for us. From this, 
it points out the mistake of romanticising the state. The anarchist criticism of 
political obligation re-enforces the claim that the state should be seen as an 
instrument to our means as morally developed (adult) agents, that it exists to 
serve us and has no ethical value over and above us. But seeing this, the 
solution is not to create a minimal state or to reject the state completely.
Philosophical anarchism offers a perspective from which we can be entirely 
diffident of the state while at the same time accepting a full welfare state.
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This means that the existence of the state does not replace our critical 
assessment of it but, at the same time, when it exists it is better that it covers 
more areas of social need rather than less, otherwise its functions are 
characterised by self-generated and unjustified coercion. In this light, the 
anarchist ideal of legitimacy stresses that our focus should be on quality, rather 
than quantity; on the legitimacy of the character which state authority takes 
when exercised. This is the most reasonable position for us to adopt while 
living in the state. As a result of this position, the anarchist is with the friend 
of the state in that we should help and offer our positive participation while 
living in it.
1.4.2.Improving the wav critical philosophical anarchists see their position.
Simmons’ theory as an illustration.
According to the preceding argument, prominent positions on the state are 
unsatisfactory. But, the view that philosophical anarchists themselves have 
about their position is also unsatisfactory. This part of my argument is
necessary for a demonstration of any positive contribution on the part of 
critical philosophical anarchism. Although a discussion of Simmons is not the 
aim of this thesis, I will examine his position as representative of the literature 
on philosophical anarchism which I find unsatisfactory. Simmons misses
nothing of the main characteristics of critical philosophical anarchism defined 
above (page 47). And these are the features on which I base my account. My
aim is to detect and defend something about them which has been neglected.
1.4.2.i.Simmons’ theory.
Critical philosophical anarchism is involved in a ‘subversive campaign’.45 
That campaign aims to demonstrate, through the criticism of the state, that the 
non-existence of a general political obligation affects in general our thinking 
and acting in the public domain. By leading to the conclusion that there is no 
general political obligation, the anarchist criticism ‘removes any presumption in
45Miller 1984, p.18. See last pages o f the introduction. For representative bibliography, 
applying to the rest o f  this paragraph, see: W olff 1970, pp.11 and 18-19; Smith 1973, 
pp.969-973; Simmons 1979, chapter VIII; 1987, pp.275-279, and 1993, pp. 263-269; Green 
1988, pp.254-255.
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favor of obedience’ and with this it ‘force[s] us to view the position of man 
in political society in a different way’.46 It forces us to cease to think and act 
on the assumption that there is a morally binding special political relationship 
and to approach cases of obedience and disobedience on the basis of 
independent moral grounds. It invites us to distinguish moral reasons for action 
from grounds related to a distinctively political status and from the political 
formalisation of them and to accommodate ourselves to a careful weighing of 
the various moral considerations that are at issue in social situations. We need 
then to cultivate within the political structure the way we think about political 
institutions. We are to begin to consider instances of illegality under a 
different light. In everyday life, we learn to appeal to particular laws as long 
as they overlap with morality and to recognise that many of them are arbitrary 
(for example, policies interfering with harmless private conduct, as is the 
criminalisation of drugs). In this way, we may gradually get used to depending 
less on authority in most of the practices and interactions of our social life.
The critical outlook which the anarchist project forces upon us involves a 
more difficult way of discharging our social responsibilities. It suggests ‘that 
we be more thoughtful about and more sensitive to the particular moral issues 
in our lives’.47 We are reminded that we owe both to ourselves and to others 
qua persons to take a responsibility for our social lives that goes beyond blind 
obedience and that the latter is unacceptable even in the case we had political 
obligation. That ‘citizenship does not free a man from the burdens of moral 
reasoning’.48 And because in practice we are used to acting as if the directives 
of political authorities are beyond question, despite the fact that our times 
recognise that all relationships of authority need justification, ‘[i]t is this 
widespread habit of compliance that the philosophical anarchist is trying to 
subvert’.49
Correspondingly, the anarchist perspective and its accompanying ideals of 
legitimacy insist on the evaluative role of a set of generally acceptable moral 
standards and thus function as a principled reflection of the seriousness and
46Simmons 1979, p.200.
47Simmons 1993, p.269.
48Simmons 1979, p.200.
49Miller 1984, p.18.
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the implications of an attempt to justify political authority. In this, the
anarchist position becomes a suitable standpoint for the political theorist and 
for the larger population to adopt in order to conceive and apply adequately 
political ideals in an attempt to construct proper forms of social organisation. 
It thus constitutes a strong basis for a deeper understanding and improved 
conception of our social relationships and lives. On the whole, as philosophical 
anarchists themselves claim, the anarchist scepticism challenges social order 
‘from within’, it forces us to reassess the moral status and significance of
social order and ‘makes a difference to the nature of social relations’.50
Yet, critical philosophical anarchists claim also that a widespread adoption 
of such an attitude does not challenge the existence of political institutions and 
does not necessarily lead to a significant change of our existing social reality 
at the practical level. These positions relate to a list of arguments which these 
anarchists employ against the accusation that their position leads to an extreme 
and invariable radicalism and entails disorder.51 As Simmons claims, the view
that there is no political obligation does ‘not entail that disorder or revolution
is justified’.52 And he advances his claim on the basis of mainly three lines of 
argument: first, that to be a correct position, critical philosophical anarchism 
should also be ‘weak’ and adopt a ‘balance-of-reasons’ approach concerning 
the weight of ‘judgments of state illegitimacy’.53 Second, that there are various 
classes of moral reasons that individuals may have for complying with the law 
even in the absence of political obligations.54 Third, that political obligation is 
only one aspect of justification of political institutions and the kind of 
evaluation properly involved in it does not replace the kinds of evaluation 
involved in other justifications of them.55 These arguments interact with each 
other.
According to the first argument, philosophical anarchism should be seen 
as giving to its conclusion against state legitimacy a ‘minimum content’,
50Green 1988, pp.254-255.
51For such accusations, see, Senor 1987; Klosko 1994, pp.269-270.
521979, p.200.
53Simmons 1996, pp.23-27.
54Simmons 1979, chapter VIII; 1987, pp.275-279; 1993, pp.261-269; 1996, pp.28-32.
55Simmons 1979, chapter VIII; 1996, pp.26-27; 1999.
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namely that ‘the subjects of illegitimate states have no political obligations’.56 
This conclusion does not extend to a claim that either these subjects or people 
generally have an obligation to oppose and eliminate the state, although 
defenders of weak anarchism may hold such a view on independent grounds.57 
Thus the anarchist conclusion of the debate on political obligation ‘does not 
translate into any immediate requirement of opposition to illegitimate states’.58 
In addition, the judgement that there is no political obligation is not held to 
provide final reasons for action, which outweigh all other moral considerations, 
but rather to present the relevant rights and obligations within a ‘balance-of- 
reasons’ approach, to be examined in view of other good reasons.59 On balance 
there may be good moral reasons for not opposing the state even if it is 
illegitimate.
Accordingly, as Simmons’ second argument goes, there are three classes 
of such reasons. There are moral duties to others qua persons, such as duties 
not to harm others which cover acts which are malum in se and ‘wrongs of 
coordination’.60 In the cases where political institutions prohibit these kinds of 
wrongs their laws overlap with morality and thus citizens are morally required 
to obey them. Also, if persons have a natural right to enforce these duties on 
others, then governments themselves (as ‘sets of persons’) must have the same 
natural right even if the absence of political obligation deprives them from a 
civil one.61 Furthermore, we have a ‘natural duty of justice’ to support 
institutions that exhibit certain qualities such as being benevolent or promoting 
happiness.62 Such merits relate to ‘dimensions of ‘justice” which might 
counterbalance a government’s ‘coercion without right’ and thus constitute
56Simmons 1996, p.22.
57Ibid.
58Ibid. p.23. This feature is also usually seen to be what differentiates philosophical anarchism 
from political anarchism.
59Ibid. pp.23-25.
60Simmons 1987, p.276. The latter are not wrong in themselves but they become morally 
forbidden within contexts which make them harmful (e.g., when we endanger others by 
driving on the left in a society where the common practice is to drive on the right: ibid.; 
1993, p.262).
61 Simmons 1987, p.276. In this case coercion arises as part o f  a non-political context and it 
is not seen to be an exclusive function o f government as such. On the whole, the arguments 
o f  this paragraph can be understood better within the context o f Lockean political philosophy 
and its account o f  natural rights and duties, to which Simmons adheres (ibid.; Simmons 1993, 
esp. section 8.4.). The present argument in particular derives from Locke’s doctrine o f the 
natural right to punish (Locke 1690, Second Treatise, section 13).
62Simmons 1987, p.277.
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grounds which provide government action with justification even where it
functions without right.63 Finally, there are weighty moral reasons for acting 
that do not have the status of duties but yet play a role in determining our 
judgments about action, for example when we are to inconvenience others or 
disturb their plans with our disobedience just because we are entitled to
disobey.64 Thus, Simmons concludes, the lack of political obligation does not 
entail that the state’s right to command and be obeyed disappears for every 
particular case, nor that illegitimate states always act without justification in 
particular cases, nor further that we have a conclusive right to disrupt their 
functioning and oppose their laws.65 All the reasons just discussed limit
instances of disobedience and encourage support even though the proof of no
general political obligation shows that governmental action for preventing 
harmless private conduct, laws enforcing conduct that serves the protection of 
the state and those imposing payments which finance government operations 
concern areas where the state is not entitled to require our support.66
These considerations bring us to the third argument provided by 
Simmons.67 Simmons claims that political obligation concerns only one area of 
justification of political institutions, namely their right to rule and its 
correlative obligations. And that this needs to be assessed in terms of a 
particular relationship created on the basis of significant elements of specific 
interaction between governments and each of their citizens. My thesis attempts 
to bring to light the importance of such transactional evaluations for the 
problem of political obligation and the anarchist position in it. For one thing, 
they help avoid the derivation of political obligation from evaluations of 
political institutions which might cover for different claims about justification. 
For Simmons, the distinction between different areas of justification itself is of 
great importance. As he argues, the state may be defended for having a right 
to exist, which refers to a kind of justification other than state legitimacy (qua 
obligation) and which can be used to support the state independently of and 
despite the conclusions concerning its legitimacy. In this context, considerations
63Ibid. pp.277-278.
^Ibid. p.278.
65Simmons 1996, pp.24-25.
66Simmons 1993, pp.264-268.
67For the following presentation o f this argument, see Simmons 1999.
53
about the general virtues of institutions play a primary role and constitute the 
ones referred to as generic evaluations. I will argue that such evaluations can 
be seen to play a role within the problem of political obligation but not to be 
primary and sufficient to generate this special political relationship. Also I will 
show how, given the implications of the problem of political obligation for 
further justifications of institutions which the anarchist criticism stresses, these 
evaluations can be reintroduced in the political debate and be useful.
At this point, considerations about general qualities and accomplishments 
of institutions can be seen as the elements which justify the general moral 
duties for complying with political institutions discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs. And they become in the hands of the anarchist theorist reasons for 
showing that the anarchist perspective does not dictate widespread disobedience 
and retains its critical value within a context that carefully separates various 
moral assessments and allows evaluation to take multiple directions and create 
various avenues of support. Importantly so, critical philosophical anarchists can 
use these reasons to distinguish good from bad governments, against the 
accusation that their view implies that all illegitimate states are morally equal 
and should be treated in the same ways.68 Another ‘dimension[..] o f evaluation’ 
which is distinguished in this context is that states may sometimes ‘act with 
justification ', namely have particular actions or policies of them justified on 
moral grounds, even when they are neither justified to exist nor legitimated to 
rule.69 The separation of at least three dimensions of evaluation of political 
institutions corresponds to the different classes of moral reasons for complying 
with them and functions according to the rationale of ‘weak’ anarchism and a 
‘balance-of-reasons’ approach. It is the combination of these aspects, which 
allows for great flexibility in the political debate, that certain critical 
philosophical anarchists think characterises the anarchist perspective and which 
they offer in defence of their claim that their view does not have dramatically 
counterintuitive implications.
68See Simmons 1979, pp.196-199; 1993, pp.260-269; 1996, pp.26-27.
69Simmons 1999, p.770, emphasis mine. For example, a thoroughly inegalitarian government is 
justified in prohibiting murder even though it is neither virtuous to merit support nor does it 
have a right to direct and coerce us.
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However, I think that we need to examine the resulting anarchist position 
more carefully. Simmons is right to claim that the anarchist conclusion about 
political obligation provides reasons for action which can be overridden in light 
of other serious moral considerations. And I concede that the lack of political 
obligation does not directly challenge the existence of institutions, given the 
independent function of generic evaluations of them and the indispensable 
moral force of such evaluations. Also, I find the idea that philosophical 
anarchism does not entail widespread disobedience and chaos a legitimate 
conclusion of these arguments and one compatible with my support of the 
positive contribution of critical philosophical anarchism in this thesis. The title 
of Simmons’s book On the Edge o f Anarchy has the positive meaning that this 
is exactly where we should be, that anarchism is not something we have to 
escape, that the edge of anarchy is not the verge of chaos. And it is on this 
idea that his work concludes. Yet, I find this conclusion compatible with a 
radicalism that is central in the contribution of philosophical anarchism and 
which Simmons’ line of argument seems to neglect. The distinctive role of the 
anarchist is not to distinguish good from bad governments, nor merely to put 
limits to political institutions. Its edge lies somewhere else and this is what I 
argue below.
To support my view, I begin with an estimation of specific claims made 
by Simmons in relation to the preceding account. Then I will follow this 
estimation with an account of my more comprehensive departure from his 
position.
1.4.2.ii.Specific arguments against Simmons.
Simmons concludes his book On the Edge o f Anarchy with an account of 
the wrongs done to us by illegitimate yet benevolent states, given the non­
existence of any special political obligation, and derives his Lockean, anarchist 
conclusions about the position individuals should take with regard to this 
phenomenon.70 At one point he confirms that ‘...most of us in the “ free 
world”  are in Lockean terms just persons in the state of nature (simpliciter), 
subjected by our governments to a variety of (usually) relatively minor, but
701993, pp.264-269.
55
frighteningly regular, wrongful acts and policies',11 and this explains why 
‘[g]ood governments might merit our support, but they are not entitled to 
require it (without our free consent)’.72 Later he suggests that certain ‘moral 
facts [that oblige us independently of any special legal requirement to obey, 
facts as those discussed above], plus considerations of simple prudence (i.e., 
our interest in avoiding legal punishment), seem to dictate that moderately 
good governments, which violate our rights only in ways such governments 
typically do, ought not to be resisted in ways that threaten to destroy them or 
to replace them with distinctly inferior alternatives'12 And he concludes that 
‘[i]n the world of illegitimate states that will continue, moral persons must cast 
off their childhood lessons in good citizenship, and proceed by selectively 
supporting or opposing their governments’ actions and policies solely according 
to the particular moral standing o f each governmental move'.14 These points 
represent the critical philosophical anarchist position, which comes out of the 
debate on political obligation with the message that we should adopt a more 
critical attitude towards existing governments, an attitude, however, which does 
not involve rejecting them altogether but focuses rather on the quality of their 
particular functions.
Yet Simmons is missing something. First, his account of our moral 
obligations is determined by his advocacy of Locke’s philosophy, which is not 
a view that someone, including an anarchist, has to be committed to. But even 
if his idea of moral responsibilities is an acceptable one, the problem with his 
approach still remains. With his first claim cited above he dismisses as minor, 
wrongs done to us by governments which are, nevertheless, frighteningly 
regular. And he supplements this claim with his further suggestion that good 
governments which violate our rights in ways that such governments typically 
do, should not be dangerously resisted. But these statements constitute a very 
incomplete representation of the anarchist criticism which proceeded them and 
its results. And this is obvious in the very form that they take: how can a 
politically informed and active person, or just a reasonable one, not to mention
71Ibid. p.266 (emphasis mine).
72Ibid. p.265 (emphasis mine).
73Ibid. p.268 (emphasis mine).
74Ibid. p.269 (emphasis mine).
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an anarchist, consider as minor violations acts and policies that are at the 
expense of the individuals concerned in a frighteningly regular manner? What 
is the habit of compliance if not such an untroubled acceptance of continual 
violations? And how can a critical approach to political institutions concede to 
their violations being seen as those typically committed by such institutions? 
Isn’t this an unquestioning concession to the existing status quo rather than a 
challenge to it, as misguided as the romanticising view of the state? Simmons’ 
relevant appeal to prudence and to the dangers of possible destruction of good 
illegitimate governments and their replacement by inferior alternatives is a 
moderate concession concealed by an air of political realism rather than a 
reasonable pragmatic realisation. Furthermore, these claims contradict with the 
concluding demand for a critical and selective approach to governments, based 
on the quality of their particular policies. Such an attitude involves much more 
reflection and scrutinisation, as well as abstraction from existing determinations, 
than the rush from the very beginning to make concessions to them involves.
On the whole, by dismissing the importance of certain facts about 
governments which the anarchist view brings to the fore, Simmons commits 
philosophical anarchism to a view much less radical than really entailed by the 
anarchist perspective. To be sure, to believe that for specific instances minor 
violations of rights are better than major ones and also that it is not bad to 
accept minor violations of rights is reasonable. But when these views are used 
as indications of an approach to the very problem with authority, they render a 
view which is incomplete and misguiding. The problem lies in that from such 
a perspective they seem to suggest that it is fine if our relations to the state 
are descending a bit and that the whole issue is to establish a minimal state.
Simmons’ statements lead him to this approach.
1.4.2.iii.A more general departure from Simmons’ approach.
My following arguments about the significance of the question of
obligation and of the anarchist ideal of legitimacy as well as for a departure 
of the anarchist view from supports of the minimal state are meant to 
demonstrate where my approach differs fundamentally from Simmons’ and 
where I find his approach to be more generally inadequate.
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The significance of the question of political obligation.
When the anarchist says that we cannot ground the state on voluntariness, 
justice and reciprocity, he reveals a gap in the justifications of the state. This 
is his message derived from the debate on political obligation: we don’t 
participate in creating and managing the state and there are no ethical concerns 
which arise distinctively from it as such. This makes the state illegitimate in 
terms of political obligation, although it is not a positive proof of its 
illegitimacy in general: we have no special ethical relationship to the state, 
although for it to be illegitimate, or wholly unjustified, we need to show that 
it does something wrong. Thus, Simmons thinks that this conclusion is 
perfectly compatible with keeping the state. That it encourages a critical 
outlook towards it and an independent approach to our obligations to others, 
but these nevertheless continue to be expressed within a framework widely 
determined by the state: the state can have the right to impose specific duties, 
it should be supported when it serves ethical duties and it can very well 
continue to exist in a justified manner (when it is a good rather than a bad 
government). This view stresses the importance of differences between 
evaluations of political institutions (between evaluations in terms of their 
existence, in terms of their legitimacy qua obligation and in terms of specific 
obligations that these institutions might be justified to impose even when they 
are neither justified nor obligatory) and the fact that political obligation is only 
one such evaluation. It is this latter that I challenge in my approach to critical 
philosophical anarchism. This thesis accepts that the difference between kinds 
of evaluation of the state matters and so, in this light, the state can exist even 
when there is no political obligation. Yet, although the separation between 
different kinds of evaluation is central in the anarchist perspective, its value 
does not lie in permitting different kinds of justification to proceed 
independently of one another. It rather lies in helping us see the force of the 
considerations provided for and against political institutions in each case by 
drawing attention to the elements which characterise primarily the 
considerations applying to each issue we want to examine.75 This does not
75For example, it reminds us to look for morally significant features o f specific interaction as 
the elements relevant for generating the particular relationship characteristic o f  the problem o f
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mean that the different avenues of justification of political institutions do not 
affect each other considerably.
The result of the anarchist criticism is not that political obligation is just 
one evaluation among others with no distinctive effect on the justification of 
the state. I argue instead that by showing the state to provide no distinctive 
ethical concerns, to be based on no special relationship of political obligation, 
the anarchist uncovers a very serious gap in it: lacking political obligation is a 
defect in the very nature of the state. How can political institutions relate to 
their subjects if they lack political obligation? And how can they function and 
be distinguished from their alternatives if they lack such a relationship? That 
is, how can they be seen as coercive and exclusive if they have no right to 
command and be obeyed? These questions lead to more general doubts about 
political institutions. They make us examine their very nature and discover 
defects in it that have been neglected. The coercion which makes political 
institutions efficient is also a problem, and this needs to be addressed. It is at 
this point that the romanticised view of state-order starts to look out of place. 
In this way, the challenge to political obligation is not just a restricted and 
harmless criticism of the state but a viewpoint from which the state is seen as 
a defect (even if not as totally evil) and something difficult to justify.
Political obligation cannot be derived simply from arguments for the 
existence of political institutions and the latter might survive the debate on 
political obligation. Yet, it will be also explained that the character of 
institutions is a relevant and important condition for finally validating the right 
to rule76 and that the considerations and results of the debate on political 
obligation affect crucially further defences of political constraints. The particular 
and actual relationships required for political obligation to exist are not 
indispensable elements for deciding the moral value of institutions more 
generally, but the absence of such an obligation constitutes a serious gap in
political obligation instead o f  trying to derive argumentative force from general qualities o f  
institutions, which play a secondary role in creating such a relationship.
76It is not likely that morally unacceptable (e.g. extremely bad) governments would allow their 
right to rule to be valid even if  the required specific transactions could apply to them. As 
will be shown throughout this thesis, quality is still relevant in the debate on political 
obligation.
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their status.77 And, more importantly, the difficulty with proving political 
obligation which the anarchist criticism reveals, redirects the debate to the 
deeper concerns that need to determine our approach to political institutions. I 
argue that the anarchist position to the problem of political obligation exhumes 
a more fundamental question which underlies every approach to political 
institutions. That the perspective which every theorist needs to adopt is one 
characterised by the question of whether political institutions should exist at 
all. The anarchist indication that political obligation cannot be established by 
appeal to general merits of institutions and that the basis required for it makes 
it a matter of continual justification, leads to a wider consideration about 
whether appeal to general virtues is enough to motivate constraints and 
whether it motivates them once and for all. It is stressed in the argument of 
this thesis that for such evaluations to be effective they need to apply within 
the background set by the fundamental question that the anarchist brings to the 
fore and that such a question makes the demand for justification constant. This 
clarifies the complexity of avenues towards a defence of political institutions, it 
indicates what the proper way of using their merits to support them is and 
how difficult this may be. In the light of the debate on political obligation and 
its results as effected by the anarchist criticism, then, every attempt to 
justification is reformulated and the task of justification becomes harder.
This way, we can claim that indirectly the justification of political 
obligation has a significant effect on other dimensions of justification of 
political institutions and thus on their overall justification. Ultimately, the 
outlook of every theorist and every person is determined by the demand that
rather than considering the merits of political institutions on the basis of an
assumption that we need them and desire them we start to ask whether we 
should need them at all and appeal to their merits in the light of this 
question. This is the anarchist perspective, and the way it is activated within 
the debate on political obligation makes that problem, if not decisive for the
content of other kinds of defence, still totally decisive for their structure and
77The different view to our position in society which the anarchist subversive campaign 
creates with its removal o f  the presumption in favour o f  political obligation constitutes a 
serious change for social life in the presence o f  political institutions. But further, the absence 
o f this central relationship which characterises their status as political raises doubts about the 
very plausibility o f their validity, function and viability.
60
force - decisive in the way it leads to a proper reformulation of the
considerations applying to them and a correspondingly different estimation of 
their input. The critical approach and a careful weighing of the independent 
moral grounds that bear on action in different political circumstances which the 
philosophical anarchist recommends should be seen in this light.
On the whole, we can see a parallel between the position which the
anarchist establishes within the debate on political obligation and the one 
advanced more generally with regard to political institutions. The removal of a 
presumption in favour of obedience involved in the subversive campaign of 
philosophical anarchism corresponds to a removal, through the fundamental 
question that the anarchist perspective raises, of a presumption in favour of the 
existence of political institutions. The fundamental concern becomes the very 
possibility of political obligation, or, the very possibility of political institutions. 
And the different outlook to our position in political society forced upon us as 
the practical stance maintained by the subversive campaign of philosophical 
anarchism within the debate on political obligation corresponds to a different 
outlook with regard to the status and stability of political institutions, again 
through the fundamental question that the anarchist criticism exhumes and the 
demand for justification that this raises. Their existence is not taken for
granted and their desirability becomes a matter of constant justification.
So, although the anarchist position does not render the results of one 
specific avenue of justification to overthrow all the other avenues, it
nevertheless reintroduces an approach which constitutes a unified challenge to 
all of them at the deepest level. Even if not obvious to its advocates, the 
perspective of critical philosophical anarchism carries with it and remains 
faithful to the traditional position of anarchism that there is “ nothing lovable” 
about external constraints and that the state remains a problem. It is in this 
respect that philosophical anarchism remains thoroughly radical. The claims that 
it challenges social order from within78 and that it helps us press for the 
respect of self-government within social life79 should be seen in this new light.
78Green 1988, pp.254-255.
79In the criticism o f Raz above I stressed the importance o f voluntary choice in securing 
freedom within political society. In the hands o f anarchism the force o f  consent is expressed 
in a negative form: we couldn’t possibly agree on having a state; if  we were given the
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Correspondingly, by making the demand for justification harder,80 the anarchist 
position makes the various expressions of the critical approach it recommends,81 
even if not vehicles of an immediate and radical change, surely more 
obviously representative of a serious challenge to actual societies and more 
effective as indications of active citizenship. More precisely, the demand to 
show in every instance that the arising political constraints respect the values 
they are held to help secure creates a central role in the political debate for 
the task assigned to individuals of thinking carefully about the relevant moral 
reasons for support or rejection. In this sense critical philosophical anarchism 
has a much stronger link with the political anarchist criticism of the state as 
an evil than first thought. Horton is right to claim that the challenge to 
political obligation can change much in our political lives, since a central part 
of our view of the political world is shown to be a myth. In the end we 
have moral reasons to be more independent in our reasoning about social 
behaviour and also to develop non-political forms of solution to social 
problems, or, at least, to understand their intuitiveness (to see that they are 
motivated). Yet this view does not adopt the political anarchist demand for the 
removal of the state. Not as the initial and primary anarchist goal anyway. But 
then, what does it help change?
The anarchist does not provide an effective yet spread criticism 
concerning different variables, which makes no strong overall impact. Rather, 
the anarchist criticism reflects a unified demand on justification which affects 
our perspective on political institutions. And it is not the case, as some 
philosophical anarchists claim, that the anarchist position within the debate on
possibility to agree on it we would not (for more on anarchism and consent, see chapter 
two). But I agree with Raz that it is wrong to believe that political societies can become 
voluntary associations. Simmons is wrong to believe this (see 1993, p.268). It is because they 
cannot become such associations that the anarchist opposes them and sees them as destructive 
to proper relations. In light o f this problem we need to find another way o f  asserting self- 
government and legitimacy within political societies. The anarchist perspective and ideal o f  
legitimacy work in this direction.
80See chapter five, especially my explanation o f  the way the anarchist perspective makes the 
demand for justification continual and o f the role o f the anarchist ideal o f  legitimacy in 
further justifications o f constraints.
81For example, ‘Even if  we find that we can seldom justify or forbear the consequences o f  
disobedience or substantial opposition, we can at least lobby for the elimination o f those laws 
that interfere with harmless choices, impose needless regimentation o f  behavior and lifestyle, 
limit personal liberty without securing important social benefits. ... [We can ask] questions 
about the moral merits or defects o f the individual laws, actions, or policies o f our 
governments’ (Simmons 1993, p.269).
62
political obligation and the attitude it recommends will not change much in
practical terms. On the contrary, this position and attitude reflect a significant 
implication of the anarchist outlook with regard to real institutions and our 
lives in relation to them: a gradual but stable effort to make substantial actual 
changes. By rendering a principled support of the nature of state authority
problematic, the anarchist position keeps the debate on political obligation 
vivid, on the basis of what makes it worthy; it presses for the exercise of our 
critical powers; it allows the construction of improved accounts of the authority 
of the state and of more satisfactory political arrangements and it imposes 
more demanding criteria on wider evaluations of constraints; also it renders a 
picture of the political which founds an innovating conception of our political 
relationships and which inspires more informed views about the role of public 
institutions. These aspects suggest substantial changes to our conception of the 
political and to our political lives, which might neither be based on an instant 
reconstruction through revolution nor be a desperate expression of our
dissatisfaction with authority and the present character of public life.
Anarchism becomes a reminder that our times should actually recognise 
and apply what they are more qualified and appear to recognise, to wit, that 
all relations of authority are in need of justification and that the proper 
approach to political authority is one which sees its scope to be limited on the 
basis of considerations of quality. This is the way in which the anarchist
critique helps remove the habit of compliance. But, more importantly, the 
anarchist position remains consistent. Its fundamental concern is still not to 
establish limits on political coercion. It rather remains the claim that coercion 
is always problematic. All this involves a proposal which is as radical as it is 
valuable: it testifies that anarchism suggests and remains the continual source 
of a move towards a fundamental reconstruction o f our social relationships 
and lives. The possibility of such a reconstruction is still to be proved and its 
realisation is necessarily gradual. Yet, it remains a desirable end and an 
alternative worthy to take its place in our moral and political history.
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Departing from the minimal state.
But, how does the anarchist perspective and its accompanying ideal of 
legitimacy differ from already existing views for and against political 
institutions?
The anarchist message is that we don’t have a comprehensive argument 
for political obligation. Also, that there are good reasons why we cannot have 
such an argument. This is a way of understanding the gap in justification 
instead of trying to fill it: it prepares a perspective for, rather than a ground 
for, obligation. Beginning from the gap created from the absence of political 
obligation, critical philosophical anarchism suggests that we leave aside the 
attempt to answer the question of obligation. That political obligation concerns 
an everlasting effort of justification which is not susceptible to a final 
resolution. And the anarchist scepticism is not about providing such a
justification for the state. Rather it is bracketing the question of obligation and 
concentrates on something else, which is nevertheless motivated by the
difficulty of this question. Instead of attacking the existence of the state and 
trying to roll it back, the critical philosophical anarchist claims that, whether 
we love it or not, when we have it the state is not a matter of magnitude, or, 
quantity, but rather of quality: to be critical towards the state in the way that 
the philosophical anarchist suggests means to see whether it matches ethical 
concerns that we need, whether, that is, as it exists, it is acceptable in view 
of justifiable claims we have towards one another. I call this ‘the quality 
thesis’ on the state.
Such an approach departs both from romanticising accounts of the state 
and from those against the welfare state. With regard to the latter it is
important to see how the anarchist approach differs from defences of the 
minimal state. In contrast with what Simmons’ account suggests, for the 
critical philosophical anarchist there is no way of filling the gap which the 
lack of voluntary participation creates by diminishing the tasks of the state to 
the minimal. A state which does not support education and health-care and
does not provide distribution and general protection, but is just policing 
property, is more unjustifiable than a full state. Such a state is even further 
from a condition of liberty without inequality which all forms of anarchism 
desire: instead of being an establishment which protects individuals without
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undermining their equal right to self-government and participation, it gives 
liberty to the few, whose interests it protects and perpetuates, at the expense 
of the rest, who remain unsatisfied and unequal. It cultivates division and 
conflict by supporting a society where competition and social difference thrive 
and thus in fact it is very far from what is supposed to be the primary 
function of the state and for which it is claimed to deserve justification in the 
first place, namely to serve its citizens.
The perspective on the state which the anarchist adopts is guided by the
anarchist ideal o f  legitimacy. In its different forms this ideal represents what a
society characterised by appropriate relations between persons would be like. 
And because the state is not such a society, namely it is not the ideal, as the 
anarchist criticism of political obligation shows, what it can do instead is to 
prove in every instance that its functions are compatible with the moral criteria 
of the ideal (to approximate it). This does not mean that it proves to have 
political obligation but rather that, in the lack of it, this is the only way of
ensuring active participation; not in the making of the state but in the process
of evaluating its functions and in being able to restrict it to what it can 
justifiably demand from us.
This is what results from the evaluation in terms of political obligation 
and what makes that evaluation more important than Simmons thinks, namely 
not merely one among other evaluations which is moderate and limited but 
rather the basis for a substantive transformation of our view of the state. It 
shows that the state has gone too far and is taking too much from us, that it 
offends self-government and proper relations in the name of a good that it is 
not. But instead of either overthrowing it or trying to fill the (unbridgeable) 
gap of justification that its defenders attempted, we can become those who 
determine in a justifiable way where and how it should stop: when its 
functions are of a character that is justifiable to us and not at our expense, 
when by protecting through coercion it does not overdo the latter at the 
expense of the former. The perspective the philosophical anarchist offers shows 
us a way of being entirely diffident of the state while at the same time 
accepting the welfare state. This view does not depart from my claim that 
critical philosophical anarchism is still linked with political anarchism: at every 
instance there is the possibility of becoming dissatisfied with the state in terms
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of the ideal of legitimacy and this endangers its existence. In light of the 
results of the debate on political obligation which the anarchist brings to the 
fore, the undesirability of illegitimate constraints becomes categorical and the 
ideal becomes a constant guardian against discrepancies of the state, not by 
providing a form of consent but by testing continually the quality of its 
functions. The anarchist thus reminds us that the dissatisfaction and lack of 
patience which we feel towards the state at times of crisis should be the 
characteristic attitude and the starting point of our viewing our social 
responsibilities. This is the way for the state to be an instrument in our 
service, compatible with individual self-government and positive participation.
1.5.Conclusion.
We then have to be committed neither to an inevitable acceptance of the 
state nor to a complete rejection of it. The anarchist approach offers an option 
which has been neglected and which is the most reasonable: we can stay 
within the state and participate in advancing the social aims it is meant to 
serve and yet always keep an eye on the way its coercion might overstep its 
initial task.
But having adopted this view, the philosophical anarchist has further to 
answer the question of how we fulfil our obligations to others without the 
state within a background where the state exists. How do we do without the 
state apparatus in a situation where we don’t have perfect abundance? That is, 
how do we manage independently of the state to co-ordinate and co-operate 
towards an effective and fair satisfaction of our needs in a world where goods 
are not abundantly available? This is a legitimate question to ask the anarchist 
who does not insist on removing the state and yet finds its defects in terms of 
illegitimacy to be a good reason for independence from it. He has to answer 
this question in order to prove that he remains an anarchist and can convince 
others for the merits of his position. I will deal with this issue in the 
conclusion of the thesis.
In the rest of the dissertation, I elaborate on the arguments presented in 
this chapter: I examine in detail how the anarchist raises the problem about
66
political institutions and how the distinctive contribution of critical
philosophical anarchism works. In the following three chapters I examine the 
anarchist position within the debate on political obligation in order to
demonstrate that it is correct. In the final two chapters, and in view of the
implications of the debate on political obligation, I demonstrate the value of
critical philosophical anarchism towards the problem of political authority as it 
arises from that debate.
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Chapter Two. The Limits of Voluntarism.
Social Contract and Consent theories are the most familiar and, perhaps, 
attractive accounts of political obligation. Such accounts centre on a 
voluntarist interpretation of political obligation, which places a premium on 
the free decisions and choices of individuals. For this reason, they are 
discussed here under the title Voluntarism. However, as it will be seen in this 
chapter, these theories differ in the degree to which they deserve this 
characterisation in virtue of the kinds of decisions and choices that they
require of individuals in order to justify political obligation.
Voluntarism, or the belief in the normative significance of the choices, 
decisions or agreement of individuals, is highly valued by both anarchists and 
many defenders of political institutions. Even oppressive rulers care to claim 
that their rule is compatible with the will of their subjects. Contractualists
have placed consent in the centre of their defence of political authority. What 
is appealing about consent? Why does agreement matter?
Consider the following example: a woman tells her partner that some 
time ago she made a big decision about their relationship which involves 
certain new conditions and which she thought would be the best for both of 
them. She didn’t say anything to her partner because she thought that if they 
continued to live as they did and she carried out this decision for both of 
them without him knowing, he could continue his plans and would have the 
matter sorted out for him without being frustrated. Thus, her behaviour has 
been overall good for him. The man gets very upset. His main complaint is 
that however beneficial her attitude might have been for him, he still wanted
to know about something so important that affected him and to be able to
have a say on it; to participate in the solution of the problem, to think, 
decide and agree by himself. The complaint of the man seems justified. What 
is appealing about it? There is a basic form of freedom about which we care 
the most. We care a lot about living our own life. About being able to make 
our own decisions concerning who to be, how to live and what to value and 
achieve. There is a big difference felt between letting others impose 
constraints on us and deciding about the matter ourselves. That we can and
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do decide to put constraints on ourselves changes significantly their status and 
application. Although it is believed that there are ways other than consent 
through which freedom can be realised, the aim of this chapter is to show 
how consent remains a primary route to this end, despite its failure to ground 
political obligation. For this, an understanding of the basic freedom at issue is 
necessary and I will attempt to provide it in this chapter.
This chapter is constructed on the basis of two underlying leading 
considerations.
(a) The questions to be addressed differ in character: questions such as 
‘what are the proper signs of consent?’ or ‘is consent possible?’ are factual in 
character although with significant normative implications. They concern 
primarily the realisation and proper applications of consent. Questions such as 
‘what are the conditions for regarding consent valid?’ or ‘is consent valid 
even when given?’ are directly normative ones. They are asked in an attempt 
to establish the normative relevance and significance of consent in order for it 
to be used as a ground of social relations and practices. It will become 
obvious that different contractualist arguments address different questions or 
sets of questions - some addressing all of them, others only some of them. 
This will affect the role each contractualist view plays in the present 
endeavour.
(b) There are distinct kinds of consent. The main distinction is between 
actual (explicit or tacit) and hypothetical consent. Further, hypothetical consent 
itself takes different forms.1 Some forms of consent more naturally give rise 
to coherent voluntarist theories.
Also, versions of contractualism differ from one another. For example, 
while in Locke’s theory of social contract we find in his explicit consent a 
version of actual consent,2 others are closer to hypothetical consent views. 
Thus, as I will argue later in this chapter, Hobbes’ contractualism is based on 
a hypothetical consent argument. And my arguments with respect to Rawls, in
’All these forms o f consent appear already in the work o f traditional contractualists such as 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant and are almost commonplace among contemporary 
political theorists.
2A1so , in his appeal to ‘tacit consent’, Locke aspires to promote it to actuality, since, as we 
will see in discussion o f this notion o f  consent below, he considers the acts which he calls 
‘signs o f consent’ to be legitimate inferences o f consent, having the status o f  genuine consent.
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Chapter Three, show that his appeal both to concerns of rationality (of a 
Hobbesian character) and to concerns of fairness (of a Rousseauian-Kantian 
character) is reflected in his adoption of a hypothetical contract view. Most 
importantly, it will become obvious that the rationale of actual consent differs 
from the rationale of hypothetical consent.
Thus there are different types of contractualist reasoning: the voluntarist 
accounts to be examined here differ in nature and the distinctions between 
them reflect the different difficulties that these theories face with respect to 
the same general problem. That is, the problem to prove the possibility of 
agreement or of some other morally acceptable way of reflecting voluntary 
engagement, as an expression of an ample characterisation of why and how 
agreement matters. Therefore, my criticisms will not be directed towards the 
theory of any particular philosopher, but rather will be developed in light of 
these variations. These criticisms are the first step towards a defence of the 
critical philosophical anarchist position within the debate on political 
obligation.
2.1. An anarchist criticism of voluntarist theories of political 
obligation.
The historical roots3 of voluntarism and the individualist account of 
persons as free and equal rational beings characteristic to it explain the 
centrality within voluntarism of the notion of ‘obligation’ and its source in 
the voluntary undertakings of individuals. The focus of the present study is 
this centrality itself. That is to say, it is the insistence on the importance of 
developing a voluntarist account of political obligation consistent with the 
active dimension of obligations - in contrast to the passivity of obedience - 
which is to be examined.
As explained in the Introduction, all theories of political obligation 
should provide a moral ground for a special kind of obligation, namely the
3There is an extensive literature concerning the prominence o f  voluntarist theories o f the state 
during the seventeenth century and its connection with the ideological and economic 
consequences o f  the Reformation and the rise o f Capitalism. See, for example, Skinner 1978. 
Also, these are the theories which helped to define the Liberal Democratic form o f society 
(for example, see Pateman 1985, chapter one).
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political. For this, their moral ground should meet the conditions of political 
obligation, that is: ‘generality’, ‘particularity’, ‘bindingness’ and ‘content- 
independence’ as involved in the nature of the ‘political’.4 Voluntarist theories 
attempt to meet these conditions by appeal to the voluntary undertakings of 
individuals. They should thus show that this type of act is both possible and 
of a sort appropriate to their demands. This sort of endeavour has created the 
most fundamental difficulties for these theories: both contract and consent
theories are criticised for their failure to provide, in a sufficiently generalised 
form, an actual and effective analogue in the political sphere of the type of 
commitment they take to be a necessary and sufficient ground of the
obligations in question.
The arguments to follow show that the possibility o f agreement is 
ungrounded: either consent is not given or it is given in a way that perverts
its voluntarist and intentional nature. This constitutes the central problem for
voluntarism. For its core element fails if it is not shown to be extensively 
realisable and this in a way such that it preserves the core intuition of the 
theory - that is, the desirability of meaningful individual authorisation. The 
problem of agreement involves both factual questions, concerning the existence 
of consent, and normative ones, regarding its validity and bindingness - each 
kind affecting voluntarism in a particular way.
2.1.1.Actual Consent.
I begin with theories based on actual consent. These include views 
based on the notion of ‘explicit’ consent and those based on the notion of 
‘tacit’ consent. In what follows each view is discussed in turn.
The existence of actual consent would directly reflect the required act of 
commitment in the political world. It finds its most promising definition in 
terms of explicit consent. Voluntarist theories of political obligation would 
establish their success if they could demonstrate conclusively the possibility of
4See introduction, section 1. Generality requires that political obligation applies to most o f the 
individuals in a society governed by the state. Particularity requires that individuals are 
obligated to the particular government o f their own country o f  residence. Bindingness and 
content-independence mean that the law is authoritative as such and to be obeyed in the way 
it requires to be obeyed. Together these conditions express the distinctive nature o f the 
political.
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a widespread form of explicit consent. I take such a consent to be either 
‘historical’, namely the original consent of the first members of a political 
organisation, or ‘personal’, namely the consent given by each citizen 
individually.5 Explicit consent, so defined, would satisfy the basic conditions 
o f free choice and commitment. These conditions are: that there is intentional 
and voluntary decision and choice over the content (and, hence, implications) 
o f the commitment in question, under circumstances of unimpaired knowledge 
and rationality; that all this is also communicated as an object of public 
assessment.6 The following considerations display the difficulties with 
establishing the possibility of explicit consent, first, in a historical and, 
second, in a personal form.
The obvious problem with any account which may appeal to an 
‘original’ consent is that it has hardly been a historical reality: there is rare 
historical evidence for it and no convincing reason to accept its possibility 
around the world. Still, even if it had existed once, it would later constantly 
require the consent of future generations. Such a requirement generates two 
worries. First, the problem of agreement,7 reflected in the risk of a refusal by 
next generations to undertake the required commitment. Second, the question 
whether the form of self-assumed duty constituted by such a commitment can 
be accepted as the right form of voluntary undertaking. Political consent 
provides only one understanding of ‘self-assumed obligation’ - namely, as an 
‘authorization’ to someone else’s acting on one’s own behalf, as acceptance of 
‘an already existing relationship of obligation’ - and probably not the most 
appropriate one to capture this notion.8 This understanding defines a passive
5This is a distinction used by Simmons 1979, pp. 60-61, 71-74.
6For these conditions, see, Rousseau 1762; Horton 1992, p. 28; Pateman 1985 p. 13; Simmons 
1979, p.77. The central idea is, in Raz’s words, that ‘the core notion o f  voluntary obligations 
is the knowing undertaking o f an obligation’ (Raz 1979a, p.95).
7This problem is realised by traditional contractualists, not only in their recognition o f the 
difficulty o f establishing the original contract, but also in their appeal to future consent as a 
necessary stage following the initial contract, since it would be a proper form o f  
authorisation.
8See Pateman 1985, p.21. It could be contested that this understanding is better described 
under the notion o f ‘consensus’ rather than ‘consent’. For example, Green is in agreement 
with P. H. Partridge when he refers to the latter’s refusal to join other theorists in an 
uncritical consideration o f a ‘permission given deliberately in advance, with or without 
subsequent approval o f the permitted action’, and various other examples o f  ‘political and 
social conforming behaviour’, as original examples o f consent (Green 1988, p.159). However, 
what matters here is that the ‘permission’ o f future generations to which contractualists appeal
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acceptance of a relationship determined and characterised by someone else and 
hence of whatever is authorised by them. And it differs from the conception 
of self-assumed obligation as ‘the free creation of a [new] relationship’.9 This 
latter involves a relationship initiated by individuals themselves and determined 
in content by their own autonomous judgements. It is the conception 
exemplified in the practice of promising and, in fact, it is the model of what 
would make the case for voluntarism in the political sphere. The political 
correlate of this notion is the objective of a consistent voluntarism and it is 
this that voluntarism cannot provide. When the voluntarist character of the 
notion of consent is thus questioned, its implementation by further generations 
becomes even more controversial: apart from the difficulty with acquiring their 
agreement, the character of this agreement itself becomes problematic. On the 
whole, historical consent has more of a rhetorical function. All consent and 
its value is based rather on personal consent.
In the case of personal consent, the impossibility of its general 
realisation, which is in fact determinative of the difficulty of establishing 
historical consent, is more obvious. Almost none of us has ever given such
consent and we rarely find the opportunity today to give it to the
governments of the societies we inhabit. The conditions of living of the 
populations of democratic governments, the size of modem cities and other
external circumstances, make it impossible for their citizens to commit 
themselves individually. Also, ethnic, class and sexual differences and the 
discriminations accompanying them, along with the controversial status of
voting as a proper implementation of personal consent on a large scale,10 are 
substantial obstacles to such a possibility, especially because they affect the 
very validity of personal consent. Finally, the way even the most familiar 
sorts of democratic governments are organised makes it difficult to compare 
them to the forms of voluntary associations, the nature of which would render
is properly represented only by the contested understanding o f  self-assumed obligation; and we 
can submit without contradiction to the idea that this is better captured by the notion o f  
consensus.
9Pateman 1985, p.21.
10The place o f  voting and o f ‘majority consent’ in the theories in question will be considered 
in the discussion o f  tacit consent below.
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practices similar to promising possible.11 Importantly so, such schemes have 
little relevance to the structure and characteristics which make our societies 
political. The large-scaled, centralised, hierarchical, monopolistic and coercive 
character of the latter does not provide a background where close and directly 
informed relationships can flourish and it in fact generates the social 
difficulties just stated.12 This is observed by various theorists, whether they be 
anarchists or not. All these obstacles become more difficult in light of an 
aspiration to understand personal consent to involve the appropriate form of 
self-assumed obligation distinguished in the previous paragraph, namely as free 
creation and determination of a new relationship.
The above considerations represent prominent philosophical anarchist 
criticisms of the voluntarists’ appeal to explicit consent. They can all be 
summarised in the following assertion of Simmons: ‘...expressed consent is not 
a suitably general ground for political obligation. The paucity of express 
consentors is painfully apparent. Most of us have never been faced with a 
situation where express consent to a government’s authority was even 
appropriate, let alone actually performed such an act’.13
2.1.2.Tacit consent.
The aforementioned difficulties with explicit consent contribute to the 
considerable appeal to voluntarists of the notion of tacit consent. Given the 
way it is used by the theories in question, my suggestion is that tacit consent 
is a hypothesised form of commitment meant to acquire, through an 
appropriate interpretation, the actual substance required in order to make it 
relevant to, and effective within, a voluntarist theory of political obligation.
nFor such schemes, see chapter four, section 4.3.2.
12For more on the relationships involved in voluntary associations, see chapter four. An 
additional observation to the ones above is that there are many people - anarchists and others 
- who do not want to consent to the authority o f their governments, and thus would never 
give their personal consent even where possible.
131979, p.79. This assertion reflects a failure to combine generality with particularity within a 
voluntarist account o f  political obligation (see introduction, section 1). The element which 
voluntarism offers is a very suitable instance o f  what would explain a relationship with our 
own government in terms o f its own criteria, thus meeting (where it is actually given) the 
particularity condition o f political obligation. But it fails to remain so to a sufficiently general 
extent, as the generality condition requires.
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The importance of tacit consent lies in that a proper instance of it is 
not significantly different from explicit consent. The former differs from the 
latter in the ‘special mode of its expression’: it is either ‘silent and inactive’, 
or legitimately inferred from certain actions construed as ‘signs of consent’.14 
The problem then becomes one of discovering and establishing the proper 
instances of tacit consent, by proving the possibility and actuality of the 
legitimate modes of its expression, either in terms of silence, or in terms of 
legitimate inference.
In the case of silence, there are certain conditions to be met in addition 
to the ones posed on explicit consent (for the latter, see page 72). These 
further conditions include the demand for a precise definition of the time 
during which one can decide whether to consent or not and of the reactions 
which may be taken as indications of consent (for example, remaining present 
during the time of decision-making). These clarify the terms in which the 
communication desired can be achieved. Also the demand that reasonable 
means be used for the indication of consent and that the consequences of 
dissent be not too severe (for example, that no complicated physical acts are 
required to express consent and that no dismal punishment threatens potential 
objectors). These latter conditions are extremely important for the validity of 
consent, since complicated procedures and alternative choices with undesirable 
effects limit or even cancel the availability of options which makes consent 
free.15
Only passive attitudes meeting these conditions form instances of tacit 
consent. Relying on these conditions, however, provides no more than a basis 
for a case-by-case estimation. Such a procedure qualifies only for settlements 
at an empirical level, depends largely on contingencies and is sometimes very 
complex and impractical. Thus, it complicates the establishment of a valid act 
of authorisation because it does not represent a general normative guide of a 
theory of tacit consent in the political sphere.
In the case of legitimate inference, appeal to which is the most usual 
method of defending tacit consent, the need is for specification of certain acts
14Simmons 1979, p.80.
15For five conditions such as the ones discussed in this paragraph, see ibid. pp.80-83.
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correctly regarded as implying consent. There is disagreement over the extent 
to which we should decide which acts qualify as signs of consent on the 
basis of ‘conventional criteria’, namely of conventional means for members of 
a society to commonly invoke as determinative of whether certain words or 
gestures are signs of consent (for example, whether a nod in a marriage 
ceremony is a way of saying ‘I do’).16 But the main issue here is normative. 
It affects whether the kinds of acts usually invoked do entail consent. And it 
is these very acts that, as the anarchists point out, do not seem to satisfy the 
conditions of validity given above - especially the basic normative conditions 
of knowledge, intentionality and choice. They are interpreted by the theorist in 
defiance of the normative demands and obligate persons in absence of their 
own permission.17
The failure of consent theorists to provide proper instances of tacit 
consent and to establish their validity, in order then to show their general 
application in existing polities, is demonstrated by the following discussion of 
three kinds of acts traditionally construed as signs of consent.
The first is residence. Appealing to residence creates perhaps the clearest 
ground for doubts. This is effectively criticised by Hume, in an argument of 
his from ‘Of the Original Contract’, where he compares remaining in one’s 
own country with the situation of ‘a man ... remaining in a vessel ... [within 
which] he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, 
and perish, the moment he leaves her’.18 This comparison describes residence 
when emigration as the corresponding alternative is both extremely difficult - 
especially under the conditions of the modem nation-states, let alone the 
varying financial and other material circumstances of different citizens - and 
painful. Thus, it shows that residence alone cannot be counted as consent, 
since it does not present itself against a real alternative which would make it 
a free choice.19 This should not be taken to mean that the impossibility of
16See, e.g., Green 1988, pp.166-173.
17For such a criticism, see Pateman 1985, p.16.
18Hume 1748, p.193.
19Green 1988, p.174. For similar points on tacit consent and residence in Locke and on the 
status o f  tacit consent in general, see Lloyd Thomas 1995, pp.38-40. Also see W olff 1996, 
pp.46-48.
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dissent makes it impossible to consent but rather that intentional consent 
through residence cannot be assumed.
In response, it has been objected20 that emigration is not an unacceptable 
choice forced upon us, unless the only attitude available under residence is 
the acceptance of the authority of the state. But survival within a state does 
not necessarily require acknowledgement of its authority. The salient point 
here, however, is that these observations, although they might free residence 
from being a kind of invalidating duress, confirm rather than oppose the 
inappropriateness of it as a sign of consent to authority. Whether bearable or 
not, residence still cannot necessarily be assumed as evidence of such a 
consent. And, in the end, the real force of Hume’s argument can be seen to 
lie in its revealing this point: even if valid intentional consent remains 
possible under residence, we cannot infer that residence is a voluntary 
decision nor can we infer a voluntary decision to acknowledge the state 
simply from it. Still, we may have underestimated Hume’s position if we link 
it too closely to residence. For he is making a more general point which is 
crucial for discussions of political authority. I will return to this view in the 
end of my discussion of tacit consent.
At this point, we can see that consent theory is deprived of an element 
which would guarantee a high level of generality in a properly particularised 
way. Generality and particularity are two of the main conditions that theories 
of political obligation have to satisfy together. Tacit consent in the form of 
residence would, if it was shown to be a valid sort of authorisation, commit 
a large part of the population to their own particular government and thus 
provide a satisfactory moral justification of the obligations suitable to its 
political nature. But residence is far from being a validating acquiescence to 
political authority.
The second kind of action construed as a sign of consent is the 
acceptance of benefits provided by the government of one’s own country. This 
appeal is found in Locke, in his Second Treatise o f  Government. Such 
benefits have usually the status of public goods, namely goods which may be
20Green 1988, p.175.
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reasonably regarded as valuable to (almost) everyone and which are 
nonexcludable and nonrival in nature.21 However, acceptance of such benefits 
constitutes, at best, a ‘consent-implying act’ - namely, an act which commits 
morally to the same performance which would be required on the basis of 
consent but which would not normally be taken as an attempt to consent nor 
its agent to have intended to consent - and not a clear sign of consent.22 It is 
an act better described and justified on the basis of the principle of fairness, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Four. Although, as I will argue in that 
chapter, an adequate interpretation of that principle has to be voluntarist, its 
nature is still different from consent. Acceptance of benefits is deprived of a 
directly consensual character. And it is vulnerable to the objections to the 
principle of fairness as a ground of political obligation.
The third candidate is voting. Plamenatz23 and others appeal to 
democratic elections as a proper indication of consent to the authority of the 
state.24 Yet, reliance on voting involves at least these difficulties. Firstly, the 
background conditions for qualifying elections as free seem to be properly 
met only in direct participatory democracies.25 Direct democracy, however, is 
not found within any current democratic society.26 Secondly, the contemporary 
expression of liberal ideals by representative democracies is defective. Voting 
for representatives is the kind of authorisation which was referred in the
21‘Non-excludable’ means that such goods, once produced, cannot be enjoyed by some 
members o f a society without being enjoyed by all the others. ‘Non-rival’ means that the 
extent and way they are enjoyed by an individual does not affect the utility enjoyed by
others. For a definition o f  public goods similar to the one I give here, see Harriott 1996,
p. 120. For a more extended discussion of, and bibliography on, public goods see chapter four.
22This point has been argued decisively in Simmons 1979, pp.88-95.
23Plamenatz 1968, p. 170. Although, in justice to Plamenatz, we can take his theory on the
whole to be an attempt to account for aspects that should create more or less conditions o f  
political obligation rather than arguing that voting expresses consent. More precisely, his claim 
can be taken to be that a society which allows voting is more legitimate than one which 
does not. Nevertheless, my following points on the relation between voting and consent still 
hold.
24Voting can be taken as explicit rather than tacit consent, given that it is an act o f  
commitment to specified aspects o f a constitution. But here it is discussed as authorisation o f  
specific governments which might be taken as a sign o f  consent to political authority and in 
this respect its function is o f a less overt kind.
25Namely, where there is direct, equal, extensive participation in political decision-making. 
Even in such polities, mixed motivations in voting (i.e., the presence o f  both self-interest and 
concern for the common good as working motivating bases o f  decision-making) complicate 
the issue o f consent. For example, on which o f the two grounds does consent count? And 
how do we understand which motivation operates each time?
26For this observation, see, e.g., Horton 1992, p.37 and W olff 1996a, p.45.
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above discussion of explicit consent as a questionable paradigm of self­
assumed obligation. It is in fact a promise to obey the directives of the 
representatives, an attitude reflecting more conformity to, rather than willing 
and active approval of, those directives. Also, the social differences (class and 
sexual) and circumstances present in modem democracies do not allow for an 
informed and deliberate choice of rulers at a general and equal level. Thirdly, 
and in the face of the second criticism just made, there are (at least) two 
points which suggest failure to meet the generality condition of political 
obligation as understood and applied in the debate. First, many people abstain 
from voting and the choices of many others are defeated in the elections. Can 
these persons be regarded as voluntary supporters of the elected government? 
The former surely not and the latter only if they themselves confirm the 
result as their second-best preference.27 The second and most important point 
is that, even if voting was sufficiently general, it would not necessarily imply 
recognition of the authority of the state. It could express a choice of good 
over bad governments, consistently made even by an anarchist, and other 
instances of decisions concerned with who shall rule but not bearing on 
questions of the justification of authority.28 Given the alternatives available, 
any individual can vote on specific aspects of a constitution without at the 
same time expressing his or her opinion on the general question of its 
foundation. On the other hand, even if through voting citizens legitimated 
government, this would still not authorise every significant act of it and thus 
would not establish a permanent, actual obligation to it. On the whole, voting 
takes place within already existing institutions, namely when the existence of 
the state is taken as a given. It cannot thus be taken as basis of an 
obligation to the state.
Having presented these arguments it should be clear now that appeal to 
tacit consent is not as promising as it appears to be initially. Silence needs 
careful detection and interpretation, and legitimate inference rarely obtains. 
Tacit consent fails to exemplify the kind of act which could be seen as the
27This shows, in addition, that possible appeal to the consent o f the majority as binding for 
all invokes a form o f consent which is redundant to personal consent and thus open to all 
the problems that the latter has been shown to involve; for this, see Horton 1992, pp.39-40.
28For this point, see ibid. p.38. This way particularity as required for political obligation is 
not satisfied.
79
voluntary undertaking of political obligations at a sufficient level of generality. 
This is the fundamental complaint that anarchists raise against voluntarists.
Here is where we can return to the important, additional insight 
provided by Hume in his discussion of social contract.29 Hume explains the 
distance between philosophical appeals to an original contract as the basis of 
political authority and the actual relation between individuals and the 
governments of their societies. He stresses the effects to the acquiescence on 
the part of individuals of force, necessity and habit and his criticism of 
residence examined above is an aspect of this demonstration. But the crux of 
his argument is that the constraints of political authority have a special nature. 
We can escape constraints of a different nature but political constraints are 
inescapable. This distinctiveness of political norms requires a distinctive 
perspective on them and a distinctive way in which we can think about 
whether they are constraining. We cannot derive the best political norms 
through abstraction. The objects of allegiance to existing societies are very 
complicated for an ideal appeal to consent to provide a proper explanation 
and basis of it. We have to provide a justificatory basis of political norms 
which accounts for and at the same time overcomes the actual inclinations of 
individuals and the conditions of social life and their complexities. We have 
to attend to their special nature and find a proper way of assessing them in 
view of that nature. If we insist in the language of consent, in the case of 
residence, for example, it can justifiably be asked: where are the alternatives 
given to each individual? Why do they have to live with the constraints 
imposed on them without ever having given their free consent?
This is to a large extent the essence of the anarchist perspective. 
Anarchists remind us that the political nature of institutions and of the 
obligations attached to them ask for a special kind of justification. The moral 
reasons provided in their support might account for the acceptability of certain 
aspects of them but they need first and foremost to apply as a recognition 
that the coercive and inescapable nature of political institutions puts particular 
constraints on what is going to count as legitimate justification. We might be 
advised to support political institutions, but why is this an overriding
29Hume 1748 (O f the Original Contract).
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obligation whose violation should be punished? How is it that a coercion- 
based determination of social relations is ever justifiable? For Hume, consent 
theories cannot give the answer. For the anarchist, such a need for a proper 
assessment of the nature of the political draws attention to the significance of 
choice, the character and role of which must be shown to be much stronger 
than that of the acts involved in tacit consent. For this, hypothetical consent 
seems a more promising approach.
2.1.3.Hypothetical consent.
Thus, the next candidate for grounding political obligation in voluntarist 
terms is hypothetical consent. This has received considerable attention from 
contemporary theorists30 and an influential improvement of its Kantian roots in 
Rawls’ A Theory o f Justice (1971). However, it has taken a form which 
departs from voluntarism. This can be seen if we bear in mind an important 
distinction between two forms of hypothetical consent and the roles of their 
different rationales. I shall argue that there are two ways of understanding 
hypothetical consent, neither of which grounds political obligation. On the first 
understanding, which falls more clearly under voluntarism, consent is offered 
as a device of reasoning which helps us understand our actual disposition 
towards the authority of political institutions. On the second understanding, 
hypothetical consent becomes a moral route representing the conclusions of 
unimpaired and impartial reasoning. I shall show that the first way of 
understanding hypothetical consent is the more problematic of the two, and 
that the second, which is the one usually involved in theories of political 
obligation, is irrelevant to direct voluntarism.31
30For example: Pitkin 1972; Dworkin 1975; Zimmerman 1983; Hampton 1986; Lewis 1989. 
For an influential contemporary theory o f hypothetical contract outside the debate on political 
obligation, see Scanlon 1982; 1998.
31 As explained at the beginning o f section 2.1., in the context o f the present discussion on 
political obligation voluntarism is understood in its most literal and direct form, namely as 
theories appealing to the unimpaired, actual decisions, choices and actions o f individuals. The 
discussion on hypothetical consent introduces another dimension to voluntarism and it will 
clarify the extent to which this form o f consent belongs to voluntarism as understood so far, 
or if  it properly extends voluntarism to purely incorporate a different sense and whether this 
is useful for the debate on political obligation. For a relevant distinction between the two 
different trends claiming to be proper identifications o f voluntarism, namely the voluntaristic 
and the rationalistic, see: Waldron 1993a, pp.51-57; Simmons 1999, pp.760-769.
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It is important for voluntarist accounts to preserve a link between the 
ground of political obligation they provide and the quality of the institutions 
to which it is owed. Even if some form of actual consent was successfully 
given, it would have to be given to institutions which exhibit some morally
relevant merits in order to be valid.32 In the context of the discussion of
actual consent, an effective solution to the problem would be provided by the 
incorporation of institutional morality in an exhibition of a proper instance of 
voluntary undertaking by the theories under scrutiny: an act involving actual 
choice which was also reasonable would be likely to provide the required
link. Yet, as explained above, these theories fail to provide such an instance 
of voluntary commitment and the link with quality remains a related unsolved
problem. This fact eliminates the possibility of success for voluntarism on the
basis of the most promising route. Thus, the attention of its defenders has
been re-orientated towards hypothetical consent. In this context, there is an 
initial concern with institutional quality: the demand that the arrangements to 
which people consent should be to an acceptable extent reasonable and fair 
gives rise to the idea that this could be achieved ‘by characterising the
circumstances of voluntary agreement in such a way that indisputably
irrational, unreasonable or unfair agreements [would] not meet the conditions 
for voluntary consent’.33 A representative example of an attempt to such a 
characterisation is given by the description of the ‘state of nature’ provided 
by traditional contractualists.34 The discussion below shows how the endeavour 
fails to combine voluntarism with a hypothetical consent view of political 
obligation.
The point of hypothetical consent is to show what it would be fair, 
reasonable and rational for people to agree to within appropriately
32Simmons 1999, note 18. I suggested in the introduction that both quality and specific 
interaction are relevant aspects o f institutional evaluation within the debate on political 
obligation. In the discussion o f  consent so far, given my focus on actual consent, I have 
developed elements o f transactional evaluation (i.e., features o f specific interaction). At this 
point o f  the discussion, I reintroduce the idea that quality, or, institutional morality, is 
relevant to any account o f political obligation and thus should be examined in relation to the 
accounts analysed here, namely voluntarism. The discussion o f hypothetical consent will 
provide the first steps for understanding and deciding the proper role o f  quality-based 
considerations in the debate.
33Horton 1992, p.82.
34Hobbes 1651; Locke 1690 and Rousseau 1762.
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characterised circumstances. This signifies a departure from direct voluntarism, 
since it makes the actual consent of individuals irrelevant: the question here 
is not whether they have actually consented but whether they ought to 
consent. The hypothetical consent becomes a theoretical device used to 
represent the conclusions that reason would yield, whenever unimpaired and 
consistently exercised.
The first form of hypothetical consent which I want to discuss, however, 
both utilises this device and might allow voluntarism. It involves an 
understanding of hypothetical consent which aspires to actuality. According to 
it, consent serves to make us understand that under circumstances of unbiased 
reasoning35 we would in many cases have consented to that to which, under 
the present circumstances, we may be unwilling to agree. In this way it 
claims to retain the character of voluntarism, since it shows that reason leads 
us to the conclusion that we would in fact consent, and thus to the realisation 
that we do consent, in many cases. Even though our reasoning does most of 
the job here, the last court of appeal lies in the existence of a disposition in 
us to personally consent. Unfortunately, this form of consent falls prey, even 
if in a counterfactual way, to similar problems to those which affect the 
notion of personal consent and its function within voluntarism, and which 
were discussed in section 2.1.1. Most pressingly in this case, the validity of 
our disposition to consent depends largely on the circumstances within which 
such a consent works. Its existence and function does not generate obligations 
unless the circumstances are such that the conditions of the validity of 
consent survive the relevant thought-experiment, i.e., that the disposition for 
actual choice applies naturally under them. Thus, in regard to most of us, it 
is very difficult to prove what we really think in each case about the relevant 
functions of the political institutions of our country of residence and that our 
conclusions represent a valid choice. Once again, the required satisfaction of 
both the generality and the particularity conditions of political obligation is 
not achieved.
35Namely, when being ready to adopt the course o f  action that is derived from rational and 
reasonable deliberation, not influenced by our knowledge o f  information concerning what is 
beneficial to our personal interests or by our feelings about the persons involved in the 
relevant case.
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It follows that the possibility o f agreement collapses once more. These 
considerations show that the attempt, under this first form, to combine
voluntarism with the rationale of hypothetical consent, so as to justify political 
obligation on its basis, is problematic. It is because of this that a different 
form of hypothetical consent is usually involved in accounts of political
obligation.
This second form of consent provides the most representative
implementation of the essence of hypothetical consent as described at the
beginning of our discussion of hypothetical consent (pages 82-83). It is this 
form that constitutes a device used to clarify the demands of Reason. It 
concentrates exclusively on what a rational, reasonable and unbiased person is 
in the position to recognise as indisputably reasonable and fair; that is, it 
provides a theory of good reasons. In this way, consent becomes irrelevant. 
Voluntarism as represented in forms of actual consent is absent in this 
hypothetical account. On the other hand, if the fundamental intuition of
voluntarism is modified via the rationale of hypothetical consent, such a
rationalistic voluntarism seems to be invoked within a theoretical background 
where it plays no role. Hypothetical consent cannot be located within the 
voluntarist effort to prove the actuality of agreement. One could of course
argue that if a question such as ‘can I will that...’ reveals moral aspects
which were not visible, then surely voluntarism has played a fundamental role 
in deciding the possibility of agreement. Whereas I agree with this, my claim 
is that it has no role to play for actual obligation. Whether or not it is
accepted as a proper expression of the essence of voluntarism, the rationalism
of hypothetical consent is still distinct from the concern with actuality invoked
in straight voluntarist accounts.36 The theorist then has to choose between an 
approach which commits him to a proof of actual, valid choice - which so 
far has been shown to be unsuccessful - and one which provides a
phenomenology of how we might feel about our duties through reasonable 
reflection - which is important for explaining and affecting choice but does 
not actually prove its existence and application.
36Being such, it remains a question whether it can ever be a direct basis o f  political 
obligation. For more clarifications, see my discussion o f a stronger claim in favour o f  
contractualism and hypothetical consent in section 2.1.6.
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One important point to derive from these considerations is that 
hypothetical consent - which is not, as explained, of an actual voluntary 
nature - might have its ultimate source either in ‘teleologicaP or in 
‘deontological’ accounts of ‘good reasons’ for political obligation.37 Its success 
thus depends on the success of either of these theories, though, as I shall 
proceed to argue in Chapters Three and Four, neither is, in fact, successful. 
My discussion of an improved understanding of contractualism below 
anticipates these difficulties: it generates doubts as to whether hypothetical 
consent should be used to ground political obligation in the first place.
The conclusion of the examination of hypothetical consent in the light of 
the anarchist criticism is indicative of the continued failure of voluntarism to 
establish the possibility of agreement. The first application of hypothetical 
consent remains bound to the failures of its individualist roots.38 The second 
and most accurate application of it, on the other hand, provides a route 
towards a promising account of political obligation and it accommodates 
concerns about the quality of institutions, but, in doing so, it departs from 
direct voluntarism; its plausibility and success is thus independent of the 
present discussion.
2.1.4.Raz on consent.
At this point, I turn to consider Raz’s views on the validity of consent, 
as set out in his book The Morality o f  Freedom (1979a). My discussion of 
Raz forms a natural bridge between the preceding examination of consent and 
the following criticism of contractualism.
Raz examines instrumental and non-instrumental justifications of consent 
as a ground of authority and considers the extent of its validity in each case. 
The conclusion he derives from his reference to instrumental justifications is 
that, ‘on instrumental grounds [namely, considerations regarding the benefits 
either of consent itself or of being able to consent], consent can only be held 
binding if it is so qualified that its effect is almost entirely confined to
37Horton 1992, p.88.
38It faces all the problems faced by actual consent accounts o f  political obligation, among 
which is the problem that it cannot keep voluntarism in line with a concern about the quality 
o f institutions.
85
reinforcing independently existing obligations to obey ... But it cannot be used 
as a way of endowing anyone with authority where that person had none’.39 
This assertion is founded on the recognition that whilst consent might be used 
to facilitate the establishment of authority where there are independent good 
reasons for so doing, its unqualified and unlimited use is more likely to lead 
to bad and undesirable consequences,40 which defeat its initially valuable role. 
Raz’s remarks are on a par with the preceding arguments, which show that 
consent does not constitute a generally applied actual basis of political 
obligation and that, in its failure to represent choice on this matter, it needs 
to be established on further grounds in order to ground political authority. 
They prepare us for the forthcoming examination (later in this chapter and in 
the following two chapters) of attempts to derive a general political obligation 
from (hypothetical) consent as a theory of good reasons and of their 
limitations.4' These conclusions can be confirmed by the discussion of social 
contract below.
2.1.5.Social contract theories.
Appealing to Social Contract is the most popular way of developing a 
consent-based theory. Thus, it is vulnerable to all the preceding criticisms, 
regardless of its precise formulation. Therefore, the role of the following 
discussion on contractualism is merely to provide some additional 
considerations which throw more light on the anarchist attack on voluntarism. 
The objective is to confirm that, when subjected to anarchist scrutiny, the 
centrality of free individual undertakings within the voluntarist account of 
political obligation either commits the theory to an ongoing attempt to solve
391979a, p.90 (emphasis mine).
40Such bad consequences may be unjustified serving o f  personal interests; such undesirable 
ones may be unpredictable misfortunes as effects o f  the shortcomings o f human knowledge.
41Raz’s discussion refers mainly to actual consent. It is developed within the context o f his 
own theory o f political authority, which is based on the idea that state authority is justified 
only when it is proved to be the best way for individuals to realise the independent reasons 
that apply to them. As explained in the first chapter o f this thesis (section 1.3.), his theory 
consists in a combination o f  three theses which express this idea, namely the ‘normal- 
justification’, the ‘preemptive’ and the ‘dependence thesis’ (e.g. Raz 1985). Yet, the role o f  
consent in such a theory applies also to the relation o f hypothetical consent to good reasons 
examined here, even though the rationale o f the latter differs from that o f  actual consent.
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the problem of agreement or is transformed in a way that compromises the 
theory’s primary appeal to such undertakings.
The classical contract theorists Hobbes and Locke were haunted by the 
problem of the possibility o f  agreement, since its resolution was the decisive 
move in establishing their theories. This problem remains crucial and perhaps 
insoluble for contemporary contractualists as well, even though it is 
misleadingly circumvented by the appeal to hypothetical contract.42 The use of 
tacit consent and of hypothetical contract created, for the most part, either a 
fictional actuality of agreement or the mistaken impression that from the 
detection of desirable characteristics of the state we can assume, without 
further proof, the possibility and existence of agreement.
So much is to restate that for contractualists the problem remains vivid.43 
Both Hobbes and Locke used social contract to describe an initial undesirable 
pre-social order and explain the constitution of civil society through a 
contractual agreement of individuals as a rational escape from that order.44 
And, while in Hobbes the two stages towards the establishment of authority 
are simultaneous,45 with Locke’s theory it becomes clear that the move from 
the creation of civil society to the recognition of authority is a distinct one, 
and it is this move that involves the (actual) consent from which political
42This is the case only with regard to contractualist theories o f political obligation. Those 
contractualists who offer their theories as accounts o f  principles for already existing 
institutions do not offer direct replies to the debate on political obligation and their arguments 
should be examined in a different light. Characteristic examples are the theories o f Rawls and 
Scanlon. I return to this difference within contractualism throughout the thesis.
430r, as de Jasay puts it, for social contract theories ‘the problem o f  keeping promises is 
crucial and indispensable’ (1996, p.140).
MIn Hobbes however the state o f nature involves a social characterisation (life without 
security), while in Locke it is primarily a moral characterisation: it represents the moral 
condition o f individuals who have no political obligations (Simmons 1999a). This difference 
supports the idea that Locke’s theory o f  political obligation remains more clearly one o f  
actual consent: that instead o f deriving political obligation from a state o f  nature hypothetical 
consent argument, as Hobbes does, he rather uses the latter as a way o f  depicting the merits 
o f political institutions as well as the moral condition o f  non-political individuals but without 
deriving an alteration o f  that moral condition from those merits. Also one could see the state 
o f nature arguments o f  contractualists as separate justifications o f the existence o f the state 
rather than as arguments for political obligation, whether or not they tried to derive the one 
from the other (see Simmons 1999: his distinction between justification and legitimacy; see 
my introduction, section 1 note 7).
45At the same time when the parties agree to create political society they directly give 
authority to the Sovereign through individual, non-contractual transference o f their rights to it.
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obligations arise and which is of great importance for contractualism.46 
Locke’s theory is a paradigm of an actual contract account of political 
obligation. It thus insists on the importance of actual consent as a way of 
declaring the value of choice. But, without loosing its value, actual consent 
still renders the theory vulnerable to the problem of agreement which, as 
shown in the preceding discussion, such a form of consent generates for 
political obligation.
The way the problem of agreement shows up in Hobbes’ theory is 
characteristic.47 In Hobbes, the impossibility of agreement takes the form of a 
paradox: the very impossibility of agreement constitutes a central reason for 
requiring agreement.48 The combination of this paradox with the Hobbesian 
instrumental notion of rationality49 has brought Hobbes’ theory to the fore of 
social choice and rational choice theory. These theories are mainly concerned 
with rendering individual choices compatible with collective ones and with the 
connected problems of cooperation and coordination of decisions and actions 
in the social sphere. Hobbes’ description of, and contractualist solution to, the 
‘state of nature’ has acquired a dominant transformation through these theories 
and the problem of agreement has been depicted as the game-theoretical 
situation called the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ (PD).50 The PD however differs from 
problems of pure co-ordination (in its most ordinary sense) in that it is
46The creation o f civil society itself is the first necessary and important act and the legitimate 
escape from the state o f nature for Locke, and it is the result only o f an actual and 
unanimous original contract between all those individuals who wish to create it (1690, II, 
pp.96, 99, 171, 243). The transference o f political authority from civil society to government 
(through majority rule) is legitimate only on the basis o f a firstly created membership o f  this 
kind and it involves a trust based on actual, individual consent (ibid.). Furthermore, those 
individuals who want to join a civil society after its first creation may do so by consenting 
to the terms o f the original contract and thus explicitly giving their own trust to government 
(ibid. p.89). For useful discussions o f  the two-stage creation o f  authority and the role o f  
individuals’ actual consent in this in Locke, see, Simmons 1999a; 1999b; Lloyd Thomas 
1995, pp.11-56.
47I concentrate here on Leviathan (1651).
48See e.g. de Jasay 1996, p.142. The same paradox holds for Locke: see Hampton 1997, p.64.
49Namely, o f  the reasoning o f  individuals as one based on rational self-interest, on the 
protection and promotion o f their private situation.
50The name was given by A. W. Tucker in the 1950s. The game was invented by M. Flood 
and M. Dresher. For representative literature, see, e.g.: Flood 1958; Gauthier 1986; Hampton 
1986, chaps. 2 and 3, and 1997, pp.41-49; Sanders 1996, pp.261-265; Harriott 1996, esp. 
pp. 121-125. Against the dominant tradition, Hobbes might be seen as not read through the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma. The Hobbesian contract might be seen as a contract for self-preservation, 
not self-interest. But my argument concentrates on the dominant reading o f Hobbes’ theory. It 
suffices to say that the results o f the anarchist criticism remain the same under either reading.
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primarily a problem of the impossibility of co-operation (due to an
unwillingness based on the individuals’ rationality of self-interest, due to the 
fact that it is in their personal interest to behave badly). It is not one of 
practical obstacles to achieving the best application of co-operation, which 
ordinary co-ordination is about (based not so much on rational unwillingness 
but on lack of knowledge of their situation on the part of the individuals 
involved or on their doubts about the knowledge of the rest of the
participants and thus about the possibility of the morally best outcome).51 By 
use of this game the point for contractualists is to show that the state is a 
preferable solution to a situation where self-interested rational individuals are 
led to continual deception, which deprives them all from the advantages of 
co-operation. The state is seen as the guarantor of agreement and advocated 
as the most effective provider of essential goods.
Irrespective of the related dispute between anarchists and defenders of
the state about the best social order for achieving these tasks,52 the theme is
interesting because of the two issues which underlie it. These issues highlight 
the failure of voluntarism to ground political obligation on actual free 
agreement.
First, the paradox of agreement remains insoluble. On the one hand, the 
state seems to presuppose morality, since individuals unable to keep their 
promises would not be able to keep the contract to create government. On the 
other hand, the state is created because without it agreement is impossible. In 
the first case, the state becomes unnecessary, since agreement can be enforced 
by morality. In Raz’s words, if we obey due to independent moral reasons, 
agreement as a further reason for obeying becomes derivative and is rather a 
part of and confirmation of primary reasons for obligation than the basis of it 
itself. In the second case, the crucial question is created for contractualism of 
how to prove the possibility of consent to the government itself by 
individuals who are unable to keep their agreements. Given that only the
51For this difference between the two, see, e.g., Raz 1990, pp.6-11.
52The anarchists’ arguments concerning this dispute are part o f  more positive proposals for 
alternative social orders and are a valuable extension o f the direct anarchist contribution to 
the debate on political obligation. These arguments make use o f  the Prisoners’ Dilemma and 
o f  discussions o f  public goods. See, for example, Axelrod 1984; Taylor 1976, 1982 and 1987; 
Olson 1965; Sanders 1996, 261-271; Green 1988, pp. 138-144.
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government can play the role of ‘an enforcing agent’ in the first place, there 
seems to be no satisfactory response to this question.53 Both Hobbes and 
Locke saw the contract to create authority only between individuals, they did 
not extend it to hold between individuals and the state.54 The state, thus,
became the only enforcer and guarantor of contract, in the case of Hobbes,
an absolute sovereign not itself bound by any contract.55 Yet, this does not 
solve the paradox, since it creates an infinite regress starting from a guarantor 
of the very accomplishment by the state itself of the role ascribed to it by 
the contract. But then that guarantor needs a guarantor, and so on.56 Again,
one could say, following Raz, that in the absence of morality there is no
guarantee of and no validity in the enforcement of any agent.
The preceding considerations suggest that, for contractualists, the paradox 
of agreement is inescapable.57
In fairness to social contract theory, however, we can see ways out of 
this dilemma. As far as the argument about the impossibility of the state is 
concerned, Hobbes himself does not believe in absolute egoism: his
individuals are characterised by limited altruism, which leaves space for some 
sympathy for others and for compassion (1651). These features might still be 
a basis for a basic agreement to create and preserve a common guarantor, 
even if not for keeping agreements without him. What remains to be proved 
is whether we would agree to such a guarantor. Also, in his defence of the 
state Hobbes sees in the sovereign the universality which can guide 
individuals out of their egoistic tendencies, although it is on this that 
anarchists and defenders of the state disagree. But most importantly, there is 
further something to be said against the argument that the state is unnecessary 
if morality exists. Even if individuals are moral the state might still be
53See de Jasay 1996, p. 146.
54It is important, however, to stress that Hobbes claims that the sovereign is finally and 
independently authorised by each individual in particular, but not through contract. See 
Hobbes 1651, pp.87, 221, 265.
55In addition, in this authority ascribed to it by the contract made between the citizens, the 
sovereign is free to change the law at will. For this, see Cohen 1996, pp. 167-170, based on 
Hobbes 1651, pp.313,367.
56See de Jasay 1996, p. 146.
57They support Antony de Jasay’s claim (ibid. p. 158) that the contractualist argument ‘is 
either self-contradictory (contract can remedy the impossibility o f  contract) or circular 
(cooperation requires contract which requires cooperation)’.
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needed for settling quite important problems: for judging what the demands of 
morality are and how to coordinate. For this, a hypothetical contract might be 
an indispensable device. It may be used as a route for finding out what the 
specific way of addressing interaction is. If, according to Raz’s position, 
agreement can be valuable in reinforcing independently existing reasons for 
obedience, then its role in a hypothetical form in explaining what it is that 
we have reason to do and how we might get to know it is very valuable. 
This seems to be the strongest point of social contract theory and I will 
develop it in an improved understanding of social contract that I attempt in 
section 2.1.6. below. However, having such a role the social contract device 
provides a very useful explanation of how we might understand our duties to 
others but not a basis of the enforcement of these duties. In other words it 
might provide a good diagnostic of the reasons we have for explaining the 
state but not a proof of our support of it.
The second issue which arises for contract theorists in the present 
discussion is that concentration on the advantages to be achieved by the 
creation of the state reveals misdirected concern. The contractualist argument 
is transformed from one concerning the actual possibility of agreement into 
one about the merits of the state. The story about the social contract becomes 
a strategy used to confirm the merits of certain forms of government. In the 
case of Hobbes, it becomes an argument in favour of the state as an 
independent factor which would or could (or even, can) gain our agreement on 
the basis of its qualities. Agreement, possible or not, has no bearing on the 
success of this argument.58 The theoretical basis of the latter ceases to be 
voluntarist. The link with the self-assumed commitment taken by voluntarists 
to establish a special relationship between individuals and their governments 
disappears, and the whole discussion is transformed into a debate concerning 
the accomplishments and desirability of institutions.
A central problem underlying the above issues is that the plausibility of 
the contractualists’ conception of circumstances which make coercive (and 
even absolute) interference desirable is based on a presumption of the
58Although agreement as used on the basis o f  the rationale o f  hypothetical consent has still an 
important role to play. See discussion o f hypothetical contract in the next section.
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necessity of coercion. In turn, this is rooted in our experience of the societies 
in which we find ourselves. As I indicated in the previous chapters and in 
discussing Hume’s argument earlier in this chapter, coercion is not desirable 
in itself: it cannot be presupposed as inescapable, neither established without 
proper justification. More crucially, insistence on the role of coercion as a 
motivation for compliance seeks to found the authority of governments on the 
wrong ground. As it was claimed in the Introduction and in Chapter One, 
coercion is, indeed, a feature of the political. However, it is not its only 
feature and it cannot on its own create binding requirements.59 As many 
critics insist, laws might be obeyed on the basis of prudential fear of legal 
sanctions. However, this does not reveal recognition of the law’s authority, 
that is, of political obligation. There is a difference between explaining the 
role of coercion in social interaction where institutions are already established, 
for which the above arguments from social contract might be helpful, and 
connecting coercion to grounds for further justification without adequately 
defending it in the first place.
Even if the state of nature argument for the state established a need for 
institutions, such a justification would need to be constantly reinforced. The 
contractualist depiction of institutional merits might be providing a first motive 
for creating political institutions. But this does not exclude alternative 
possibilities and does not pre-empt the argument that freedom might be prior 
to certain merits and difficult to sacrifice. For this reason, the state of nature 
argument cannot be final and it does not in itself lead to justification of 
political obligation. The contractualist failure to prove consent-based agreement 
reflects a discontinuity between quality-based arguments for the existence of 
the state and arguments for the actual creation of political obligation through 
morally relevant interaction.60 Through contractualism we can understand that 
although we might have reasons to see the state as a good thing to exist - 
for example, due to its ability to protect us - this does not establish a special 
relation of rights and obligations between political institutions and ourselves as 
the individuals who live in the territories where these institutions exist. There
590 n  this point see Green 1988, pp.151-152.
60For such a discontinuity, see Simmons 1999. This point is central for deciding the role o f  
quality in the debate on political obligation.
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is big difference between considering the state to be good and having an 
actual moral relation of duty to it, and none of these aspects can be derived 
from the other.
This discussion of contractualism reveals the strength of the anarchist 
attack on voluntarism. The considerations adumbrated show that the problem 
of agreement remains insoluble and its resolution by appeal to the services of 
the state is an illegitimate move, one which survives only outside the 
boundaries of voluntarism and has further defects of its own as an argument 
for political authority. In this, they are representative examples of the strength 
of the anarchists’ strategy, which is to show that the free commitment of 
individuals which voluntarism considers to be its strongest weapon actually 
leads to its downfall, due to the inability of voluntarists to realise this 
requirement and give true expression to its demands.
2.1.6.A defence of hypothetical contractualism.
There is, however, a better and stronger claim in favour of the idea that 
hypothetical contractualism might provide a legitimate support for a voluntarist 
theory of political obligation. On its basis, hypothetical consent, precisely 
because it is a theory of good reasons, can be consistently incorporated within 
voluntarism, and can perhaps facilitate a solution to the central problem of the 
theory.
This claim makes use of a further argument for political obligation, 
found in Hobbes, that was not mentioned above. According to this argument, 
the citizen is bound by the law exactly because she is the author of this 
law.61 She makes the law and she is, therefore, contradicting her own will if 
she later denies its authority over her. By consenting to authorise a ruler, the 
individual never alienates her will, but still she lends its authority to him for 
the purpose of being bound by his directives.62 This ‘argument about the 
citizen’63 aspires to provide a moral route towards an understanding of what
61On this see Hobbes 1651, pp.221, 265. My discussion here is profited from the analysis o f  
this and the following argument o f Hobbes’ found in Cohen 1996.
62For a powerful argument in defence o f  the claim that, even in Hobbes’ insistence on 
absolute authority, what is implied cannot, in the end, be alienation, but only lending to ‘an 
agency’ see Hampton 1997, pp. 49-52; 1986.
63For this terminology, along with ‘the argument about the sovereign’, see Cohen 1996, p.169.
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can be a subject of agreement in a way that stresses the centrality of the role 
of individual power, that is, of the freedom every individual has to make the 
decisions concerning her life on her own. This centrality is very much the 
focus of voluntarism.
According to this argument, the crux of contractualism is that you lend
your individual power, but you still retain it. Yet, it is this idea that creates
continual instability in the theory, since the problem arises of whether we can
keep our power whilst, at the same time, lending it in such a way as to be
bound by it. This problem is reflected, here, in the contradiction between the 
argument about the citizen and the ‘argument about the sovereign’, which 
Hobbes also adopts. According to that argument, the sovereign is never bound 
by the law, strikingly, for the same reason for which the citizen is bound, 
namely because he is the author of the law. This argument expresses the idea 
that, if it is the autonomous will of the individual that makes the law 
binding, then her decision to make it can be changed at will. And the 
significance of this claim does not lie in Hobbes’ supposition that we are 
never bound to what we can change. Rather, it lies in the thought that, even 
if we are bound by a law as long as we do not change it, ‘the very fact that 
[we] can change it diminishes the significance of the fact that [we] are bound 
by it’.64 The possibility of change undermines the bindingness that the creation 
of authority by contract is meant to guarantee.
This worry is given precise expression by the problem of agreement, 
which haunts contractualism. A solution to it requires establishing the 
argument about the citizen whilst devaluing the argument about the sovereign, 
at the same time without undermining their common appeal to autonomy. It 
requires the establishment of the former in a way that the bindingness derived 
from the power of the will of the individual does not deprive her of this 
power. Thus, the problem of instability, or agreement, which contractualism 
faces necessitates a satisfactory moral explanation of the form which the 
change o f  will must take. Such an explanation is necessary, if the will of the
^Ibid. p. 170.
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individual is to play, in a stable manner, the role that voluntarism attributes 
to it with regard to the problem of political obligation.
In this context, perhaps the most suitable manifestation of the crux of 
voluntarism as expressed in contractualism - i.e., that ‘you lend your power 
but you still retain it’ - is provided by a purely hypothetical contract, or a 
device which is no contract at all. This is perhaps the most promising route 
towards a solution to the problem of instability created for voluntarism by 
lack of literal agreement. Hypothetical contract, or consent, seems to provide 
the most representative form of voluntarism. As explained earlier (in section
2.1.3.), it is a theoretical device used to direct our reasoning to the 
conclusions it would lead us to whenever unimpaired. That is, to the 
conclusions we would reach when impartially deliberating on the basis of 
acceptable moral convictions.65 These elements of the contractualist device 
make it special as a way of combining morality with rationality such that 
provides the bindingness of our will. Or so I argue below.
The conclusions derived are good in themselves.66 Their moral input can 
be shown by means other than contract. They can be construed in a theory 
either as moral directives to which we might be committed unconditionally in 
a Kantian manner67 or as commitments not necessarily moral in nature but 
still important to our personal identity and integrity.68 And, so construed, they
65Convictions such as those represented in Rawls’ ‘original position’, which constitute our
considered judgments about fair conditions on agreement and proper restrictions on reasons 
for principles (see Rawls 1971, pp.146-7 and section 24; 1985, pp.399-403; 2001 pp.14-18, 
80-134). For this hypothetical contract device, see my chapter three.
66They are ‘good in virtue o f [their] internal structure’, their ‘form’ or ‘‘functional 
arrangement’ (Korsgaard 1995, pp. 107-108).
67Kant’s formalism establishes the authority o f morality by disconnecting it from the 
contingencies relevant to human nature, e.g. from the problem o f social peace, and making its 
laws universally prescriptive imperatives.
68The affirmation o f  non-moral commitments might deprive the strictly moral from the 
superiority usually attached to it, as concerning demands that represent impartiality and which 
override commitments attached to particular persons, perspectives and lifestyles. Also, such
commitments are rooted in human nature and the social effects on it. In this way, they might 
seem to create again the problem o f  instability, since human nature and society facilitate a 
change o f will which undermines the ‘law-like’ status that would make them binding 
requirements (Cohen 1996, pp.174 - 177). Still, the centrality o f  such commitments in an 
individual’s life and sense o f  identity can give them the role o f valid and overriding
requirements for this individual. Bernard Williams is characteristically devoted, as a 
philosopher, to a defence o f such commitments and o f the centrality o f personal integrity in 
our lives and concerns about the ethical (see, for example ‘A Critique o f  Utilitarianism’, in 
Williams 1973, esp. chapter 5). And yet, there is a very natural though more subtle
connection between normativity, morality and non-moral reasons for action, involved in the
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can play the role of reasons for action (i.e. good reasons). Their moral
validity is by itself important for creating the stability which helps 
contractualism.69 But the irrationality of breaking these requirements, necessary 
in order to marry bindingness with freedom as required within voluntarism, 
can be shown only by the hypothetical contact. This device shows that a 
deeper aspect of the authority of such reasons lies in that they are the
commands of our reflective will.70 Our most considered judgments are the
stipulations of our reasonable point of view.71 Having been extracted from our 
impartial and most considered judgements, these reasons can be seen as the 
directives of the will of a rational being which, at the same time, bind that 
being.72 Used in this way, as a method of making transparent to us the
present use o f hypothetical contract, as explained below in the text, and emphasised in the 
work o f  contemporary contractualists (Scanlon 1982; 1998). This connection is based on the 
idea that individuals express their autonomy in a moral capacity they have to be motivated 
by a willingness to justify their reasons (o f whatever kind) to others, to try and modify them 
according to what a ‘reasonable’ person would accept and to reach agreement (the 
‘reasonable’ is a central idea o f contractualism: ibid.; Rawls 1958; 1971; 1980; 1985; 1993; 
2001; Simmons 1999, pp.764-767). This is where morality and its binding force lies, which is 
central in the present discussion (this rationale is basically Rousseauian but it also involves 
and carries further the idea o f  the autonomous motivation accorded to individuals by Kant). 
For more on this central idea o f  contractualism, see notes 70-73 below.
69Their ‘internal structure, [their] form, makes [them] fit to be willed as a law’ (Korsgaard 
1995, p.108).
70‘It is not the bare fact that it would be a good idea to perform a certain action that
obligates us to perform it. It is the fact that [though reflection] we command ourselves to do
what we find it would be a good idea to do’ (ibid. pp. 104-105).
71These judgments are reflected in the premises which guide individuals in the course o f their 
choice and which represent their reasonableness (see note 72 below). Individuals face a
common (social) problem and they have to take into consideration, and deliberate on the 
basis of, the responses o f  others. Through the hypothetical contract, they reason from the 
same premises and reach the same solution to that problem. The acceptable solution is the 
one they all agree to, because the guiding idea is that there is no break-point in the
procedure, agreement is the only way forward.
72Because, as Korsgaard explains, they pass the test o f ‘reflective endorsement’ (1995, lecture 
3). They are thus the principles expressive o f ‘the conceptions o f ourselves that are the most 
important to us’, the violation o f them would mean that we contrast our best reason, lose our 
‘practical identity’ (ibid. pp.100-102). It can now be legitimately claimed, in support o f the
argument from the citizen, that the authority o f such reasons is ‘beyond question’ because it
is ‘the authority o f  [our] own mind and w ill’ as a legislator (ibid. p. 104). Another 
explanation lies in Rousseau’s words: ‘...there is a difference between incurring an obligation 
to yourself and incurring one to a whole o f which you form a part’ (1762, book 1, ch.7). 
The reasonableness o f  our considered judgment constitutes an “ entity” , or, will, which is a 
whole o f  which we are part and as such it is binding on us in a way that we wouldn’t be
bound if  we appointed obligations on ourselves irrespective o f this reflective capacity. We
thus follow the directives o f  a will that cannot be changed according to personal inclinations 
(and cannot thus be destabilised by them). Also, it remains an important aspect o f the 
contractualist framework that in endeavours to assert the validity o f either side, moral 
principles and considered judgements stand in mutual support (see on ‘reflective equilibrium’: 
e.g., Rawls 1971, pp.19-21, 46-53, 578-586; 2001, pp.29-31, 66-72, 134, 136).
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demands of reason, hypothetical contract offers an expression of a moral 
route o f  conception of what can be, or ought to be, a subject of agreement, 
as the essence of contractualism.73
In this way contractualism becomes a primary expression of self-
governance. Hypothetical contract represents a process through which 
individuals can see their reason work and forms the conditions which govern 
their lives by substantial reference to themselves. They come to understand 
their responsibilities and duties in the light of this framework. They get 
involved into a kind of reasoning which helps them see how they can be 
guided by impositions they themselves decide that are proper to determine 
their life and which represent their will and sense of their conditions. It is a 
process which improves their self-understanding and at the same time 
combines it with a comprehension of the moral terms which should
characterise their personal and social relations. They thus evolve as moral 
agents, who realise themselves by putting constraints on themselves. 
Hypothetical consent provides a phenomenology o f how individuals can be 
ruled by themselves and represents a route through which they come to 
identify with important aspects of their life and social world even when they 
do not actually give their consent.
However, this approach does not remove the problem of agreement as 
the focus of the present criticism of voluntarism with regard to political
obligation. It only preserves a hope for proving political obligation from a
different direction through the rationale of hypothetical contract. As argued 
above, such a contract is irrelevant to voluntarist attempts to explain political
73This is the crux o f  the rationalistic tradition o f Voluntarism, which is largely inspired by 
Rousseau’s idea o f  the ‘general w ill’ (1762) and newly developed by contemporary 
contractualists (especially: Rawls 1958; 1971; 1985; 2001; Scanlon 1982; 1998). The element 
o f  voluntarism in this outlook lies in a focus on reasonableness (through an insistence on 
understanding and agreement) and in individualism: principles are legitimate only when 
accepted by individuals, i.e., as results o f their capacity for self-governance (as expressed 
morally. See notes 71-72 above). The central idea is that individuals have the willingness to 
modify their reasons on the basis o f a shared moral ground, one which others would not 
reasonably reject. This perspective gives a new direction to the role o f  social contract in 
relation to political institutions. According to this understanding, the idea o f  reasonable
agreement as the subject-matter o f contractualism functions as a heuristic device for the
formulation o f legitimate moral principles which might then be applied to existing political 
institutions and determine their acceptability. The aim is neither to establish the existence o f  
political institutions nor to prove a general political obligation. It is rather to find and justify
legitimate principles (for these points, see note 74 below).
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obligation in terms of actual agreement and to establish the plausibility of 
voluntarism as applied to this obligation on that basis. It rather anticipates a 
theory of good reasons for political obligation. It offers a route towards 
understanding what the proper basis of our duties and relations might be, 
rather than a direct basis of duties and relationships themselves. The stability 
of individual will which rationalistic voluntarism offers is the main indication 
of the value of a phenomenology of how we might feel obligated which the 
theory provides. As such it is morally important but only theoretical. In 
departing from actual voluntarism, it does not secure the kind of actual 
interaction which the relationship of political obligation, I argue, requires (an 
actuality demanded by the nature of this obligation as reflected in the four 
conditions applied in the debate: see my Introduction and Chapter Five).74 And 
it remains to be examined in the following chapters whether any theory of 
good reasons can do this.
2.2.Dismissing ‘the conceptual argument9 for political obligation.
Let me preface the general conclusions of this chapter by some brief 
comments on a different approach to the problem of political obligation. This 
approach might at first seem to provide an alternative solution to this problem 
and to eliminate the difficulties examined so far. However, closer inspection 
reveals that it is not part of this debate. My aim here is to dismiss it as an 
obstacle to a proper speculation of the issues in question.75
74Hypothetical, reasonable contract is a form o f reasoning to be applied when we examine the 
legitimacy o f  the activities o f  political institutions from within and apart from an 
establishment o f  their bindingness. It concerns the content o f  legitimacy, the provision o f  
sound principles o f  legitimacy in the light o f which institutions, as an unavoidable reality, 
must be assessed. In the hands o f theorists such as Scanlon, this form o f contractualism does 
not see its role as arguing for actual obligations. Actual obligation could result only in the 
(improbable) case o f  absolute coincidence between actual institutions and ideal principles. That 
is, if  existing institutions were a perfect application o f the principles o f legitimacy so that 
individuals could affirm those principles by obeying the institutions constantly. These points 
prepare the way for re-estimating the attempt o f those contractualists who use hypothetical 
contract to ground political obligation: their very approach within the debate is misguided (see 
my chapter five). This lies mostly in the discontinuity between quality and actual obligation 
indicated in the preceding discussion o f contractualism in relation to arguments from coercion.
75This, not only with regard to voluntarism but also as far as the other theories criticised in 
this thesis are concerned.
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This alternative approach is known as ‘the conceptual argument’.76 It 
adopts an internal viewpoint with regard to the problem of political obligation, 
in order to deny its very existence and meaning. It advocates an internal, 
logical relationship between the state, or political authority, and political 
obligation, on the basis of which it attributes the requirement for a general 
justification of political obligation to a conceptual confusion: the very concept 
of authority is claimed to be inseparable from political obligation and thus to 
pre-empt any need for independent justification of the latter.77 In addition, it 
considers political obligation to play a constitutive role in our understanding 
of ourselves as members of a polity.78 In this way, the conceptual argument 
dispenses with the problem of finding a moral filter for separating the 
unacceptable from the acceptable political requirements. They are already 
moralised by our membership in a particular polity.
Admittedly, such an approach could undermine the whole debate over 
political obligation, since it entails that the moral aspect of the problem of 
political obligation,79 and all the criticism of the state deriving from it, has no 
meaning. But, accepting this approach has two negative effects. First, it 
sacrifices the connection of the notion of obligation with the self-assumed 
undertakings expressive of personal freedom. Second, and, more importantly, it 
circumvents, instead of addressing, the motivations which give rise to the 
problem.
The first worry reflects the following significant point: even though 
moral obligations are not necessarily and exclusively connected with 
voluntariness - for example, duties to aid and parental obligations are not self­
assumed80 - the concept of ‘obligation’ itself involves the active role of 
individuals conceived as free and equal persons able to make substantial 
judgments and decisions, not only in the private, but also in the public
76See Pateman 1985, esp. pp.104-105, 132; Horton 1992, pp.137-145,170.
77See Horton 1992, p. 138. This is not the correlativity thesis explained in my introduction, 
which concerns understanding the notion o f political obligation. The conceptual argument 
represents a normative outlook to the problem o f political obligation as a whole, a position 
about the very point o f asking the question o f such an obligation which has normative 
implications.
78McPherson 1967, p.64.
79See introduction, section 1.
80See Horton 1992, pp.43, 144.
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domain.81 It reflects the effective initiation of action which the voluntarist 
insistence on the importance of individual will requires.82 This perspective is 
characteristic of liberal political theory, but it can be adopted by any view of 
social relationships which rejects theories of ‘divine authority’ and of ‘natural 
subordination’, which involve a hierarchical and inegalitarian understanding of 
the positions of and relations between individuals within society.83 That 
obligation embodies this perspective is what brings it in conflict with 
obedience or mere subordination.
The second worry derives from a more significant point and central 
from the perspective of the current inquiry. With this point I close my 
discussion of the conceptual account, satisfied that its failure has been 
established. It was mentioned in the Introduction that the use of morality as a 
way of filtering political requirements serves the very motivations which give 
rise to the problem of political obligation. These motivations are basically 
found in a concern to avoid the unlimited and unqualified imposition upon us 
of political requirements and the hardships of not obeying them, and in the 
resulting doubts about the very idea of being subjected in this way.84 If we 
accept the conceptual argument we disregard these motivations and we are 
deprived of any representation of the reflective dispositions which enable us 
to create, from time to time, an autonomous, critical distance from the 
political world we inhabit. The problem which the conceptual argument denies 
reflects an aspect of ourselves as reflective social beings. Thus, by rejecting 
this argument, and, in doing so, accepting the problem of political obligation, 
we continue to assert the expression of ourselves as autonomous, reflective 
beings and a reaction against blind subordination to existing authorities which 
this motivates.85
81See Pateman 1985, pp.13-14.
82See also the beginning o f  my discussion o f arguments regarding theories o f  consent in 
section 2.1.
83For a paradigmatic examination o f such theories see Jean Hampton 1997, chapters one and 
two.
84See Meckled-Garcia 1998, pp.9 and 24.
^Hypothetical contractualism in being a route o f reflective deliberation asserts this aspect o f  
ourselves and in this way it has at least a negative impact with regard to political obligation: 
if  we can show that we would not have possibly agreed to some conditions, probably we 
should not.
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2.3.The implications of the anarchist criticism of consent.
The general conclusion derived from this chapter is that it is the very
centrality o f  the voluntary undertakings within the contract and consent
theories that leads to their failure as accounts of political obligation. The 
essential feature of these theories cannot be combined with the basic
conditions involved in a proper justification of political obligation - in 
particular, with the generality condition compatibly with the other three,
namely particularity, bindingness and content-independence - and so cannot 
found a satisfactory account of that notion.
This, to be sure, is already recognised by the relevant literature as the 
upshot of the anarchist criticism of voluntarism. My aim in this chapter has 
only been to provide a careful elaboration of the anarchist criticism, in order 
to make clearer the roots and the development of its conclusion and to
establish its soundness. However, the aim in so doing is not limited to 
providing such a clarification. It lies, rather, in establishing the implications of 
the success of the anarchist criticism. It is these that will concern me in this 
section.
The lesson that should be learnt from the anarchist criticism of
voluntarism is that neither the value of voluntariness nor the conditions of a 
valid justification of authority should be dispensed with. The failure of 
voluntarism indicates the defective character of the state and connects this to 
its involuntary establishment.86
It follows that voluntarism provides a significant element to be used as 
a test for forms of social order. Even if not unanimously accepted as the 
primary or necessary condition on them, the free commitment o f  individuals 
constitutes a desirable feature for such forms to incorporate. An insistence on
86For a useful account o f the basic features o f ‘the state’ see Miller 1984, p.5. As explained 
in note 1 o f the introduction, I use the state interchangeably with ‘institutionalised coercion’.
The latter designates the function o f political institutions as distinct bodies which concentrate
and monopolise the determination o f the rights and obligations o f individuals and use force in 
order to back up such a determination. The absence o f voluntariness for political obligation 
indicates the coercive character o f the state. And that this absence reflects failure to meet the 
four conditions o f  political obligation indicates that it is the ‘political’ character o f obligation 
(or, o f  the state) - namely, its coercive, binding and exclusive nature - that cannot be 
combined with voluntariness to create a proper instance o f  a suitably particularised and 
sufficiently general moral relationship. For a basic definition o f  the notion o f  coercion and a 
useful analysis o f other instances o f the notion o f ‘power’ see Taylor 1982, pp.13-25.
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the centrality of voluntary undertaking would guarantee, and enrich our view 
of, the value of any social organisation to the extent that such organisation is 
compatible with it. A strong reason for this is the compatibility of this feature 
with, and expression within social life of, the value of freedom., or, 
autonomy. This claim holds under any of three ways in which autonomy 
might be construed: (1) as a property of persons conceived as ‘ideal moral 
legislators’, capable for an impartial ascription and review of moral principles; 
(2) as a right each of us has to arrive at decisions about certain aspects of 
our life without interference from others; (3) as ‘self-governance’, involving 
conscious understanding of the components of whatever problem should arise 
as well as moral integrity.87
Our societies do not facilitate the exercise in the political sphere of a 
practice analogous to promising as exercised at a more private level. But this 
has been encouraged to a large extent by the dominant view of the political 
as a centralised and coercive form of social order. Perhaps it would help to 
consider more pluralistic representations of it, having the form of ‘free social 
relationships’ of a cooperative character, as constructed ‘on a small scale’.88
87For these three senses o f autonomy see Hill 1991, pp.43-51. Taylor’s analysis o f ‘pure 
negative freedom’ and o f ‘autonomy’ provides a further clarification o f  these dimensions o f  
freedom: according to the former, a person ‘is unfree if, and only if, his doing o f any action 
is rendered impossible by the action o f another individual’ and the latter involves that ‘the 
individual must have the capacities and inclination for subjecting his values and beliefs, 
norms and principles to critical scrutiny, he must be able to make out o f  this critical process 
a coherent set o f values, beliefs, etc., and he must be able to choose or to create (with the 
cooperation o f others) an appropriate role or character with which he identifies’ (1982, pp. 142 
and 160 respectively). For the anarchist approach to freedom, in striking opposition to 
coercion, see note 29 o f my introduction. In its most complete expressions, this approach 
involves an understanding o f  freedom which is more inclusive than the above conceptions and 
captures better the picture rendered by them. Such an understanding can be expressed amply 
by the idea o f  ‘free individuality’, which can be identified as the sort o f  scrutinised and 
round life conduct reflected in a combination o f self-legislation with self-realisation and the 
kind o f self-expression and self-development involved in it (see Habermas 1994, section I). I 
take this ideal to be effectively captured by Karl Marx’s notion o f ‘human emancipation’ as 
the liberation o f  our humanity from all material obstacles and all the suppressing dualities 
which curtail the free development o f  human capacities, experiences and activity in the world, 
a liberation effected within social activity and interaction and transcending mere ‘political 
emancipation’ (Marx 1843, p.57; 1844, pp.92). Yet, a basic understanding o f  freedom might 
suffice to motivate the central concern with it which characterises anarchism and the 
inevitability o f  such a concern for all human beings. For this understanding, see note 93 
below and the paragraph to which it belongs.
88Miller 1984, p. 183.
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We can find such an orientation among the main anarchist proposals,89 and it 
is compatible with the normative core of voluntarism. It also facilitates a
reconciliation o f our private with our public lives and a barrier against any 
radical separation of these two domains.90
But the crux of the present insistence on voluntariness lies in the
following point. Freedom may be respected in ways much less strict than
explicit voluntary commitment and alternative views of the political might 
properly accommodate a looser sense of self-assumed choice. The aim of the 
present discussion is not to insist exclusively on contractualist instances of
voluntary commitment.91 It is rather to introduce the element which makes 
voluntariness, either in a strict or in a looser sense,92 important and which
will prove central in the rest of this thesis for the problem that I examine:
that is, the idea that individuals’ self-determination and equal, active, effective 
participation should be preserved as the central characteristics of social
relationship. This element remains the constant concern of the anarchist 
challenge. It reflects the anarchist claim that authoritarian attitudes undermine 
the status of persons as free and equal and the kinds of interaction which are 
suitable to them.
As argued in the preceding discussion of hypothetical consent, it is
important for human beings to see fundamental aspects of their life being
89See Joll 1964, especially his presentation o f  the ideas o f  Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin. 
See also original books o f these theorists such as: Proudhon 1851; Kropotkin 1877-1920;
1902.
90For a criticism o f this separation, see Pateman 1985, e.g., pp.129-133.
91 Although, due to its very nature, for a justification o f the political as we know it, it is 
more likely that this element will be necessary. For more clarification, see my chapter four, 
section 4.3.2., on the relation between existing polities and the idea o f schemes o f social 
cooperation.
92For a looser but equally worthy and demanding sense o f  voluntariness, Graham’s explanation 
o f the way traditional anarchists understood it is characteristic: ‘Implicit in the idea o f free 
agreement is some notion o f  self-assumed obligation, but it is a concept o f obligation which 
is not connected to any concept o f equivalent exchange. Through the process o f free
agreement individuals publicly commit themselves to future courses o f  conduct voluntarily 
chosen by them. The underlying model o f obligation then is no longer contract, but
promising. ... Kropotkin could argue that the free agreements in an anarchist communist
society would not have to be enforced because these agreements would not be contracts o f  
equivalent exchange. Rather, they would be the public expression o f  free choice between 
persons whose relationships are characterized by co-operation and mutual a id  instead o f the 
manoeuvring for competitive advantage found in capitalist society’ (Graham 1989, p.165; 
emphasis mine). This idea o f voluntariness is centrally supported by the main lessons o f this 
thesis. Chapter four provides another instance o f a weaker implementation o f  voluntariness, 
which also preserves its core.
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under their control, as being “ up to them” . Self-governance seems 
indispensable at least understood as the capacity to rule one’s own life. This 
can be characterised as the ability to understand, decide and determine the 
elements concerning the most important aspects of one’s life and to 
understand the features of situations that affect it importantly in order to 
control them. Fundamentally it is a basic capacity to continually secure and 
determine one’s own survival and moral world, which freedom in its most 
basic form is.93 Human beings cannot live without it. It secures survival 
through the exercise of reason as it distinctively characterises human beings. 
And this involves constraints. Yet it is constraints that one puts on oneself. 
What is required is not being ruled by another, which might concern both not 
being subjected to others’ interests and will and, most importantly, not 
standing in an unequal relation (of power) to others such that generates the 
possibility of dependence and subjection and undermines one’s status. Coercion 
in any of these forms stands against freedom. Thus self-governance and equal 
participation, which pertain to the preservation of proper relations between 
people, stand together as the most valuable features of the kind of social life
suitable to human beings. And voluntarism remains a valuable expression of
this idea. We shall see in Chapter Four a different way of stressing it.
At the same time, the conditions of generality, particularity, content- 
independence and bindingness can hardly be dismissed as inappropriate or 
demanding. Far from being confined to an anarchist conception of legitimacy, 
they are reflections of the political nature of the obligations examined in this 
thesis and they are accepted by many theorists, with different and even 
opposing convictions, as a reasonable and suitable test. Their formality does 
not undermine the strength of the normative implications that these conditions 
create in combination with the moral ground of political obligation discussed 
in the present chapter.
93Irrespectively o f any specific conception o f freedom, its importance for human beings can 
be comprehended simply, yet adequately, through an understanding o f  this basic form.
Rousseau’s view o f why freedom is not alienable provides, I think, such an explanation.
According to Rousseau freedom involves an immediate sense o f responsibility and the 
capacity to control our own decisions and is something that we care about as much as we 
care about our self-preservation, it is that basic capacity through which we can protect the 
fundamental elements o f our being (e.g., 1762, book 1, ch.6). On the whole, it constitutes 
part o f  ourselves and renouncing it would be to be deprived o f any guarantee o f the 
protection o f anything essential to us, thus to renounce our own nature.
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These considerations lead to a final thought. In the previous chapters I 
referred to an ideal o f legitimacy, which is part of critical anarchism as a 
complete philosophical position. Some of the critical force of this form of 
anarchism has been demonstrated by the preceding arguments. In the same 
manner, the ideal of legitimacy to be provided as a positive contribution of 
critical philosophical anarchism finds its initial elements in the considerations 
incorporated in the present chapter. The proposal is that the central feature of 
voluntarism, while being the cause of the failure of this theory as a defence 
o f the authority o f the state, nevertheless qualifies as a feature which could 
characterise centrally the interpersonal relations o f  a society which constituted 
an ideal o f  legitimacy. That is, attempts to ground political authority on 
voluntariness have failed, yet the value of choice remains and a pattern of 
voluntarist social relations provides a guiding model of legitimate society. 
Present polities aspire to, but fail to exemplify such an ideal.
Some critical, philosophical anarchists begin from such a voluntarist 
picture of societies in developing their arguments against the state.94 The 
anarchist arguments examined in this chapter and the insistence on the 
conditions of political obligation which they involve become an indication of 
the prior anarchist consideration that the voluntarist kind of specific interaction 
which existing institutions fail to involve is a valuable feature of a morally 
acceptable social life. Thus, voluntariness is at the same time a desirable 
element for the construction o f what would be an acceptably complete 
theoretical attempt to justify political obligation and central characteristic of 
what would be a legitimate society.95 I will therefore regard it as a useful 
criterion to be taken into account, along with the traditional conditions of 
validity, in a theory of political obligation, and I will argue in Chapter Five 
about how it can be important for further justifications of coercion.
94See, e.g., Simmons 1979; 1996; 1999.
95T o reiterate, the combination o f  the four conditions o f political obligation with this moral 
criterion becomes a first instance o f what a positive account o f political obligation would be 
like. Also this combination reflects at the theoretical level what at the social level would be 
the basis o f  proper social relationships, namely the application o f  a morally significant feature 
o f  specific interaction as the central characteristic o f the relationship o f  government (in this 
case, the actual consent or choice o f each individual). Without totally dismissing quality, this 
picture o f what would be a successful voluntarism incorporates ‘transactional evaluation’ as 
the appropriate test o f  political obligation (see: Simmons 1999; my introduction, section 1).
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To conclude, the criticisms analysed in the present chapter provided a 
confirmation of the importance of voluntariness as a condition to be respected 
and reflected in an ideal of political legitimacy. This condition, when used for 
their own purposes, leads to the failure of theories of general political 
obligation (or, of the authority of the state) and, in this, motivates a different 
outlook to social relations and to what is to be regarded as a legitimate form 
of political organisation. Its role as involved in the anarchist criticisms 
becomes a first indication of a positive and comprehensive outlook reflected 
in the anarchist perspective. Most importantly, it expresses the anti­
authoritarian impulse which anarchism contains, the idea that there is always a 
complaint against the sacrifice of individual self-determination and of the 
relations of equal participation which determine the quality of human 
interaction.
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Chapter Three. An Anarchist Critique of the 
Rawlsian Idea of a Natural Duty of Justice .1
In this chapter I focus on the anarchist criticism of a deontological 
theory of good reasons for political obligation. More precisely, I criticise 
attempts to ground political obligation on a Rawlsian conception of natural 
duty. This criticism is not aimed at Rawls’ theory, but rather at the appeal to 
his natural duty of justice as a basis of a general obligation to obey the state. 
The reason for concentrating on this form of natural duty is the fact that the 
dominance of Rawls’ Theory o f Justice in political philosophy has placed his 
notion of the ‘natural duty of justice’ at the focus of the debate on political 
obligation. Yet, while for Rawls this idea, and other ‘principles that apply to 
individuals’,2 are an essential part of his theory, the establishment of a general 
political obligation on its basis is not central in this theory, nor does it 
directly determine its success. Thus, in this chapter, I address the following 
criticism only to whoever might want to adopt the Rawlsian notion of natural 
duty as the foundation of an, allegedly, adequate theory of political obligation. 
But I do not claim that Rawls himself is committed to such an endeavour.3
There are, however, connections between the basic elements of Rawls’ 
theory as a whole and his notion of natural duty. These links preclude the 
development of a theory of political obligation in terms of the latter in
'The discussion in this and the following chapter concerns only deontological accounts o f  
political obligation. I do not criticise utilitarianism, although this theory has serious problems 
when taken as an account o f political obligation. For these problems, mainly the difficulty for 
utilitarianism to satisfy the particularity and bindingness conditions o f  political obligation and 
to be compatible with the demands o f justice, see Simmons 1979, pp.45-54; W olff 1996a, 
pp.53-60; Horton 1992, pp.54-70. This limitation does not affect the main argument o f the 
thesis, since the criticism o f natural duty in this chapter renders conclusions about the 
importance o f  particularity and justice for theories o f political obligation similar to those 
derived from a criticism o f utilitarianism. They are conclusions that centrally affect theories o f  
good reasons, to which utilitarianism also belongs, and it is on this matter that I focus this 
discussion as part o f  an examination o f a different perspective on the problem o f justification 
o f political institutions.
2For these principles, see Rawls 1971, chapter VI.
3Although Rawls’ normative claim in A Theory o f  Justice could be a basis for attributing
such an attempt to him. He writes: ‘... there are several ways in which one may be bound to 
political institutions. For the most part the natural duty o f justice is the more fundamental, 
since it binds citizens generally and requires no voluntary acts in order to apply’ (1971,
p. 116). Yet he makes clear statements in his work that he does not provide a general theory
o f political obligation (e.g., 1958, p.71, n.22).
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complete abstraction from the former. This becomes clear, for example, in the 
argument from particularity analysed in sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3. In this 
argument, reference to a central part of Rawls’ theory is necessary if one is 
to clarify the force of the criticism of natural duty suggested by the 
particularity condition. Thus, in the following section, I provide a brief 
presentation of the basic elements of Rawls’ theory as they relate to his 
formulation of natural duty.
3.1.Rawls’ theory and the natural duty of justice.
Rawls’ Theory o f Justice is a paradigm of contemporary contractualism. 
It makes use of an individualist account of rationality similarly at work in 
Hobbes’ contract theory of political obligation, but, more centrally, it aspires 
to capture considerations of fairness, as a theory which ‘generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of social contract’.4 
That is to say, Rawls advances a theory which draws on social contract 
tradition in order to clarify the concept of justice as fairness, where contract 
takes the form of hypothetical agreement the object of which is the first 
principles of justice.5
The theory of justice proposed by Rawls consists mainly in, first, a 
methodological framework which includes his device of the ‘original position’,6 
and, secondly, a view about the content of justice as captured in his two
4Rawls 1971, p .l l .  For Hobbes’ contractualism, see chapter two.
sRawls 1971, section 3; 2001, p.16-17. In its formulation, Rawls’ theory draws significantly 
on Kant’s contractualism. Rawls himself claims affiliation with Kant in certain fundamental 
structural features and elements o f the content o f his theory, such as the distinction between 
the Reasonable and the Rational, the priority o f right, the role o f  the conception o f  the 
person as free and equal and its accordance with Kant’s notion o f autonomy (for this 
resemblance, see e.g. Kant 1793, pp.79-81; Rawls 1971, section 40 and pp.251-257; 1980; 
1985, esp. p.395; 1993, III, 2; 2001, pp.14-18). These aspects o f Rawls’ theory are indicative 
o f its character as an example o f a contemporary development o f the theory o f social 
contract, where the idea o f conceiving hypothetical contract as a moral route for deciding the 
content o f morality, justice and/or legitimacy and the role o f reasonableness in this, are 
central. For this understanding o f contractualism, see chapter two and the discussion below.
6See, for example, Rawls 1971, section 4, pp.l 18-150, 251-257, 187, 264; 1993, pp.22-28 and 
304-310; 2001, pp.14-18 and part III.
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principles of justice.7 These two parts to his theory constitute Rawls’ liberal 
proposal as a basis for a just political organisation.
In this chapter I concentrate on a discussion of Rawls’ original position 
and its relation to the problem of political obligation. This contractualist 
framework provides the formulation of good reasons in the manner of a 
hypothetical contract argument. Thus conceived the contract is a conceptual 
device which helps to show how the idea of fair agreement, which Rawls 
adopts for explaining how to specify the terms of social cooperation, justifies 
the principles of political justice that constitute those terms.8 This hypothetical 
contract device is characterised by various stipulations regarding our reasoning 
on how the parties participating in the agreement are to be situated and on 
what restrictions are to be made with regard to the knowledge and reasons 
they have and are deprived of, so as for the agreement to be ‘fair and 
supported by the best reasons’.9 Thus the political principles are supported by 
an agreement which is worked out deductively, rather than being a historical 
and actual covenant. It is an agreement which represents reasonable 
considerations under due reflection. The original position is ‘a theoretical 
structure’ used to represent ‘the fixed points of our considered convictions’ 
about social justice;10 a device of representation which ‘models our 
convictions’ about ‘fair conditions of agreement’ on political principles and 
about ‘acceptable restrictions on reasons’ we give for these principles.11 As 
such it is proposed as a proper philosophical basis for evaluating, or 
choosing, principles for political institutions and principles for individuals. It is
7See, for example, Rawls 1971, section 11, section 13, chapter IV; 1993, pp.4-11, 229, 237,
282, lecture VIII: sections 1-2 and 5-9; 2001, part II.
8Rawls 2001, pp.14-18.
9Ibid. p. 17.
10Rawls 1971, pp. 579-580. According to Rawls, ‘[t]he original position serves as a mediating 
idea by which all our considered convictions, whatever their level o f generality - whether 
they concern fair conditions for situating the parties or reasonable constraints on reasons, or 
first principles and precepts, or judgments about particular institutions and actions - can be 
brought to bear on one another’ (1993, p.26). In relation to this, see also on Rawls’ idea o f  
‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971, pp.19-21, 46-53, 578-86; 1993, pp.8, 28, 45, 72, 95-97, 381f, 
384n, 388 and 399; 2001, pp.26-31, 66-72, 134, 136) and further developments o f  it by 
Daniels (1979) and Klosko (2001, section I).
"Rawls 2001, pp. 17-18. Rawls revises his conception o f the original position as follows: ‘the 
original position is to be understood as a device o f representation. As such it models our
considered convictions as reasonable persons by describing the parties (each o f whom are
responsible for the fundamental interests o f  a free and equal citizen) as fa irly  situated  and as 
reaching agreement subject to appropriate restrictions on reasons for favoring principles o f  
political justice’ (ibid. p. 18, emphases mine).
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these so called principles for individuals which include the natural duty of 
justice.12
From the perspective of the debate on political obligation Rawls’ main 
account13 is found among his discussion of ‘natural duties’, which ‘apply to 
us without regard to our voluntary acts’.14 More precisely, in his idea of ‘the 
natural duty of justice’,15 defined as ‘the duty ... to support and to comply 
with just institutions that exist and apply to us [and which] also constrains us 
to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be 
done without too much cost to ourselves’.16 The arguments below are 
developed around this definition of natural duty as a theory of political 
obligation, and, more precisely, around its first part. The idea here is that if 
the basic structure of society is just, or reasonably just,17 then we all have a 
natural duty to do our part in supporting and promoting the existing scheme 
independently of any voluntary commitment on our part. The basis for 
obligation is justice, not voluntary acquisition.
12Amongst other natural duties and the obligations o f  fairness which Rawls acknowledges. See 
1971, pp.114-117, 333-337.
13Rawls refers also to the obligations o f a limited and well-placed group o f citizens, those, 
for example, ‘who are best able to gain political office and to take advantage o f the 
opportunities offered by the constitutional system’ (ibid. p.344). For Rawls, the basis o f  such 
obligations is voluntarist (and is accounted in terms o f  the ‘principle o f  fairness’: ibid. 
pp. 114, 116, 344). For an analysis o f this principle o f political obligation, see the following 
chapter o f  the thesis. Yet, for reasons such as those examined in that chapter, Rawls does 
not consider that the principle o f fairness can be used to explain a general obligation to obey 
the law.
14Ibid. pp.114-115. The points Rawls makes about his interpretation o f ‘natural rights’ in 
1971, pp.505-506: note 30, provide an important step towards a better understanding o f what 
he means by the notion o f ‘natural duty’. He connects the term ‘natural’ with the attributes 
which are ascertained by natural reason as naturally belonging to persons, independently o f  
social and legal conventions, and which are given special weight. He also uses the term to 
distinguish the rights and duties identified by his Theory o f  Justice from those defined by law 
and custom. I take it that the two features connected with the ‘natural’ here are central to 
the Rawlsian definition o f natural duties.
151971, pp.l 15-117, 333-337.
16Ibid. p .l 15 (emphasis added).
17A s Rawls himself stipulates ‘just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect’ (ibid.), since no 
existing institution is stably perfectly just. The arguments provided in this chapter apply also 
to what Rawls calls ‘nearly just’ institutions, since he considers his theory o f  natural duty to 
be justifying both ‘just’ and ‘nearly just’ institutions (ibid. pp. 351, 363). Here I focus only 
on the just ones, as we should see the effects o f the present criticism on the ideal case first 
in order then to decide those effects on institutions which fall short o f the ideal. Presumably, 
the effects on nearly just institutions will be o f the same character as those on just ones, 
although more severe, and problems with the definition o f the former do not play a central 
role in the present discussion.
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The argument of this chapter draws the limited conclusion that an 
alternative in terms of good reasons for political obligation fails as much as 
consent to justify this obligation: the natural duty of justice does not qualify 
as a ground of political obligation. Yet, this argument reveals implications for 
our evaluation of political institutions which have not been derived before. 
The consideration of Rawls in relation to the anarchist criticism from 
particularity illuminates these implications and what they show about the role 
that the anarchist position plays in understanding our relation to political 
institutions. The Rawlsian account of our duty to obey raises an interesting 
problem. It brings to the fore a focus on good reasons as a basis of political 
obligation. Such a focus departs from voluntariness as affirmed by the 
anarchist criticism in the previous chapter. Yet in being a theory of 
hypothetical consent the Rawlsian account of natural duty still preserves a 
significant appeal to self-governance. In both these aspects, it helps the 
argument developed in this thesis by providing further insight into what the 
role of institutional qualities is in justifying political authority and into how 
this relates to the role of specific interaction. Most importantly, it brings to 
the fore the fundamental anarchist positions about the value of consent and 
the problematic character of political constraints.
3.2.An anarchist criticism of the natural duty of justice.
The anarchist criticism in this section may be separated into interrelated 
two parts: first, arguments against taking the justice of the institutions as a 
reason for obedience and, second, arguments about the relation of the Rawlsian 
natural duty to the particularity condition.18 I shall deal with each in turn.
3.2.1.Against the justice of political institutions as a ground of political 
obligation.
Appealing to the just nature of political institutions as the basis of 
political obligation is what makes theories of natural duty such as Rawls’
18Namely the requirement that an account o f political obligation explains the special 
relationship between persons and the particular government o f  their country o f  residence.
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theories of institutional morality. By definition, such theories focus on the 
moral qualities of institutions in order to establish political obligations.19 But, 
can the justice of an organisation ground a general obligation to obey the 
law?
The problems which stand in the way of such a conception of our 
political duties arise from the consideration that just or good legal systems 
might provide grounds for obeying their laws and for distinguishing them 
from bad systems and yet not create political obligation. In what follows I 
shall argue that the sufficiency of justice as a ground of political obligation is 
questionable.
Raz’s discussion is representative of the anarchist criticism at this point. 
As Raz has pointed out, the substantial functions of the law, which are 
reflected in two main ‘legal techniques’, can be evaluated by appeal to certain 
general reasons for action which underlie those techniques - reasons which 
nevertheless do not suffice to establish general political obligations.20 The first 
technique provides legal sanctions as useful prudential reasons for obedience, 
in such a way as to support the respect of valuable moral duties. Either 
negative duties, like the avoidance of harm, or positive duties, like the 
provision of aid. The second technique provides ‘publicly ascertainable 
standards’ which help to guide the social behaviour of officials and the active 
contribution of citizens for the preservation of ‘worthwhile forms of social co­
operation’, in so far as these officials and citizens accept the independent 
moral reasons which underlie the standards in question.21
These connections might show how general moral reasons, and in our 
case the fundamental duty of justice, might explain the moral acceptability of 
certain political functions, but they do not generate any special relation of 
political obligation. The prudential grounds which constitute the first technique 
might be appropriate ways of securing valuable moral duties. But it cannot be
19Namely, they concentrate on the character o f  political institutions, on general moral virtues 
o f  them (such as justice) and moral accomplishments o f them for their subjects as a whole 
(such as promotion o f social happiness), rather than on any elements o f  specific interaction 
between them and individuals (such as the giving o f  consent). For some first considerations 
on the role o f quality as an aspect o f the evaluation o f  institutions within the debate on 
political obligation, see Simmons 1999; my introduction and chapter two.
201979b, pp.246-249.
21Ibid.
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taken for granted that they are the only ways of doing so and in virtue of 
their political character: individuals’ sense of duty and of their responsibility 
to others might themselves provide stable motivations for respecting these 
duties, without the need of coercive measures. But, more importantly, if such 
duties have a real moral value then it is on the force of this value that we 
should concentrate as the direct reason for support and see what kind of 
justification this provides. That the reasons for support lie in the value of 
these primary duties might make various, political or non-political, ways of 
administering them morally acceptable but it does not define the necessity of 
any specifically political means of enforcement and of a specifically political 
obligation to them. The natural duty of justice is more clearly emphasised by 
the reasons underlying the second technique which represents functions of the 
law. Yet, the observations concerning the first technique provide the 
foundation for an estimation of the role of the standards provided by the 
second technique.22 Crucially in the present case, it is part of the character of 
political institutions that legal sanctions play a central role in sustaining moral 
reasons. But my objection here is that there is no necessary principled and 
empirical connection between this political character and the sustaining of 
moral values within society. On this basis, my objection in the case of the 
standards provided by the second legal technique is that the reasons 
underlying that technique are moral reasons for action which work
independently of the existence of any political requirement on action.23 It is 
the force of the morality of these reasons and their acceptance by those 
whose behaviour they are to determine that generate obligations. The morality
which makes these reasons strong and acceptable bases of action does not
derive from the political character of their enforcement, nor does it
exclusively authorise political techniques even when such reasons are 
facilitated by them. Thus it deprives these reasons from being grounds of a 
specially political obligation. Pertaining to such moral reasons, the natural duty
22The prudential grounds o f the first technique which support the moral duties underlying it 
stand in interaction with the standards which affirm the grounds underlying the second 
technique and should be compatible with them in the way they both characterise the system. 
Their role is relevant to the present focus on natural duty as a moral reason and primary 
ground o f political obligation. In general, prudential grounds provide additional motivational 
support o f  moral reasons.
23See Raz 1979b, p.249. In relation to this argument, see also introduction note 11.
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of justice does not indispensably require publicly ascertainable standards of the 
kind imposed by the state and does not define a duty special to them.
Nevertheless, there might be appeal to the existence and value of good 
laws on which the character of a political system is founded, or, by which it 
is expressed, as a reason for supporting any further laws which contribute to 
the preservation of the good ones and thus as requiring general obedience for 
this system to be respected. This is an appeal to the moral ‘argument from 
setting a bad example’.24 It is the argument that known disobedience to 
certain (even bad) laws on the part of some individuals will badly affect 
other individuals’ conformity to good laws or to a good legal system as a 
whole. Therefore only general obedience to any law can preserve and thus 
respect good laws. Raz seems right that this argument is inadequate as a
ground of general political obligation. Disobedience is undetected in many 
cases and, most importantly, it does not always set a bad example 
encouraging offences against good laws. In fact disobedience to bad laws 
could encourage improvement of a system and enforce conformity to it. And 
the known violation of good laws can invite disapproval on the part of those 
individuals who engage in a reflective assessment of their value. Individuals 
can support good laws on the basis of their own evaluation of them, without 
the need for a general requirement of obedience to affect their reasoning and 
behaviour. These observations indicate that the argument from bad example 
lacks generality. That is, it simply does not apply to various cases of legally 
evaluable actions which must be shown to be such by a theory of political 
obligation. The relevance of this criticism to the natural duty of justice lies in
that the argument from bad example can apply to just laws, since they are a
paradigm of goodness which might be expressive of a system. The qualified 
argument falls prey to a similar objection: disobedience does not provide a 
bad example generalised enough to hurt a just system and thus violate the
requirement of the natural duty. It follows that the natural duty of justice 
fails, in a similar manner, to combine the duty to support just institutions 
with the generality condition of political obligation.25
24See Raz 1979b, pp.237-241.
25Ibid. p.241. To remind the reader, the generality condition is one essential link between a 
moral ground and the political character o f political obligation and the two are constitutive
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The above remarks suggest that the just character of an institution does 
not provide a sufficient ground for political obligation. The arguments from 
justice just examined fail to conjoin it with the essentially political character 
of this obligation. The conclusion reached so far finds expression in John 
Simmons’ statement that while morality means that ‘just institutions are the 
sort that ought to be promoted (for a variety of reasons), ... it is this fact 
alone that is expressed by a duty of justice’.26 Thus, ‘the mere justice of an 
institution ... is insufficient to derive a moral requirement to comply with and 
do ones part in that institution’.27 In other words, although justice is a 
necessary pre-condition for grounding political obligation, it is insufficient as a 
ground of such an obligation.
Jeremy Waldron gives an explanation of how the demands of justice 
involved in the natural duty account should be understood which might 
facilitate an effective reply to the preceding objection.28 When examining 
justice as a significant condition of political obligation, amongst others, 
Waldron proposes that it is important to understand justice as a moral 
imperative. For this, it is not enough that we ensure that the institutions we 
happen to have are just. Rather the natural duty of justice means that ‘the 
demands of justice [ought to] be pursued period1 and is satisfied only when 
we do our part to establish just institutions.29 In this light, the demands of 
the natural duty of justice invite a sense in which an institution can be just 
which Waldron considers both to be different from the one adopted by 
Simmons and Raz in their criticism of the natural duty of justice and to be 
substantive enough to establish political obligation in terms of such a duty. 
According to Waldron’s understanding, an institution ‘can be just in the sense 
that it is doing something that justice requires’ and not in the sense which he 
attributes to Simmons, namely that it is ‘just in the way it operates’.30 This
elements o f a satisfactory account o f our political bonds. The combination o f all the four 
conditions o f political obligation is expressive o f the political character o f such an obligation. 
For this, see the introduction o f this thesis, section 1.
261979, p. 154.
27Ibid.
28For this analysis see Waldron 1993, pp.27-30.
29Ibid. pp.28-29.
30Ibid. pp.29-30. This latter sense can be derived from Simmons’ explanation in 1999, pp.754- 
755. Also it can be understood in terms o f the elements involved in Raz’s discussion o f  
good and just institutions, namely in terms o f techniques that constitute a system’s substantive
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means that an institution is just, not when its internal operations are just 
without it being important from the point of view of justice that we assist 
them, but rather when it responds to the demands of justice. That is, when it 
is a matter of justice that it has its practices realised. And since the demands 
of justice are overriding, whenever present in an institution they facilitate an 
explanation of our bonds to that institution in terms o f natural duty.
However, this argument does not help to deflect the preceding criticism. 
The requirements of justice may be imperative and to this extent affect the 
evaluation of, and our allegiance to, an institution which satisfies them on 
purely moral grounds, without any essential reference to its political features. 
In this way, their importance is asserted through morality, but this does not 
mean that such requirements entail (or just, are) political obligations. For this, 
it has to be shown that only a political organisation qua political is effective 
and appropriate for realising these demands, which is what the anarchist 
doubts. The anarchist conclusions reached above still hold, namely that the 
moral value of justice might ground the acceptability of an institution but it 
does not on its own generate a moral requirement to comply with the 
institution. Waldron provides an account of effectiveness and legitimacy which 
he sees tied to the natural duty theory as a reply exactly to this objection. I 
will examine his argument in the discussion of particularity in the next 
section. For now, the point made is that the value of justice cannot by itself 
ground a special relationship of obligation to political institutions. This point 
is reinforced when the natural duty of justice is tested against the particularity 
condition.
The main upshot of the above considerations on the role of justice in an 
account of political obligation can now be stated. Justice makes strong moral 
claims on us. Such demands, however, do not derive from the political status 
of any institutional organisation which may make them. They thus constitute 
general moral requirements and they generate approval of the quality of any 
form of social order that reflects respect for them, but they cannot provide a 
sufficient defence of political obligation. Furthermore, the arguments for this
functioning and in terms o f its containing just laws expressive o f its character (Raz 1979b. 
See the discussion o f  these elements above).
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conclusion show that anarchism recognises the importance of the demands of 
justice in a society. The main anarchist claim, for which the present 
conclusion provides support, is that the state is not essential to the satisfaction 
of these demands and that, therefore, the demands of justice do not legitimate 
the authority of the state, nor do they establish the necessity of its existence.
These claims form the basis of the argument I want to advance in this 
chapter. Significantly, they reveal the following points. The demands of justice 
can, in the end, ground the acceptability of certain forms of government, 
distinguish bad from good governments and also serve as criterion for 
avoiding excesses of power. But this is not enough for settling the problem 
of obligation to political institutions: good reasons constitute sufficient 
justification of institutions, if we understand by this that they are legitimate 
forms of social organisation, but not of our obligation to the state. The 
anarchist view expressed in the present criticism reflects an approach which 
goes beyond a concern with justifying the legitimacy of political constraints, 
which is a concern with putting limits to political institutions within a 
background where they are generally accepted as a given. For such an 
approach, an understanding of the proper role of general moral values in an 
assessment of political institutions is crucial. And the present demonstration of 
the lack of connection between one such value and the special political nature 
of those constraints provides the first step in this direction. Political constraints 
are exclusive and inevitable in nature and the failure of general moral values 
to ground political obligation to them as such directs us to a different use of 
those values in an attempt to evaluate political institutions, one primarily 
determined by this special nature.
3.2.2.The argument arising from particularity.
Granted the above considerations, the most prominent criticism against 
the Rawlsian natural duty of justice as an account of political obligation 
concerns its relationship to the particularity condition of political obligation. 
This criticism focuses on the observation that the duty to support just 
institutions does not explain the particular relation of each citizen to his or
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her own polity. It rather facilitates support of every system that is just, 
whenever that be possible.
These points are supported by an extended argument made by 
Simmons.31 He asserts, firstly, that the theory of natural duty lacks a ‘strong 
sense of application’, namely one which is generated by actions that make an 
individual ‘an active participant’, when, for example, one explicitly consents. 
My arguments in Chapter Two showed that explicit consent constitutes a 
genuine expression of initiation of and participation in a particular relationship, 
even though existing polities fail to obtain it. And it is an element which is 
lacking in natural duty accounts. Secondly, Simmons claims that the natural 
duty satisfies only a ‘weak or territorial sense of application’, one holding, for 
example, when we ‘live in an area in which [the rules of an institution] are 
enforced’, which, not being morally significant, cannot establish ‘a genuine 
duty’. It is important to note here that this claim is merely that a theory of 
natural duty can satisfy only this weak sense of application. It is not to be 
interpreted as a claim that Rawls himself appeals to such a weak notion of 
application or that it is consistent with his theory as a whole. In fact, he 
doesn’t, since his contractualism is ‘an idea of reason’ (to echo Kant’s 
phrase) rather than an actual recipe for legitimate government.32 Thirdly, 
Simmons argues that, while theories of consent or of ‘fair play’ implement 
the strong sense of application, their use in order to supplement Rawls’ theory 
of natural duty would condemn the latter to the violation of the generality 
condition which these theories suffer. The anarchist criticism developed in this 
thesis shows that neither consent nor the principle of fairness are sufficient to
31 The quotations together with the components o f this argument as presented here are taken, 
or derived, from Simmons 1979, pp.150-156.
32Kant 1793, p.79. This observation attacks a stronger formulation o f  the present objection as 
part o f  the criticism from particularity. In that formulation the claim is that an appeal to 
Rawls’ phrase ‘apply to us’ as an indication that the duty addresses the inhabitants o f a 
particular community is an arbitrary move: it focuses on ‘practical considerations’, concerning 
the proximity o f each state to the members o f the society which it governs, as an important 
reason for obedience (Horton 1992, pp. 104-105; Simmons 1979, pp. 154-155); such a focus 
works in defiance o f principled considerations, which in fact constitute the proper basis o f  
any attempt to combine particularity with justice. In general, the inclusion o f  the ‘application 
clause’ in a natural duty theory seems illegitimate, mainly because it renders the justice o f  an 
institution irrelevant to a justification o f our political bonds (Simmons 1979, pp.153-156). The 
position o f  natural duties within Rawls’ theory, especially their relation to his original position 
as a method o f  hypothetical contract as specially conceived by Rawls, enables his theory to 
avoid this problem. For this, see the discussion o f the role o f the original position with 
regard to particularity in section 3.2.3. below.
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generate political obligation for most of the individuals in existing societies.33 
Also, such a supplementation is illegitimate, since it grounds ‘a quite different 
sort of moral requirement’, obligations rather than duties. According to 
Simmons, a significant difference between obligations and duties is that the 
former correlate with “ rights on personam” , namely ‘rights which are held 
against a specific person, and are rights to a specific performance or 
forbearance’ while the latter correlate with “ rights in rem” , namely ‘rights 
which are held against all other people’.34 The morality of the natural duty of 
justice secures only the latter and in this creates no connection with the 
particularistic character of political obligation, to which consent and fairness
adhere. Finally, Simmons argues that only the strong sense of application, 
with its ‘personal transaction’ element (which is essentially voluntarist; see the 
first point of his argument here), can meet ‘the particularity requirement’ as 
an essential condition of political obligation.35 Thus, Rawls’ idea of natural 
duty, indeed, any duty-based theory, in violating the particularity condition, 
fails to ground political obligation.
In response to this type of argument, Waldron has proposed a strategy 
for reconciling the Rawlsian, duty-based view, with the particularity condition. 
Waldron concludes that ‘an organization which is just, effective and legitimate 
.... [establishes] ... the moral requirement that we support and obey such an 
organization .... not itself based on any promise that we have made’.36 Here I 
want to examine the steps leading to this conclusion.
A first step is to establish that principles of justice can be ‘range-
limited’, namely such that there can be a set of persons who can be
distinguished as those whose conduct, claims and interests it is the point of 
these principles to deal with, so that they are considered as ‘insiders’ in
33 See chapters two and four.
341979, p. 15.
35This point is central in the anarchist perspective on political obligation. It expresses the idea 
that only morally significant features o f specific interaction, those involved in transactional 
evaluation, can establish the particular moral relationship which political obligation requires for 
its actuality (Simmons 1999). One o f the main aims o f  my examination o f the anarchist 
criticisms is to see whether this claim is justified. Chapter two has given an affirmative 
answer. The arguments o f this chapter (and chapter four) make a more decisive step in this 
direction. They also help to complete the considerations introduced in the previous chapters 
with regard to deciding the role o f  quality for political obligation.
361993, p.27.
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relation to them.37 On this basis, principles of justice can be seen to demand 
special allegiance from the insiders and thus be particularly applied to them 
as opposed to ‘outsiders’. We need an argument which shows principles of 
justice to be range-limited such that it avoids mere appeal to the weak notion 
of application described above. For this, Waldron appeals to Kant’s argument. 
Thus we need to examine whether it gives a solution to the problem. The 
argument38 is that the decision to enter political society is not an open
question because if individuals are so situated that they are inevitably close to 
certain others and thus have a claim to the same resources, conflict and 
violence will be inevitable even if those people are good natured and 
reasonable. Disputes will arise about the possession of the same resources and 
people will still disagree about what seems good and just to each regarding 
the use of those resources. So in order to avoid conflict and the suffering it 
entails people should quickly enter a form of society with those with whom it 
is more likely to see their interests to compete, namely with their near
neighbours. In this way, the principles which are to define their relations are
range-limited in the sense that they are the ‘basis for settling those conflicts 
which are immediately unavoidable’.39
It is doubtful however whether this is a satisfactory argument. The 
appeal to conflict shows a way of defining particular application which lies in 
external circumstances rather than in a principled connection between justice 
and the generation of particular relations. Thus it seems to operate the weak 
notion of application, rather than the strong one which provides a direct 
principled basis for distinguishing insiders from outsiders. Nevertheless, in 
order to decide whether the sense in which the argument identifies the 
demands of justice as range-limited is a strong sense and whether the
argument can establish a demand of special allegiance to political institutions, 
we need to examine it further.
37Ibid. p. 13.
38For the following analysis o f this argument, see ibid. pp. 14-15. This argument appears in 
the prudential reasoning o f Hobbes with regard to human nature and the necessity o f the state 
(1651) as well as in Hume’s account o f justice (1739-40, book III, part II). But here it takes 
a special form which draws attention to prudential considerations only as part o f  the demands 
o f  justice, which is more clearly represented by Kant’s view (see also Kant 1793, pp.79-81).
39Waldron 1993, p.15.
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At this point we can see how the Kantian argument works with regard 
to the administration of principles by institutions. In the case of political 
institutions, the claim is that a range-limited application of principles is 
possible if we see that the insiders are those who are constrained to accept a 
principle of justice and then to accept secondary principles which accompany 
it - for example, principles which require individuals to accept its supervision 
by a specific institution which embodies its demands - while the outsiders are 
those who are constrained only to not interfere with this administration.40 And 
an institution will be able to administer a range-limited principle of justice if 
most of the people to whom it applies accept these secondary principles and
most others accept the principle of non-interference. But for this to work we
need to establish that people are actually bound to the institutions which
claim to have this role.
For Waldron, this can be provided by the satisfaction of a test of 
legitimacy.41 According to this test we need to show, first, that the existence
of institutions which do justice is significant, secondly, that it is important for
there to be only one institution doing justice in a territory and, thirdly, that
there are grounds for seeing one particular organisation as appropriate for this
purpose.
The first demand Waldron requires to be satisfied by Kant’s argument 
analysed above. But even if this argument was proved to work for the
application of principles, there are reasons for doubting its success with regard 
to the necessity of political institutions. The discussion of social contract in 
Chapter Two provides the basis for such doubts. The social contract 
arguments from the state of nature examined there may show that the state is 
a good solution to problems of security, peace and co-ordination, but they do 
not establish the state as the only solution. First, they do not provide a proof 
that the state of nature would make agreement impossible, they rather simply 
assume this. Secondly, even if it would, there are still proposals in favour of 
non-political, decentralised forms of interaction which might as well provide 
the background for resolution of conflicts. It remains an open question which
40See ibid. pp. 15-19.
41For this and my analysis below see ibid. pp.20-27.
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alternative will do better, but non-political alternatives have been excluded by 
state-of-nature defences without proper examination and this shows that their 
appeal to the state as the alternative is very quick. So even if principles of 
justice could be properly range-limited by appeal to the danger of conflict, 
their application by political institutions is not necessarily entailed and thus no 
special relation of obligation to those institutions is justified. The argument 
does not prove that it is important for the sake of justice that political 
institutions exist.
Yet, it can be argued that political institutions are one important solution 
to problems of justice and since we are already within their terrain this 
should suffice for their justification. Even if we accept this argument, it 
remains for us to examine the replies given to the other two demands in 
order to see if it can ground political obligation. With regard to the second 
demand of Waldron’s test of legitimacy, his argument is that if we accept 
that the avoidance of conflict provides a justification of political society then 
on this basis we can explain why we should have only one such organisation. 
The reasoning here is that if there are more than one organisation there will 
still be conflict of the same kind in which individuals were involved in the 
first place: individuals will still support the organisation which serves their 
own reasons as they understand them and conflict will arise between such 
organisations as representatives of different claims, a conflict of an even 
worse kind since the fighting will be better organised. Also given the 
demands of cooperation, people need an assurance that others follow the same 
goals with them so us to know that they will cooperate with them and 
achieve these goals. Such an assurance can be provided by the existence of 
only one system which determines the goals that people are to share, the 
ways to achieve them and the cooperation of all. Furthermore, problems of 
coordination demand a similar solution in order for there to be an assurance 
that all individuals follow the same of the various possible ways in which 
they might be able to coordinate (for example, although both driving on the 
left and driving on the right might be equally acceptable solutions, individuals 
in the same society need to follow only one and the same in order to 
coordinate). Both cooperation and coordination are important not only for the 
avoidance of conflicts but also for the avoidance of injustice itself.
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In response to these arguments, one can claim that when society is
organised on a small-scale, where people communicate more directly and 
cooperate for smaller goals without need for centralised supervision and where 
more general goals might be solved through confederation between the smaller 
groups, then the need for a single organisation does not seem so urgent.
Anarchists support exactly these kinds of social solutions. Theorists and 
activists disagree about their viability and there might be reasons for doubting 
that existing societies can afford such a change, but this possibility cannot be 
excluded on the basis of an assumption that only the state can work.
Alternative structures might not be immediately viable but they are possible.
What is interesting about this reply is that it resurrects an argument against 
the state which underlies the defence of alternatives and makes it stronger. 
The underlying reasoning is that the state might seem important because a 
focus on the necessity of its existence neglects the fact that it might be the 
very existence and structure of the state which generates the problems that we 
are then asked to solve. The state is our reality and it might work well with 
regard to the problems it is required to solve, yet it might be that it is the 
very reality of the state that makes it so that it becomes the only visible way 
of solving problems. We find ourselves in it without being asked and without 
being presented with other possibilities. The problems the state is asked to 
solve are identified through the experience within it. Alternative structures 
might not even identify conflict in the same way as it is identified within the 
state. In the end, the argument from alternatives works primarily as an 
indication of the uncertainty of arguments for the necessity of the state. And 
the arguments to follow show this more decisively.
Even if a final solution to the problems of conflict and injustice 
favoured the state, there is still the third demand of the test of legitimacy to 
be examined. And this is quite crucial because the aim of my argument is to 
show that granting political obligation seems to be the wrong way to go 
about justification. According to Waldron’s argument, legitimacy demands that 
an organisation be capable of enforcing justice and, for this, that people be 
prepared to accept it, that they can be assured that sufficient others are 
disposed to comply with the principles of justice in order to think that a 
particular institution is effective and thus that they are bound to it. The last
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step for establishing that a particular organisation is the appropriate one for 
exercising justice is to prove its salience. And the proposal is that, for 
proving salience, majority consent, hypothetical consent or hypothetical 
majority consent can suffice.42 Here the idea is that the ground for recognising 
a particular scheme as appropriate is justice, namely that it embodies the 
demands of justice. But a good way of establishing this is to use hypothetical 
(majority) agreement, as an indication that that institution ‘may appropriately 
embody those demands’.43 This, for Waldron is not a consent theory of 
political obligation. We do not try to show the existence of an actual consent 
as a basis of obligation but we rather use hypothetical consent as a 
confirmation of the appropriateness of political institutions in terms of justice. 
Obligatoriness here becomes a matter of moral background. The natural duty 
of justice makes justice the ground of obligation and consent is used to 
distinguish the institutions which embody it. For this, hypothetical majority 
consent is all that is needed.
In this argument, we can see an appeal to hypothetical consent similar 
to the one set out in Chapter Two. The focus is on the qualities of political 
institutions, on good reasons for accepting them. And consent is used as a 
thought-experiment for conceiving these reasons, as a moral route through 
which we discover what the best reasons are for supporting principles and 
institutions. This, however, helps us understand our moral duties such as those 
of justice but it does not prove an actual relationship to a particular
organisation. Anarchists agree that justice is an imperative. And Waldron’s test 
of legitimacy might show that certain institutions are just and thus acceptable 
on general and imperative moral grounds. But the hypothetical consent can
establish only this. This is what the proof of salience amounts to.
Hypothetical consent, or hypothetical popular consent (or even popular 
consent), does not establish a particular relationship between each person and 
institutions which claim his or her allegiance. General political obligation to 
particularly one society is not proved. Waldron uses legitimacy in a sense
different44 to the one used in the debate on political obligation, where it is
42Ibid. pp.26-27.
43Ibid. p.26.
^For this, see also Waldron 1993a, chapter two.
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seen as the correlate of that obligation.45 Still, he argues that the satisfaction 
of his idea of legitimacy is enough as a basis for accounts of obligation, that 
it establishes the bindingness of institutions. But what I argue here is that his 
ideal of legitimacy generates a demand for constant evaluation of institutions 
in terms of justice rather than a basis for ultimate allegiance to them, which 
constitutes political obligation.
With regard to Rawls, Waldron himself accepts that his hypothetical
consent is ‘a model-theoretic device for establishing what justice actually
amounts to; it has no political or institutional significance, either with regard 
to obligation or with regard to legitimacy (in the sense [Waldron is] 
discussing)’.46 Indeed, in Rawls’ case it is more obvious how hypothetical
consent works as a way of justifying principles for institutions, for discovering 
the political principles which are supported by the best reasons, rather than as 
a theory of political obligation. It might still be possible that there is a
connection of his theory of natural duty to particularity on the basis of this
understanding of the theory. I will examine this possibility in the following
section. The point I argue here is that the connection is not provided by
Waldron’s account. Still, we can see Waldron’s defence of natural duty as a 
departure from Rawls. But, despite his claim on institutional significance, the 
lesson we learn from that defence is that justice matters for legitimacy and 
that legitimacy can be understood as a matter of the acceptability of political 
institutions, of a proof that they can embody and apply justice to a specific 
society, and of the need to be assessed constantly on this basis. This does 
not prove that they are the only ones which can do so nor that their range- 
limited application derives from their political nature. The questions still 
remain open of whether conflict is the basis for political society and whether 
a single political authority is justified. And hypothetical consent cannot
combine affirmative answers to these questions with its kind of evaluation of 
political constraints in a way that establishes particularity. The moral 
importance of justice does not itself make constraints range-limited and the 
representation of its demands through hypothetical consent does not provide a
45For this, see my introduction section 1.
46Waldron 1993, p.26, note 46.
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salience which generates a special and actual relation binding each individual 
to his own government. Particularity is still not satisfied.
3.2.3.Rawls and particularity.
Nevertheless, there are considerations coming from a closer estimation of 
the relation of Rawls’ account of natural duty to particularity, which can deal 
better with the anarchist criticism. In this context Rawls’ original position 
becomes crucially relevant. In the discussion of this framework (in section
3.1.), I stressed that Rawls’ contractualist methodology is a device used to 
model what we regard as fair conditions on agreement and acceptable 
restrictions on reasons for principles of social justice. Also, that his theory of 
natural duty is more precisely a hypothetical contract theory of natural duty, 
since the natural duty of justice to be imposed on individuals is among those 
principles that would be acknowledged by individuals in his original position.47 
This shows that an appeal to the Rawlsian natural duty of justice as an 
account of political obligation cannot disregard the role of Rawls’ original 
position and its connection to the issue. Given these features of the theory we 
can begin to understand its relation to particularity. According to Rawls, both 
his two principles of justice and his methodology are designed for a specific 
form of society: the ‘formal conditions on principles’, the considerations 
hidden by ‘the veil of ignorance’ and other elements relevant to concerns 
about social justice involved in the original position48 include ideas which 
Rawls believes to be central for citizens who live in societies of a liberal 
democratic tradition. The original position represents the considered judgements 
of the citizens of such societies. It is for these societies that Rawls proposes 
his theory of justice. The construction of the original position tenders a 
deontological version of hypothetical contract as a theory explanatory of what 
would be considered good reasons by reasonable49 democratic citizens. The
47A s Rawls himself claims in 1971, p .l 15.
48See Rawls 1971, pp. 146-147. For ‘formal conditions on principles’ see section 23. For the 
‘veil o f ignorance’ see section 24. See also Rawls 1993, pp.22-28; 2001, pp.14-18 and 80- 
134.
49To be reasonable is to take the interests o f others into consideration, to be willing to justify 
or modify your own reasons according to a basis that they can share with you as long as 
they are similarly motivated. This is reflected in Rawls’ and Scanlon’s formulation o f the 
motivation o f the contractors, by which they attribute to them ‘a sense o f justice’ and a desire
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natural duty of justice, along with the idea that we need political institutions 
for a successful implementation of the requirements of social justice, are
claimed by Rawls to deserve reasonable acceptance by individuals in his 
imaginative position. In this way, Rawls’ theory seems to satisfy the
particularity condition, at least in principle. Through the hypothetical thought- 
experiment each individual of a democratic society can assert the
considerations which reflect his reasonable viewpoint as such a citizen and the 
principles affirmed on this basis are the result of the best reasons with which 
he identifies. Thus, individuals can be seen to have a particular normative 
relation to the principles chosen for their societies and to be able to extend 
this relation to the institutions which embody these principles in these 
societies. The natural duty of justice is based on the reasonable viewpoint that 
the citizens of societies with a specific character should have and it can
determine their social relation to the institutions which satisfy this viewpoint. 
In principle, the strong sense of application is satisfied.
Yet, it is that this happens only in principle that makes theories 
focusing on institutional qualities problematic as accounts of political 
obligation, even when such theories are based on hypothetical consent with its 
significant representation of self-governance. The normative force of the 
original position affects first and foremost the acceptability of principles which 
can then determine the character of political institutions and not the 
acceptability of institutions themselves. Furthermore, such an acceptability 
regards the character of political institutions rather than the features of a 
particular relation of authority. Finally, a definition of what counts as the 
reasonable viewpoint of democratic citizens differs from an identification of 
their actual viewpoints. The former constitutes a normative standard for 
assessing their viewpoint, a representation of the idea of political autonomy, 
but it does not establish any actual authority unless it characterises their real 
viewpoint as it actually applies to specific institutions. Rawls’ theory might be 
representative of the general attitude of reasonable democratic citizens of some 
societies, but this does not prove any application of the specific interaction
to justify their claims to others (e.g.: Rawls 1971, pp.46, 312, 505; 1980; 1985; Scanlon 1982; 
1998).
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between individuals and between them and political institutions required in 
order to establish actual political obligations.50 It is only when the 
reasonableness of accepting a natural duty to our just institutions is asserted 
in the specific tasks they serve for each and every member of their society 
that a special political relationship can be created. The general justice of 
institutions may justify their existence and/or desirability but not that they are 
actually and continually performing their tasks and are accepted.51 We will 
have to examine the specific relations between particular democratic societies 
and their citizens as governed by the principles of justice in order to see 
whether in their particular case Rawls’ theory can establish special allegiance. 
As it stands, Rawls’ account provides general normative constraints of justice 
for evaluating political institutions in general and as they already exist, it does 
not serve the purpose of establishing a particular society and its authority.
We can see this to be clearly conceded by Rawls himself: ‘..in contrast 
to the various conceptions of social contract, the several parties do not 
establish any particular society or practice; they do not covenant to obey a 
particular sovereign body or to accept a given constitution. Nor do they, as in 
game theory (in certain respects a marvelously sophisticated development of 
this tradition), decide on individual strategies adjusted to their respective 
circumstances in the game. What the parties do is jointly acknowledge certain
50A1so , in representing what Rawls thinks as the characteristic reasonable attitude o f the 
democratic citizen in liberal societies, his theory does not examine the considered beliefs o f  
ordinary people who actually live in these societies. So it is not certain that his intuitions 
reflect accurately those o f the public to whom he refers (this observation does not challenge 
the appropriateness o f  his abstraction but rather suggests that for the abstraction to be a 
faithful application o f  the reasonable which is particular to the culture it addresses it may be 
necessary that it is more securely connected with the actual reasonable o f  that culture). For 
this point see Klosko 2001, section I. To the sets o f considered judgments and moral 
principles which stand in mutual support according to Rawls’ method o f ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ (Rawls 1971, pp.19-21, 46-53, 578-586; 2001, pp.29-32), Klosko adds ‘the beliefs 
o f  ordinary citizens’ and calls his own a ‘broad reflective equilibrium’ (2001, p.5). This is a 
further development from Daniels’ ‘wide reflective equilibrium’ (Daniels 1979), which itself 
extends the logic o f  Rawls’ account by involving also appeal to ‘a set o f relevant background 
theories’, which underlie and serve the evaluation o f competing moral principles (ibid. p.258). 
Maybe Klosko’s appeal to ordinary beliefs should be seen as an ‘argument from common 
opinion’, one resting on the authority o f common belief, rather than as one ‘from coherence’, 
o f the kind that Rawls’ method is (for this point see Green 1996, pp.2-5). But in the present 
case, the focus is on the relevance o f  public opinion for creating particularity, whatever its 
proper role in a theory might be. To what extent Klosko’s and any empirical investigation 
can deliver true public opinion on comlpex, normative matters such as political obligation is 
another issue, which I discuss in chapter four (on this see Green 1996).
51For this point see Simmons 1999, pp.754-755.
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principles of appraisal relating to their common practices either as already 
established or merely proposed. They accede to standards of judgement, not to 
a given practice; they do not make any specific agreement, or bargain, or
adopt a particular strategy. The subject of their acknowledgement is, therefore,
very general indeed; it is simply the acknowledgement of certain principles of 
judgement, fulfilling certain general conditions, to be used in criticising the 
arrangement of their common affairs. The relations of mutual self-respect 
between the parties who are similarly circumstanced mirror the conditions 
under which questions of justice arise, and the procedure by which the 
principles of judgement are proposed and acknowledged reflects the constraints 
of having a morality. Each aspect, then, of the [Rawlsian] hypothetical 
account serves the purpose of bringing out a feature of the notion of
justice’.52
Therefore it is concluded that the relation of a Rawlsian theory of
political obligation to particularity is this: in principle, Rawls’ account of 
natural duty does not violate the particularity condition. Moreover, when an 
attempt to base political obligation on the Rawlsian conception of natural duty 
reflects the centrality and connection of Rawls’ original position to the issue, 
then the attempt preserves, in principle, the prospect of particularity. But the 
principled support provided for natural duty within such a framework renders 
no proof of the actual application in terms of natural duty of the moral 
relationship between citizens and government required for political obligation. 
The particularity condition for political obligation is not satisfied.
3.2.4.Self-govemance and the role of general moral principles.
The above considerations are crucial for the main argument of this 
thesis. They shed light on the following observations about a significant 
connection between the role of general moral principles such as justice in 
defending political institutions and the affirmation of the importance of self- 
governance, with which I end this section. As argued in Chapter Two, 
hypothetical consent provides a phenomenology of how individuals can be 
ruled by themselves and represents a route through which they come to
521958, p.57.
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identify with important aspects of their social world even when they do not 
actually consent. This nevertheless does not itself ground social relations and 
duties. The preceding discussion of Rawls confirms these points, now as 
applied with regard to the demands of justice. Furthermore, as regards the 
relation of justice to the political discussed in this chapter, this moral value 
constitutes a criterion for the acceptability of political institutions and can be 
used along with other such values for moral evaluations of such institutions 
which do not however depend on their political nature. In the absence of 
direct expressions of voluntary submission and a transactional application of 
the demands of justice, political institutions can be assessed in terms of 
general values in order for us to see aspects of their existence to be 
appropriate. But this does not generate political obligation. And it does not 
secure individual freedom unless it is done in light of the defects of political 
institutions. The results of the debate on political obligation so far show that 
the exclusive and authoritative nature of political institutions makes them 
incapable of certain relations and possibilities - such as the kind of 
interactions that would justify a relationship of political obligation - and this 
gives us reason to reconsider the way we accept them and let them govern 
our lives. It indicates the instability of arguments for their necessity. The 
nature of political institutions is such that within them there is always a point 
at which self-determination is governed by aspects external to itself. When 
political obligation is claimed to be defended as a special relationship which 
gives governments the right to decide the conditions of social life without 
being challenged in terms of content and degree and to use coercion to back 
up this function, then the possibility of re-evaluating those conditions is 
limited. That is why the basic acts of self-assumed commitment and kinds of 
social co-operation which involve decentralised, reciprocal and equal relations 
do not sit well with such a duty. In order to secure respect of self- 
governance, beyond their use for assessing the acceptability of political 
institutions and for limiting excesses of their power, general moral values can 
be used as general requirements on institutions which apply constantly and in 
view of their defects.
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3.3.The implications of the anarchist criticism of natural duty.
The implications of the preceding elaboration of the anarchist criticism 
of the Rawlsian natural duty are as follows:
1) In many cases, the just character of political institutions is a 
considerable reason for supporting aspects of them that express this character. 
It also renders them more suitable and possible candidates of political 
legitimacy. However, it does not qualify as a ground of political obligation. It 
fails, despite its moral significance, to be a general basis of obligation which 
comes to terms with the political character of institutions. Thus, the natural 
duty of justice is guaranteed a privileged position from the perspective of the 
general debate on morality and on the desirability of constraints, but not as 
part of a successful defence of political obligation.
2) Failure to satisfy the particularity condition does not necessarily 
condemn Rawls’ account of natural duty, since, his theory as a whole serves 
aims quite different from the aim to defend political obligation and since, 
when accommodated to the latter concern, contrary to first impressions, that 
account is, at least in principle, compatible with the requirement. But such a 
compatibility does not establish the theory as an account of political 
obligation. The discussion of Rawls’ theory is helpful in that it highlights the 
significance of the particularity condition as an indispensable part of a theory 
of political obligation and so justifies the anarchist insistence upon it. The 
discussion of particularity confirms the anarchist’s demand that we need to 
focus, as the last court of appeal, on the actual and particular conditions 
which may generate and characterise the relationship of political obligation - 
with which our concern with values when assessing political institutions is 
transformed into a direct and substantive assessment of our social world.
In sum: particularity proves to be a hard test for any account which 
focuses on moral qualities of political institutions. Such accounts provide 
elaborated bases for evaluating political institutions, for understanding the 
reasons of their existence and the criteria on the basis of which we can 
explain our relation to them. But they do not provide the ground for an 
overall justification of political impositions and for primary determination of 
the actions of individuals by them. This can be established only on the basis
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of the presence of morally important features of specific interaction between 
political institutions and individuals, as something which substantially and 
continually characterises social reality. At the same time, whilst justice cannot 
provide a ground for obeying government, the possibility of attempts to 
undermine it is restricted by the central role of this idea in morality.53 Justice 
and every other important moral quality of institutions remain strong criteria 
for their assessment.
At this point of my study, the role of institutional morality, or quality, 
within the debate on political obligation becomes clearer. Institutional morality 
is an indispensable aspect of evaluation of political constraints since the latter 
cannot be taken for granted and desirable in themselves. In the present case, 
the justice of institutions plays central role in moral evaluations of our social 
reality and for imposing principled demands on political structures and 
practices. Yet, for the specific relationship which needs to apply in order for 
there to be political obligation, this general quality - and any such quality - 
is insufficient. Instead, it is how such qualities apply to the interaction 
between existing institutions and each of their citizens and to the relations 
between those citizens themselves that matters in creating this special political 
relationship. The failure of defences of political obligation to combine the 
moral with the political feature through the four conditions which determine 
the debate on political authority is indicative of the difficulty of achieving 
this aim. It is this point that the anarchist criticisms express and which 
characterises primarily the perspective involved in the anarchist challenge.
The anarchist proposal itself of an ideal of political legitimacy is guided 
by these considerations, as declared in the conclusions of this and the 
preceding chapter. According to the conclusions of Chapter Two, a successful 
attempt to justify political obligation should satisfy the conditions of 
generality, particularity, bindingness and content-independence in a way that 
reflects a recognition of the value of voluntariness. This corresponds to the 
prior anarchist idea of a society that actually involves voluntarist transactions 
as a paradigm of legitimacy. The new element to be added as a result of the
53Although considerations o f  feasibility and efficiency might require compromise on the part 
o f  considerations o f justice, to a greater or lesser extent.
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discussion of this chapter is this: justice is a necessary virtue of political 
institutions. In order to establish their legitimacy, however, this quality must 
be proved compatible with the main conditions of political obligation, and 
especially with particularity. At the same time, while justice cannot be secured 
without at least a minimal level of efficiency, its wholesale sacrifice to the 
latter deprives an institution from most of its moral character. These 
considerations reflect another prior vision which determines the anarchist 
perspective. That is, that a society which would involve the actual distribution 
of equal rights, opportunities and other benefits - the actual implementation of 
just treatment - would be legitimately one where the special relationship 
between the coercive structures which realise these functions and the citizens 
who consider them their own exists.
Thus, the ideal of legitimacy appears in the form of anarchist proposals 
that vindicate visions of society which represent prior considerations as to 
what the aim of the debate on political obligation is. And it is significant that 
they stress the importance (and difficulty) of insisting on quality, still in a 
way that reminds us that, for political obligation, this insistence can be 
meaningful only in relation to actual, particular interaction. The anarchist 
criticisms bring once more the anarchist perspective and ideals of legitimacy 
together and thus open the way for arriving at a unified and comprehensive 
view.
These considerations advance the argument about the problematic 
character of constraints which distinguishes the anarchist perspective. The 
demand for a complete absence of constraints might seem an impossible and 
even undesirable position. We might still have serious reasons for wanting our 
decisions to be determined by others - a strong need for peace and safety as 
well as the demands of important moral duties. But in the case of political 
constraints such reasons do not suffice to justify unconditional allegiance to 
them. Their coercive character takes a centralist and exclusive form such that 
undermines not only the opportunity for self-government but the capacity for 
self-government itself and all that it mirrors about individuals qua persons, 
who as such need and deserve peace and security. Political coercion affects 
the quality o f relations between individuals in a manner and to an extent that 
it undermines the very basis of an equal standing and free participation. It
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violates the very reasons for which institutions are meant to exist in the first 
place. In the end, there aren’t very strong arguments for having a duty to the 
state as there are for other moral duties and this has significant implications 
for political institutions themselves.
These points relate to the importance of self-governance and the value 
of consent which the preceding anarchist criticisms underline. Self-government 
matters as the fundamental exercise of our capacity to control and lead our 
own lives without being subjected to arbitrary limitations. And as such it 
preserves and requires relations of a free and equal character, which reflect a 
respect for the status of human beings. Self-government does involve being 
ruled. It involves constraints. But it also involves the expression of a desire 
not to be constrained. This might seem inconsistent. Yet different ways of 
attending to self-governance make a difference which explains the 
compatibility between these two demands. Consent has not proved to be an 
adequate basis of political obligation but it still remains an obvious way of 
expressing and exercising personal authority and achieving equal participation. 
Actual consent secures self-government. It provides an immediate way of 
realising this capacity. In its absence, it is important that the constraints 
imposed on us are of a kind which still relates to our capacity for critical 
reflection and decision making, that they are rooted in our decision to be 
ruled. The unconditional acceptance of political constraints on the basis of 
their general virtues does not preserve this connection. The failure of quality- 
based accounts to ground political obligation indicates this problem. Also, it 
indicates that such accounts should work as a basis for a regular and 
regularly re-evaluated assessment of political institutions, which is necessary 
for ensuring the legitimacy of their workings in light of the instability created 
by the absence of political obligation. Principles such as justice can be used 
for assessing the merits of institutions and tracing their legitimate power in 
light of their defects and by reference to the harms of particular persons. So, 
in the absence of consent and other features of morally important specific 
interaction, we need to work very hard in order to assure that constraints are 
compatible with proper social relations and self-governance. Proclaiming 
political obligation is not the right way to go about justification.
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The results of the debate on political obligation show that it is very 
difficult for institutions to become legitimate. And this motivates a more 
demanding approach to them. The problem of justification is one beyond 
applying limitations to institutions. It is rather about how difficult it is for any 
state to be legitimised and about highlighting these difficulties. This 
perspective is distinctive of the anarchist position.
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Chapter Four. The Failure of the Principle of 
Fairness as an Account of Political Obligation.
In this chapter, I advance an anarchist criticism of fair-play defences of 
political obligation. The fair play, or fairness, approach constitutes perhaps the 
most prominent of the reciprocity-based theories of political obligation. From 
the perspective of this thesis, it is important that the fairness principle 
exemplifies a condition which makes it a characteristic reciprocal theory, 
namely ‘the idea of proportionality’.1 This interprets political obligation as a 
contribution, or burden, proportional to an individual’s received benefits. My 
aim is to examine the limitations of the principle as an account of our duty 
to the state but, at the same time, to explain the value of its role in the
debate. The principle of fairness constitutes a further deontological, good 
reason for political authority, which is, however, different from that involved 
in the natural duty of justice examined in Chapter Three. It returns to the
active aspect of obligation, from which duty-based theories depart. 
Significantly, it brings us back to the value of voluntariness, which was 
defended in Chapter Two. The main argument of this chapter is that the 
element of voluntary acceptance involved in the principle is of crucial 
importance to our understanding of political relations and it is the
interpretation of the principle which focuses on this feature that I want to 
emphasise. I also conclude that the fairness account examined below has a 
limited application: it can determine the character of the procedures which 
might apply within political institutions (that is, it can function as the
condition that the rules of these procedures are fair), but it cannot justify 
political obligation.
I begin with a presentation of the main features of the principle of 
fairness as formulated by H.L.A. Hart and Rawls. I then go on to discuss
1 W olff 1995b, pp.8-9. Yet, with respect to this idea the principle o f  fairness is distinguished 
from other reciprocity-based theories such as gratitude in the way they define duties: the 
former defines the necessary return required from the recipient (as doing his fair share in 
producing the benefits), while in the latter the recipient decides for himself how to 
reciprocate (Klosko 2001, p. 10). And, more generally, fairness involves more complex 
relationships between the beneficiaries, determined by the idea that they are active participants 
in a cooperative structure (Simmons 1979, pp.172-175). I analyse these features o f  fairness 
below.
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certain elements which appear to be importantly involved in the conception of 
the principle but which do not seem to me to be integral to its rationale. 
This will allow for the clarification of their role with regard to the main 
anarchist arguments against the principle. Finally, I examine those arguments 
and their implications.
4.1.The principle of fairness.
Hart explains the principle of fairness in this way:
‘When a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to 
rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these 
restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those 
who have benefited by their submission. The rules may provide that officials 
should have authority to enforce obedience ... but the moral obligation to obey 
the rules in such circumstances is due to the cooperating members of the 
society, and they have the correlative moral right to obedience’.2
As for Rawls, his central formulation runs like this:
‘Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social 
cooperation, and that the advantages it yields can only be obtained if 
everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. Suppose further that cooperation 
requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least involves a certain 
restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally that the benefits produced by 
cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation 
is unstable in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or nearly all) 
of the others will continue to do their part, he will still be able to share a 
gain from the scheme even if he does not do his part. Under these conditions 
a person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of 
fair play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free benefits by not 
cooperating’.3
Comments on these two statements are commonplace within the literature 
on fairness (of which the bibliography used in this chapter is a representative
2Hart 1955, p.185.
3Rawls 1964, pp.9-10.
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part). Below I note the aspects of the principle that are most widely regarded 
as its main features under the two formulations. This will help clarify the 
formulations themselves. My examination of the arguments for and against the 
principle of fairness, in the next section, will focus on two central
interpretations of it derived from these statements.
The rationale of the principle of fairness is shown by the moral 
requirement of fair share imposed upon individuals who benefit from the 
burdensome efforts of their fellow-citizens. More precisely, the principle 
requires reciprocity in the distribution of benefits and burdens; it imposes ‘a 
duty not to free-ride on the efforts of others’.4 Thus, it is connected with the 
problem of social co-ordination.5 More evidently, it is connected with the role 
played in society by public goods and with the problem of restricting people 
who demonstrate the exploitative motivations of a free-rider with regard to the 
contribution of others for the provision of such goods.6
In its main function, the principle, as formulated by Hart and Rawls,
applies within certain contexts characterised by special circumstances. It works 
within schemes o f social co-operation, it involves a restriction o f the liberty 
of the parties involved in the enterprise and it concerns the production and 
preservation of benefits which are free in nature.
Rawls’ notion of ‘schemes of social cooperation’ (or, ‘joint enterprises’
in Hart’s formulation), provides a conception of our political communities as
4W olff 1995a, p.92.
5For a useful introduction to the problem o f social coordination, see Raz 1990, pp.6-11. For 
Raz coordination, which is a central issue in justifications o f  political authority, is taken in its 
ordinary sense: as the problem o f ‘...getting people to act in ways which are sensitive to the 
way others are guided, or are likely to act, so that benefits can be expected which are less 
likely if  they act without coordinating their efforts, i.e. without basing their own actions on a 
view as to how others should or are likely to act. Coordination presupposes that people are 
not trying to foil each other. Rather they are trying to secure goals which are agreed to by 
all, or perhaps just goals that all should have. But coordination does not presuppose that 
every participant will improve his position by coordinating’ (ibid. p.7). In this ordinary sense 
coordination does not involve subjectivism (and the related exploitative motivations) as it 
preoccupies game theory, e.g. analysis o f the Prisoners’ Dilemma, and which is applied in 
traditional approaches to the problem o f providing public goods (and, in general, to game- 
theoretical analyses o f coordination; ibid. pp.6-11). Still, it involves the basic features which 
relate the principle o f  fairness with the problem o f public goods, a problem which is in the 
focus o f  this chapter. And the problem o f public goods is a kind o f  coordination problem. 
For more precision, the problem o f public goods is one which can arise as a problem o f  
securing social coordination in its ordinary sense, but also one which usually arises in relation 
to the free rider problem o f game theory (ibid. p.8). In this chapter I focus on the latter.
6For an analysis o f  this connection and the relevant problems generated see Ameson 1982, 
pp.618-623 and Simmons 2001, pp.29-36.
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‘cooperative enterprises on a very large scale’,7 the members of which share 
an horizontal relationship of fellow-citizenship and work together for the 
achievement of common ends. Thus, they owe their political duties, not to the 
government, but to one another. The ‘restriction of liberty’ condition involves 
members accepting certain burdens (such as political obligations) corresponding 
to the benefits distributed by the cooperative scheme in a fair manner.8 These 
benefits are ‘free’ in the sense that they have the features of public goods 
and so they can be enjoyed by any single individual without his cooperation, 
as long as a sufficient number of others contribute.9 The features of public 
goods, or ‘open’ benefits,10 which permit this situation are three in number. 
First, indivisibility, namely their equal availability to and consumption by all 
members (their utility for one person does not affect their utility for others), 
second, nonexcludability, namely the impracticality of their being provided to 
some members while excluding others from their consumption and, third, the 
need of the cooperation of large numbers (a public) for their provision.11
There is one more feature of the principle of fairness, which is explicit 
in Rawls’ formulation, though not apparent in Hart’s, and is related 
importantly to those analysed above. This is the voluntary acceptance of the 
benefits of cooperation.12 Although not all theorists of the principle of fairness 
agree on its importance, this feature exemplifies, in my view, a significant 
aspect of its rationale. That an important pre-condition for the operation of 
the principle is the involvement of some voluntary act on the part of 
individuals when they receive public benefits. Such an act would qualify the 
individuals as participants in the cooperative scheme where the requirements 
of fairness, as stated by the principle, apply.
7Simmons 1979, p .l 16.
8Ibid. p. 105.
9On this see Simmons 1979, p .106; Klosko 1987, pp.244-245 and Ameson 1982, pp.621-622.
10By ‘open’ benefits I follow Simmons in meaning those usually referred to as public goods. 
They thus demonstrate all the characteristics o f public goods described here, especially their 
nonexcludability, on the basis o f  which it becomes impossible or very inconvenient to avoid 
them (Simmons 1979, p. 130). From now on I will use this term interchangeably with the 
term ‘public goods’.
n For the explanation o f public goods that I follow here see Rawls 1971, pp.266-270; Ameson 
1982, pp. 618-619; Taylor 1982, pp.40-55, 60-65, 117-120; Klosko 1987, pp.242-243 and 
Harriott 1996, p.120.
12Simmons 1979, pp. 107-108.
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This feature is contrasted with mere receipt, which is, however, 
advocated by some theorists of the principle of fairness as part of its proper
interpretation. Note that a choice between the two interpretations affects
significantly the evaluation of the principle as an account of political 
obligation. It also creates the most serious difficulties involved in such an 
evaluation. Yet, the notion of acceptance, conceived in its more direct and 
unqualified sense, clarifies something important with regard to the rationale of 
the principle. It demonstrates how the principle departs from consent theories 
of political obligation in an advantageous way whilst preserving its required 
moral character: it does not require an act of deliberate undertaking, which
one is performing under the knowledge that one becomes obligated by it. It
rather makes the weaker demand that, in the face of benefits provided by a 
cooperative scheme, one’s (voluntary) acceptance of them is enough to bind 
one to the scheme.13 It thus gives a clear sign of involvement, which tacit 
consent failed to provide, without needing to infer that it is consent. This 
seems to increase the possibility of the principle’s meeting the generality 
condition of political obligation. At the same time, acceptance preserves the 
character of a specific and self-assumed act, which is the most obvious 
application of an actual transactional basis of the relationship of political 
obligation.14 And, more importantly, through acceptance, the core voluntarist 
aspect which makes consent a significant expression of self-governance is 
preserved in the principle.
4.2.‘Triviality’, ‘success’ and ‘justice’.
Before embarking on the criticism of the principle of fairness, I want to 
examine some other elements involved in the discussion of the principle. I 
discuss them separately because, although they create important conditions for 
the acceptability of the principle, there is controversy among theorists about 
their centrality. The three elements that I consider in what follows fall under
13Simmons 1979, pp.116-117; Horton 1992, p.96.
14For the importance o f such a basis see Simmons 1979; 1999; my previous chapters. In this 
manner, acceptance also makes the principle o f fairness compatible with the particularity 
condition o f political obligation, namely the requirement that the ground o f  such an obligation 
should provide a reason for individuals being obligated particularly to their own government.
140
the following labels: ‘triviality’, ‘success’ and ‘justice’. I discuss each in turn.
0 Triviality. The first element is related to the criticism of the principle 
of fairness provided by Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and 
Utopia?5 This criticism consists mainly of a series of examples used to 
support his claim that the principle is not morally valid and that it fails to 
create political obligations within social schemes characterised by the main 
features described above. The main elements of his argument will be 
considered in the discussion of the most important criticisms of fairness in 
section 4.3. At this point, I focus only on one element, that concerning 
triviality. It has been pointed out16 that all of Nozick’s examples involve 
benefits which are of trivial value17 and that this aspect of them affects 
substantially the force of his attack on the principle of fairness. These are 
valid claims. One important condition that should be incorporated within 
accounts of fairness is that the benefits with regard to which obligations of 
fairness are created should be worthy of the individuals’ costs in their efforts 
to provide them.18 As we will see later, this condition occupies a central 
position within Klosko’s defence of the principle, and it is given considerable 
attention by other discussions of it as well.19 The point indicated here is that, 
while the core of the principle of fairness lies in its demand of a fair share 
in the benefits and burdens of a cooperative scheme, its application can be 
properly evaluated only with respect to goods which are important enough to 
individuals to support this application.20
ii) Success. The second element to be considered is success (or, 
otherwise, the perfection of cooperation within a joint enterprise). Rawls’ 
formulation of the principle of fairness makes precise, as a condition on its
151974, pp.90-95.
16Simmons 1979, p .l 19; Klosko 1987, p.246.
17Benefits such as the broadcasting o f entertaining programs in Nozick’s ‘public address 
system’ example (Nozick 1974, p.93). I will discuss this example in the following section.
18This point is allowed by a suggestion o f Nozick himself (1974, p.94). And it has been 
stressed by Simmons (1979, p .l 19).
19For example, W olff 1995a, pp.94-96; Arneson 1982, pp.617 and 621-623.
20This said, the triviality condition remains external to the moral core o f the principle o f  
fairness. As ‘[t]he kind o f unfairness condemned by the principle is taking advantage o f  or 
exploiting’ ‘the good-faith sacrifices o f  others’, the basis o f  obligation is an individual’s free 
acceptance o f a good and not the value or importance o f goods (Simmons 2001, pp.29-36). 
The relevance o f the latter lies only in its being more likely to invite the kind o f attitude 
central to the principle and generally to effect its application.
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application, ‘that the advantages [a cooperative scheme] yields can only be 
obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates’.21 Following Simmons,22 I 
take it that whilst a need for substantial cooperation in a joint enterprise may 
render free riding more objectionable, e.g., for reasons of efficiency, such a 
condition does not elicit the central requirement of the principle of fairness, it 
is not part of its reciprocal logic. Participants do have an obligation to 
cooperate, even under circumstances where many others could fail to do so 
(that is, when their lack of cooperation does not make the provision of the 
desirable goods impossible). Although the obligations of the beneficiaries are 
defined relevant to the benefits and burdens allocated to other participants in 
the scheme, it is not the necessity of compliance that characterises these 
obligations. This point is made clearer by an additional observation. In his 
criticism of the principle of fairness, Smith claims that only the infliction of 
harm upon the community and/or the deprivation of another individual of
benefits proportional (or, according to Smith, ‘roughly equal’) to those we
acquire due to his cooperative efforts generates obligations of fairness.23 
However, as Simmons rightly argues, even when the effects of her behaviour 
are not negative on someone else’s benefits, it is the fact that the free-rider 
takes advantage o f others, who do their part, that makes her attitude
objectionable in terms of fairness.24 As explained in the discussion of the 
central features of fairness above, the principle defines obligations as part of 
non-hierarchical relations between cooperative members. This aspect focuses on 
the quality of the interaction between individuals who are seen as fellow-
citizens standing in horizontal relations to each other, thus on whether the 
behaviour of some reciprocates the sacrifices of those others who stand in 
such relations to them or whether it exploits them. I believe that this point is 
reflected to an extent in Smith’s qualification that the benefits of the affected 
parties should be proportional. But even if my assumption is mistaken, the 
main point made here still stands. While not completely irrelevant, references 
to the utility of cooperation alone do not capture elements internal to the
211964, pp.9-10.
221979, p.106.
231973, pp.956-957.
241979, note p.
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rationale of the principle of fairness. Thus, success is not an essential 
condition on this principle.
iii) Justice. The last, and most important, element I want to discuss here 
is justice. Rawls indicates that the schemes of co-operation where the 
principle of fairness applies should be just.25 The justice of an institution, 
however does not directly determine considerations of fair play. The 
obligations of fairness concern the reciprocal relationships between the 
participants of a co-operative scheme. Their bindingness is not derived from 
the moral character of the scheme, and injustice in it - or the violation of 
utility or, more generally, a scheme’s promotion of ‘immoral ends’ - need not 
affect the existence of such obligations. It is not the general character of the 
scheme but the fact that fairness-based procedures take place that matters for 
considerations of fairness, on the basis of which the rules of fair play can be 
applied as determinative of reciprocity and citizens are to interact fairly. Also, 
although the condition of justice may be taken to concern the distribution of 
benefits and burdens within a co-operative enterprise and, as such, to create a 
background within which the fairness of the reciprocal relationships of the 
participants can be secured more easily, the demands of fair play do not 
necessarily depend on such a background in order to arise. This is because 
the element which is more directly relevant to considerations of fairness is 
proportionality, not justice.26 This notion motivates a central point with regard 
to fairness. It makes more explicit the fact that the principle can apply as 
long as each of the participants is benefited in proportion to the costs (or 
burdens) each suffers, and that it is this situation which is directly relevant to 
the principle.27 But this is a situation which does not arise exclusively in a 
just system.28 Of the two notions in play, it is not justice but proportionality 
(in the distribution of the relevant benefits and burdens) which is integral to
251964, p.9.
26For these points see Simmons 1979, pp.l 10-114.
27This element expresses a concern with creating and securing proper relations between
individuals in a society, which, as indicated in previous chapters, is a central concern o f the 
anarchists and the main source o f their challenge to political authority. For more on this
point, see the analysis o f the anarchist arguments in the present chapter (section 4.3.).
28This point is indicated by Simmons (1979, pp.l 12-114), but it is also compatible with
Rawls’ discussion o f the principle (1964) and with its defence by Klosko, which is analysed 
below (1987: see, e.g., p.253 the comments connected with note 32 and, more generally, all 
his references to the third condition he poses on the application o f the principle).
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the rationale of the principle of fairness.
There is, however, another consideration with regard to justice. The 
justice of an institution has been accepted in the previous chapter (as a result 
of the anarchist criticism of the natural duty of justice) as a central feature29 
of an ideal of legitimacy to which visions of society must conform. And 
justice is a significant indication of the bearing and role of considerations 
about quality, or, institutional morality, within the debate on political 
obligation. The relevance of this point to the present considerations on 
fairness is this: although justice is not a feature integral to the demands of 
fair play, the recognition of its significance in an ideal of political legitimacy 
functions as an external condition on the principle of fairness. By this I mean 
that although the success of the principle, as the foundation of a theory of 
political obligation, should be decided by reference to its internal rationale, its 
final acceptability as a general basis of legitimate authority is not independent 
of the satisfaction of central demands of justice. Its establishment as such a 
basis presupposes sympathetic recognition of these demands. Thus, a defence 
of political institutions on the basis of the principle of fairness should also 
establish the compatibility of the workings of these institutions with the main 
demands of justice (as distinctive requirements among other moral obligations).
4.3.The anarchist criticism of the principle of fairness.
Let me turn now to the most important criticism of the principle of 
fairness as an account of political obligation. This criticism draws upon the 
problems which the principle faces in meeting the generality condition30 of 
political obligation. It is active in two areas. The first concerns the 
inadequacy of the principle interpreted either in terms of ‘receipt’ or in terms 
of ‘acceptance’. The account of fairness in this chapter focuses on these two 
interpretations. The second concerns the conception of community, integral to 
the rationale of the principle, as ‘a scheme of social cooperation’.
29Although not sufficient to ground political obligation.
30Namely, that a sufficiently general number o f people have political obligations according to
an account o f  our political relationships so as to make it ‘at least reasonably general in its
application’ (Simmons 1979, p.38; see also my introduction, section 1).
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4.3.1.‘Receipt’ versus ‘acceptance’.
4.3.1.i.Obiections to understanding fairness obligations in terms of 
‘receipt’.
The formulation of the principle of fairness advanced by Hart legitimates 
the interpretation under which the central condition for its adequate application 
as an account of political obligation is claimed to be the mere receipt of 
benefits. So we have this reading of the principle: when individuals receive 
benefits from a political scheme which is sustained by the obedience of other 
individuals, they are required, in fairness to those who obeyed, to reciprocate 
by accepting similar obligations as their proportional share of burdens.
A first objection to this claim is provided by the doubt as to whether 
existing governments actually provide the required benefits. This involves both 
difficulties related to conflicting beliefs about what these benefits are and the 
fact that some people, or groups of them, either do not or try not to receive 
them.31 The interpretation thus runs into difficulties when faced with the 
demand for generality. Either the goods provided are not generally regarded as 
benefits or the fact that there exists variability in their receipt entails that 
there is ‘variability in political obligations’.32 This does not easily sit with the 
need for the general applicability of the principle of fairness as an account of 
political obligation.33 However, I shall pursue this thought no further. Even if 
we defuse this objection by accepting that the state succeeds34 in providing 
goods such as protection from pollution or the provision of national security, 
along with other goods deriving from the rule of law, and that such things 
can be conceived as important benefits and are likely to be received by most 
citizens,35 the most serious criticism of receipt as the proper interpretation of 
the principle of fairness lies elsewhere.
31For the latter see, for example, W olff 1990-1, p.166: his reference to anarchists and to 
gypsies as such cases.
32Ibid. pp.166-167.
33For this, see also Smith 1973, p. 957: disparity in the individuals’ previous sacrifice and 
compliance, as well as in the effects o f previous disobedience, affects the scope o f political 
obligation in terms o f fair play.
340 r  that it constitutes the best possible way o f obtaining the required benefits.
35Recent statistical research by Klosko and Klein purports to show that most people think that 
they benefit from the rule o f  law and other services o f the state (2001).
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The most serious criticism relates to a challenging of the moral validity 
of receipt. This objection is suggested by Nozick’s criticism of fairness and it 
demonstrates that it is morally unacceptable to infer obligations from the 
receipt of goods which are inescapable36 and thus are forced upon individuals 
without their consent. The most well known of Nozick’s examples reflects this 
criticism by describing the receipt of possibly desirable yet unsolicited goods. 
It is the ‘public address system’ example, where a person is required out of 
fairness to do his part after having benefited from a public broadcast 
instituted by his neighbours for reasons of public entertainment. According to 
Nozick, that requirement is morally invalid, since the benefit in question is 
received independently of the individual’s preference and without its having 
been consensually accepted. This claim is connected essentially with Nozick’s 
view that only requirements created by acts involving consent are morally 
acceptable.37 But it can be derived also from Hume’s argument against tacit 
consent discussed in Chapter Two, that we cannot assume obligations in terms 
of consent when the impositions of political institutions are unavoidable.
The objection has, however, taken a more general form. The principle of 
fairness makes use of the point that the argument from tacit consent failed to 
make, facing problems with illegitimate inference.38 This principle indicates our 
position with regard to important benefits as determinative of our obligation 
without basing obligation on the assumption that such a position is a sign of 
consent. Nevertheless, the present objection in its more general form 
challenges the applicability of the position required in order to bind us by 
reference to benefits. The more general form of the objection is represented 
by the so-called ‘limiting argument’.39 According to this argument, the 
principle of fairness cannot apply within schemes that provide benefits with 
the status of public goods (as described earlier in this chapter), since this 
status - especially their nonexcludability - makes their voluntary acceptance 
impossible. The impossibility of voluntary acceptance of open benefits renders
360 r  avoided only in ways which create great inconvenience or great costs to individuals. For 
this point see Klosko 1987, note 6 and Ameson 1982, note 6.
371974, p. 95. For this see also Simmons 1979, p .l 18 and Klosko 1987, p.246.
38For this see chapter two, section 2.1.2.
39Klosko 1987, p. 244.
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the objection more general since it is independent of an advocacy of consent 
as the only proper moral ground. The principle need not be taken to invoke 
consent, yet it is not that we did not consent that matters but rather that the 
inevitable presence of benefits makes any expression of willing acceptance 
indiscernible. This objection appears in the writings of Rawls. His formulation 
of the principle makes explicit reference to voluntary acceptance and his later 
rejection of it as a ground of political obligation is mainly motivated by the 
difficulties created by this inapplicability (I discuss these difficulties in section 
4.3.1.iii). The valid applicability of the principle is questioned when the
possibility of voluntary acts is threatened.
The main point of the above criticism is that a focus on the receipt of 
benefits ignores the self-assumed acts which give rise to individual
responsibility while at the same time it assumes such a responsibility. 
Individuals are considered bound in the absence of their effective participation. 
But responsibility and obligation may not be derived without the presence and 
effective expression of free agency and involvement.
The upshot, then, of the two objections above is that mere receipt of 
benefits does not give rise to a conception of the principle of fairness upon 
which it is possible to base its acceptability as a ground of political 
obligation. Firstly, receipt may not be sufficiently general in existing societies, 
but secondly, and more importantly, even if it is, it has morally unacceptable 
implications.
4.3.1.ii.Klosko’s defence of ‘receipt’.
The above conclusion, however, has been rebutted by a more 
sophisticated use of the notion of receipt, found in Klosko’s defence of the 
principle of fairness. Klosko protests that the strength of Nozick’s argument
lies in the latter’s reference to benefits of negligible value40 and aims at
providing moral considerations which give to the receipt of benefits moral 
significance such that overrides the requirement of voluntary acceptance. In 
discussing this feature of Nozick’s example (namely, triviality), I indicated
40For this see ibid. p.246.
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that the value of goods has some importance for considerations of fairness.41 
So I accept that Klosko’s observation provides a plausible motivation for his 
defence of fairness. That defence depends essentially on three conditions he 
imposes upon the acceptability of the principle. He claims that the ‘goods 
supplied must be (i) worth the recipients’ effort in providing them; (ii) 
presumptively beneficial; and (iii) have benefits and burdens that are fairly 
distributed’.42 The originality of Klosko’s contribution is found in his notion 
of ‘presumptively beneficial public goods’, which he takes to be those which 
are reasonably regarded as ‘necessary for an acceptable life for all members 
o f the community\ 43 Examples of such that he gives are, ‘physical security, 
protection from a hostile environment, and the satisfaction of basic bodily 
needs’.44 His contention is that in the indispensability of such goods we find 
an importantly relevant and morally overriding feature, sufficient to give rise 
to obligations through fairness in defiance of the individuals’ right to decide 
for themselves whether to accept them. He completes his defence by 
providing examples that support his main claim that the members of schemes 
which provide these goods and also satisfy the other two conditions he 
imposes are subject to political obligations on the basis of fairness. Finally, 
by showing how individuals continue to have obligations through fairness in a 
scheme which meets the three conditions even when it provides ‘discretionary 
goods’ - that is, goods that ‘are of less value’ or, ‘not essential to peoples 
well-being’ - he contends that, according to his view, the principle of fairness 
can effectively satisfy the generality condition of political obligation.45
Klosko’s theory provides an improved account of fairness in terms of 
receipt, which comes as a reply, not only to the limiting argument, but also 
to Simmons’ insistence on voluntary acceptance as an indispensable feature of
41 This importance also creates a natural combination between this principle as ground o f  
political obligation and considerations about institutional morality, which, as argued in 
previous chapters, when applied compatibly with the nature o f  the relationship needed for 
political obligation have an important role to play within the debate.
421992, p.39.
431987, p.246 (emphasis added). Klosko derives this explanation from Rawls’ notion and 
conception o f ‘primary goods’ (Rawls 1971, p.62 and 92. Klosko sees his ‘presumptive public 
goods’ as ‘the public analogues o f Rawls’s primary goods’: 1987, p.246. But this claim 
should not obscure the understanding that Rawls’ primary goods are public goods).
441987, p.247.
45Klosko’s whole discussion is in ibid. pp.247-259.
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the principle’s application. However, by use of Simmons’ approach, I argue 
below that Klosko’s view and its more effective employment by Ameson 
(1982) and by Wolff (1995a) underestimate the role of acceptance. It is this 
role that is neglected and which I want to elevate. And, nevertheless, I 
further argue that views which focus on acceptance fail to avoid violation of 
the generality condition of political obligation.
4.3.1.iii.Simmons on ‘acceptance’.
In his discussion of these issues,46 Simmons concentrates on the notion 
of ‘voluntary acceptance’ found in Rawls’ formulation of the principle of 
fairness and provides an explanation of ‘active participation’ which makes this 
notion both meaningful and significant for the principle’s applicability. He 
does this because he believes that the notion is compatible with Hart’s 
formulation as well47 and that the principle survives the limiting argument
both in its Nozickian and in its Rawlsian conception.48
The reading of the principle of fairness which concerns us here is the
following: individuals who have willingly accepted the benefits provided by 
the state as sustained by the obedience of other individuals are bound in
fairness to those others to reciprocate by recognising obligations proportional 
to their willing enjoyment of the benefits. Because there is a problem that we 
cannot have obligation in the absence of individual consent, the focus turns 
on fairness as a principle which shows the individuals’ input. Through 
acceptance, the principle makes a proper supplementation on tacit consent. By 
applying on the basis of explicit and operative manifestations of individual 
involvement, it is offered as a good way of evading illegitimate inferences of 
such an involvement, like those made in the name of tacit consent. At the 
same time, it does not involve the strict requirements which make explicit 
consent unattainable.
46Simmons 1979, ch. V; 2001, chs. 1 and 2.
47Ibid. p. 108.
48That is, both against Nozick’s view that the principle is unacceptable to the extent that it 
departs from consent, and against Rawls’ view that in societies where the benefits provided 
are open in nature the voluntary acceptance o f them is impossible and thus the principle is 
inapplicable there as an account o f political obligation (Simmons 1993, pp. 251-252).
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Simmons understands acceptance as ‘active participation’.49 In this he is 
motivated by an observation about Nozick’s criticism of the principle of 
fairness which differs importantly from that of Klosko (presented in section 
4.3.1 .ii. above). He observes that, while the worth of the benefits must not be 
arbitrary, as it is in Nozick’s examples, the real problem with these examples, 
as far as fairness is concerned, is that the non-contributors are ‘outsiders’ with 
respect to the cooperative scheme and so cannot be properly regarded as free­
riders.50 Thus, he concentrates on providing a notion of participation which 
distinguishes ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’, and which is meant to help establish 
obligations through fairness for the former (in terms of acceptance even in 
schemes where the benefits provided are open) but which does not obligate 
the latter at all.51
Simmons explains acceptance of a benefit as ‘either (1) trying to get 
(and succeeding in getting) the benefit, or (2) taking the benefit willingly and 
knowingly’.52 The crux of his argument lies in that, in schemes where the 
benefits are open, acceptance is still possible in one of these senses and so 
can determine who the schemes’ proper participants are. He argues53 that in 
such schemes it is not clear how individuals would go about trying to get the 
benefits, since open benefits are received by everyone irrespectively of their 
attitudes. Thus he sees the limiting argument to be effective with regard to 
the first sense of acceptance. But not with regard to the second. He claims 
that normally it is in the second sense of acceptance that we can see open 
benefits to be accepted. This sense he analyses by reference to facts about 
our attitudes and beliefs such as ‘[not] regarding] the benefits as having been 
forced upon us against our will, or think[ing] that [they] are not worth the
49This idea o f his is analysed in Simmons 1979, chapter V; 1987; 1993, pp.248-260; 2001, 
chs. 1 and 2.
50This discussion is in Simmons 1979, p. 119 and pp. 122-123; 2001, ch .l.
5’This distinction is active also in the problem o f securing social coordination understood in 
its ordinary sense (for the ordinary sense o f  coordination, see note 5). It is important both in 
those situations and in the problem discussed at present that the individuals regarded as 
participants and whose actions affect directly common enterprises be clearly detected. The 
distinction between insiders and outsiders also facilitates the attempt to find and secure proper 
relations between individuals within a society, which concerns the anarchist most. By 
understanding whether and how individuals are involved in the generation and operation o f  
social services, we start to explain their interrelations, thus their obligations, in ways which 
prevent arbitrary subordination.
52Simmons 1979, pp.132-133.
53Ibid. p. 132.
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price we must pay for them’, and as ‘an understanding of the status of those 
benefits relative to the party providing them’.54
However, generality is still a problem. Although such a notion of 
acceptance is meaningful and has the status of active participation, it is not 
the usual attitude of individuals in existing states. It is rare that we consider 
our political obligations as the correlative burdens of benefits received 
‘willingly and knowingly’.55 For example, many citizens hardly notice benefits 
that they receive and many others do not believe that the benefits received 
are worth the price imposed on them, as is the case with high taxes, legal 
restrictions on harmless private pleasures or compulsory participation in wars 
of foreign policy.56 This point receives support from the considerations 
concerning the idea of political communities as schemes of social co­
operation, to which I will turn in section 4.3.2.
4.3.1.iv.The significance of ‘acceptance’.
Despite the failure of the principle of fairness to meet the generality 
condition of political obligation when understood in terms of acceptance, I
54Ibid.
55Ibid. This argument is the first step for my disagreement with Klosko as regards the 
importance he places on the fact that ordinary people think that they have political obligations 
and tend to conceive these obligations in terms o f fairness (2001). Although I concede that 
the moral beliefs o f ordinary people matter, I do not think that the results o f Klosko’s 
empirical investigation make any important progress towards establishing political obligation 
on the basis o f fairness. First o f all, that the facts are such is itself doubtful: the form o f the 
questions asked in Klosko’s investigation and the answers to them do not identify clearly the 
aspects characteristic o f what could be seen as a genuine belief in political obligation and 
there are many instances where people’s beliefs support the anarchist conclusions (for these 
kinds o f arguments see: Green 1996; Simmons 1996, p.33). But even if  people have the 
beliefs about political obligation that Klosko’s investigation presents them to have, this does 
not show that they enter the relationship o f obligation which they approve o f  in the actual 
circumstances applying to them, nor that they demonstrate the attitude o f acceptance presented 
here (and the following examples in the text are characteristic cases where they don’t. These 
overlap with the examples o f ordinary belief given by Simmons in 1996, p.33. See also 
Simmons 2001, pp.33-35). And even if  people do not appear to have any intuitive preference 
for voluntarist interpretations o f the principle, this does not show that such interpretations are 
not the ones proper and faithful to its rationale (and I think that Klosko neglects the sense 
o f acceptance explained here in his arguments against the notion in 2001, sections V and VI). 
It is this latter point that I attempt to demonstrate in this chapter. These considerations about 
the role o f Klosko’s investigation are importantly connected to the idea o f schemes o f social 
cooperation involved in the principle and I develop them further in the context o f  the 
discussion o f this idea below.
56Simmons 1979, p.139. Even though Simmons takes the second sense o f acceptance to be 
applicable within existing societies and thus to allow that at least some individuals could 
demonstrate it there, still he believes that acceptance cannot meet the generality condition o f  
political obligation within existing societies.
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want to argue, here, that there is a certain significance in Simmons’ 
conception of acceptance. For this I refer to departures from it which form 
attempts to confirm the interpretation of the principle of fairness in terms of 
receipt as a basis of political obligation.
Simmons’ argument indicates that voluntary acceptance is very important 
to an evaluation of fairness. This is made explicit by the fact that his 
conception of the principle involves reference to ‘subjective’ or ‘psychological 
facts’,57 that is, to individuals’ attitudes to, and beliefs about, the benefits as 
signs of their conscious and voluntary acceptance of them. This appeal to 
subjective elements is central in Simmons. It is significant, despite the 
following objections.
By pointing out that the magnitude (or, indispensability) of benefits is a 
feature of them which obviates the relevance of psychological facts, Klosko, 
in his defence of fairness, preserves the notion of receipt at the expense of 
voluntary acceptance.58 Other theorists find problems with Klosko’s notion of 
presumptive benefits and utilise other elements of his account in order to 
achieve generality in terms of receipt. Wolff, for example, points out that the 
crux of Klosko’s account lies in his two other conditions, namely these of 
worth and fairness, which in combination with some reference to individuals’ 
‘subjective scale of valuation’ may establish obligations through fairness in 
terms of sufficiently general receipt.59 Also, Ameson provides a more qualified 
version of the principle along Klosko’s lines, which invites obligations in 
terms of receipt where voluntary acceptance is impossible, and believes that 
Simmons’ reference to subjective requirements licenses ‘bizarre beliefs’ as 
sources of political obligations.60
However, the departure of these theorists from subjective elements is 
problematic. Klosko’s reference to indispensable benefits is based on other 
moral principles than on fairness (e.g. on the idea of need and the duty to 
help persons in such a situation or the duty to contribute to projects essential
57Simmons 1993, pp.254-257.
58Klosko 1987, pp.248-249. See the discussion o f his argument in section 4.3.1 .ii. above.
59W olff 1995a, pp.94-96.
60Ameson 1982, pp. 623 and 632. See also Simmons 1993, note 79.
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for community life).61 And, more importantly, decisions about what is to
count, not only as discretionary, but also as indispensable benefits need to be
made on the basis of the subjective attitudes of individuals which make active 
participation possible. If, for example, it is claimed that environmental 
protection services of the state oblige individuals to reciprocate, we need to 
see whether those individuals see such services worthy of the political 
burdens, whether they do or they do not consider and follow other ways of 
providing environmental protection as the optimal ones and whether they 
continue to enjoy provision of governmental such services, in order to discern 
the indispensable receipt which invites reciprocation. As Simmons states, ‘the
indispensability of benefits, then, seems ....  an indication of when the
requirement of active participation is most likely to be satisfied’.62 This 
argument applies to Ameson and, in my view, to Wolff as well. Ameson 
appeals, among other things, to the condition that ‘the benefit [be] 
uncontroversially a benefit for all’.63 But, as Simmons argues, such a 
requirement avoids being too stringent only if it makes reference to subjective 
elements.64 In the same way, W olffs condition of a subjective scale of
valuation65 acquires meaning, so as to be used as a test of the generality of
the principle’s application, only when individuals’ beliefs are taken into 
account as significant criteria for knowing what is, in fact, valuable to each 
of them. Wolff explains that receipt must be ‘worthwhile’ for each individual 
and that this is not the same as trying to see ‘whether the individual thinks it 
worthwhile’, because individuals’ own calculations might not be very good.66
61Forthis argument see for example Simmons 2001, pp.35-36.
62Simmons 1987, p.273.
631982, p.633.
641993, note 80. Also, Simmons’ qualification o f  ‘non-negligence in one’s beliefs’ defeats 
Ameson’s objection from reliance on bizarre beliefs. Such a lack o f  negligence is similar to 
the conditions o f knowledge and rationality which make consent valid (see my chapter two, 
subsection 2.1.1.), although attitudes evaluated on the basis o f  the principle o f fairness need 
not involve the knowledge that one acquires obligations by one’s performance (as involved in 
the deliberate undertakings which form consent). And still, while ‘culpable or negligent 
ignorance o f the source, nature, or value o f the benefits one enjoys will not (by itself) excuse 
one from obligation under the principle o f fair play’, it is the responsibility o f the participants 
in a cooperative scheme to inform consumers about the ‘expectations o f  reciprocation, not the 
responsibility o f consumers to pay for what they unavoidably and innocently consume’ 
(Simmons 2001, pp.32-33).
650r, otherwise, o f a function o f  the state which is ‘worthwhile’ for the individuals: W olff 
1995a, p.96.
66Ibid.
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Yet, for political obligation it is the attitudes related to these calculations that 
matter. Wolff himself admits that it is difficult to know how the condition of 
worth is met for a given individual.67 And it is here that the importance of 
acceptance becomes obvious, as a clear expression of subjective facts. As in 
the case of hypothetical contract arguments we need to know if ideal rational 
choice corresponds to actual choice, so do we in the present case need to 
take into account what individuals actually take as worthwhile in order to 
build a criterion of worthy receipt that represents their situation fairly and can 
work for political obligation. So, if the principle of fairness says that 
individuals who receive indispensable benefits - or, goods that are 
uncontroversially a benefit to every participant, or goods which are fairly 
distributed and worthy to individuals according to some subjective scale of 
valuation - are obliged to reciprocate, then some explicit element of 
participation needs to be detected in order to give sense and applicability to 
valuable receipt. In the end, what does it matter if something has worth if 
people do not want it? Every time theorists try to specify the convention 
which the principle involves and which individuals should not violate, they 
need to articulate some attitude of acceptance which makes it meaningful.
These considerations indicate that acceptance understood by reference to 
subjective facts cannot be easily dispensed with.68 Any reference to receipt 
cannot establish general obligations through fairness without appeal to 
psychological facts related to the provision, status and worth of open benefits. 
Also, this kind of acceptance forms an attitude and activity which provides a 
realistic example of individuals’ social behaviour and satisfies a basic and 
common sense of what could be taken as a sign of active citizenship.69 Thus
67Ibid.
68In his 1999 article, Simmons seems to consider actual receipt as a proper basis o f political 
obligation (e.g., p.764). But, in the end, the point o f the argument from active participation is 
not to decide which one, acceptance or receipt, is superior but rather to preserve in either 
notion the features which would establish an actual, specific and morally significant behavior, 
which if  sufficiently general in their application within political societies would ground the 
relationship o f political obligation. The actual and solicited receipt o f  benefits to most o f the 
citizens o f a society would be an appropriate ground o f this kind and this does not clearly 
differ from acceptance in Simmons’ sense. For the main argument here, the distinction 
between the two is not crucial.
69It certainly is a clear paradigm o f  ‘morally [relevant and] significant features o f the specific 
histories o f interaction between individuals and their polities’, which compose transactional 
bases o f political obligation (Simmons 1999, p.764). As defended in previous chapters o f  this
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facts of acceptance constitute an appropriate and natural representation of 
subjective facts. But, the psychological facts which give applicability and 
moral significance to the principle (i.e. those constituting Simmons’ sense of 
acceptance, or something similar to it) are rarely demonstrated in the 
behaviour of individuals in the existing states. Thus, the principle of fairness 
is insufficient as the ground of general political obligation.
Very importantly, such a role of subjective facts brings to the fore the 
point about the quality, or merits, of institutions elaborated in this thesis. The 
present argument is that the most decisive appeals to the principle of fairness 
as a ground of political obligation need to include reference to subjective 
features. This re-enforces the following claim: the merits of political 
institutions - in terms either of positive qualities of their character (such as 
justice) or of the services that they provide to their subjects conceived as a 
whole (such as the general provision of benefits) - are an important aspect of 
evaluations of them. By reference to these aspects we can assess and justify 
their existence. But in order for us to decide their relation to the members of 
their society and, more precisely, their authority as reflected in the generation 
of political obligation, it is necessary to examine the actual and specific 
functions of these institutions in the manner they affect each of their citizens 
through the relevant particular practices, activities and interactions which 
would create the relationship of political obligation.
In relation to these points, there is an important aspect about the role of 
the principle of fairness which underlies appeals to receipt and which the 
anarchist cannot disregard. There is a specificity of political interaction which 
makes such an interaction complicated. Social problems involve 
interdependence, the fact that individuals within societies act in ways that 
affect others. When some individuals act without worrying about how their 
behaviour affects others they are taking a space to act freely which invades 
the sphere of other individuals, they act at their expense. This might be 
selfish and unfair. And it is this that the principle of fairness can indicate
thesis, such bases seem to be the only ones capturing the particularised and actual nature o f  
social interaction necessary for establishing political obligation. And likewise to be closer to 
securing the ideal o f active participation, the core o f the character o f  social relations which 
anarchism aspires to.
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and correct. Defenders of fairness who focus on political obligation misapply 
it. It cannot ground political obligation. Yet there is a place for it as a way 
of putting limits on the free interaction of individuals. Under this 
understanding, fairness in terms of receipt might be a good principle for 
defining legitimate social interrelations. Being forced to recognise what we 
have received might designate the limits required for seeing how to live in a 
society where we are interdependent. The principle says why there are moral 
limits to what we can do. It thus can characterise interdependence within 
political societies in a way which makes them morally justifiable irrespective 
of voluntary acceptance. The anarchist can concede that this explains why we 
might have moral obligations from receipt of benefits and why this in turn 
can make a social system good. But what he asks is why assume that the 
state, even a good state, can enforce such obligations on us? The preceding 
anarchist argument indicates that without some expression of individual 
acceptance there cannot be any satisfactory specific application of receipt, as 
required for political obligation. Subjective facts are necessary for recognition 
of when valid receipt occurs. However, if we see the principle of fairness to 
be determining the character of social interdependence by generally specifying 
in terms of receipt that the rules which regulate social procedures are fair, 
this is a valuable role for it to play even for the anarchist. This is a limited 
application of the principle. It defines a background within which obligations 
can arise and operate properly but it does not itself generate general political 
obligation. And it is this that the critical philosophical anarchist presses upon 
the defender of political institutions.
It is fundamental for the argument of this thesis that in the notion of 
acceptance we find a significant way of attending to the kinds of interaction 
which express self-governance in a society. In Chapter Two we saw that 
actual consent, if it existed, would constitute a direct and primary indication 
of individual self-determination and active involvement in social life. A similar 
indication is found, in the present chapter, in the kind of active participation 
involved in the fairness principle. The discussion of fairness reveals, through 
the notion of acceptance, forms of explicit, voluntary involvement on the part 
of individuals which are indispensable features of certain relations and 
possibilities of valuable social communication. The willing acceptance of
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benefits becomes a clear indication of when and how individuals are involved 
in relations of interdependence with others and the corresponding obligations. 
This shows that for the generation of political obligation as a central 
characterisation of our relation to political institutions, such forms of 
interaction are necessary. And, whenever they existed, they would primarily 
manifest the expression of individuality and active involvement which makes 
proper social relations possible. That is, they would create the desired 
combination between individual authority and social interaction. Yet political 
institutions, by their very nature, circumscribe such important expressions of 
self-government. The required forms of participation do not establish an 
obligation to political institutions because they are not enabled within societies 
governed by such institutions.
4.3.2.Faimess. political obligation and the idea of societies as ‘schemes 
of social cooperation’.
The conclusions of the above discussion lead me to the second area 
where the principle of fairness faces problems with the generality condition. 
This concerns the conception of political communities as schemes o f social 
cooperation. This conception is a significant contribution to the principle. It 
facilitates a different understanding of political societies and relations in terms 
of their status and worth. The political schemes are understood as ‘cooperative 
enterprises on a very large scale’ and our obligations are owed to the other 
participants in such schemes, who work together with us for a common 
purpose.70 This idea of political relationships reflects a background which is 
characterised by a complex web of interactions and which gives a more 
comprehensive picture of the sense of reciprocity involved in the principle of 
fairness and applied through the kind of active participation discussed in the 
preceding section. It also departs from the usual picture of political 
relationships as vertical duties to governmental bodies which monopolise the 
right to determine the conditions of our social lives. As will be explained in 
the concluding section below, this departure challenges the established
70Simmons 1979, pp.116 and 140.
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understanding of the political as the sphere where our lives are organised 
publicly and on a large scale in terms of institutionalised coercion.71
At this point, the significance of the notion of social co-operative 
schemes for the discussion of fairness as a ground of political obligation is 
simply stated. Genuine co-operation involves an actual, conscious and joint 
attempt to achieve the common good - as evidenced in small-scale, strongly 
co-operative ventures - rather than the mere ‘rendering of services’ or a rule- 
imposed or an accidental co-ordination of activities.72 And it is this picture 
that gives rise to our intuitions about fairness. Existing governments do not 
have the status of co-operative enterprises: they work in large societies, where 
the sense of sharing a unifying purpose in their everyday social activities and 
duties is lacking in most individuals. They involve a number of features 
which make them depart from a genuine picture of a strongly co-operative 
scheme, features such as the coercive enforcement of rules and suppression of 
the independent role of personal morality in sanctioning non-compliance.73 
Present societies incorporate ongoing schemes of social co-operation, those 
which involve a practice which needs the contribution of a large number of 
citizens in order to be sustained and those which create a general obligation 
that would not be concretised without their existence. And political institutions 
have a significant instrumental value in maintaining such schemes. Yet these 
activities do not make political society itself a large and unified scheme of 
social co-operation and the moral reasons for acting in ways that sustain such 
practices are not based on the fact that political institutions, or the law, 
facilitate them.74 Moreover, if we apply to these societies a ‘loose sense of 
cooperative scheme’, namely as ‘systems of rules designed to regulate’ our 
activities in ways beneficial to all (or otherwise, as facilitating the provision
71Namely, in terms o f  institutions which work as a body separate from the rest o f society 
and determine the public life o f individuals in their territory by concentrating and 
monopolising the authority to define the rights o f those individuals and force obligations upon 
them; and in these functions o f them such institutions are backed by coercion, which they 
also concentrate and monopolise (for these, see Miller 1984, p.5; Wolff, R. P. 1970, pp.3-5).
72Simmons 2001, pp.38-42.
73Ibid. p.41.
74So, the existence o f  schemes o f  this kind within present political societies does not give 
rise to a general political obligation. For these points see Raz 1979b pp.247-249. They are 
also related to the arguments in chapter three about how two main legal techniques, or, more 
generally, political functions, may make political institutions morally worthwhile - more 
precisely, just - without however giving rise to a general moral obligation to obey the law.
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of services), they cease to provide backgrounds suitable for the application of 
the principle of fairness.75 Thus, present societies lack the reciprocity in social 
relations involved in genuine schemes of social co-operation and in this way 
they deprive their citizens of a conception of their governments as co­
operative schemes characterised by horizontal relationships. Likewise, their 
citizens seem to not commonly regard any benefits provided to them as the
fruits of ‘the cooperative efforts of [others as their] fellow citizens’.76 At the
same time, as argued during the examination of the first area of anarchist 
criticism in this chapter, many of the citizens of existing states seem to lack 
the attitude of acceptance in further ways: they are likely to be those who 
‘have not taken the benefits (with accompanying burdens) willingly’.77 The 
lack of these elements makes the violation of the generality condition of
political obligation explicit. Successful accounts of political obligation that are 
founded on the principle of fairness would be those in which the 
aforementioned elements are present. Thus, these fmal considerations on co-
75Simmons 1979, pp.140-141; 2001, pp.38-42
76Ibid. p. 139. The attitudes and beliefs o f ordinary people lack this reciprocity, conception and 
approach even when these people express in general terms belief in the existence o f political 
obligation which is also generally formulated by use o f elements o f the principle o f fairness. 
It is on this ground that Klosko’s investigation is unsatisfactory (see Klosko 2001. Such an 
absence is evident, for example, in the fact that the participants in the study did not show a 
clear sense o f  the relevance o f the levels o f compliance among the members o f a cooperative 
scheme in their views about political obligation; in general, the difference between fairness 
and gratitude was not refined: ibid. p.28). More generally, there is a difference between 
people’s expressing belief in political obligation and their actually having it because they 
actually enter the relationship they think in general terms that they should enter and they 
actually believe in every particular case in the existence o f  the elements which create it. 
Furthermore, and importantly, Klosko’s research is conducted within a background o f already 
existing institutions and thus its results (which are anyway based on a limited group o f  
people) might apply to them and general principles might seem to be met only through them 
because they are the Establishment and as such they already have an effect on the beliefs 
investigated (in the same way, these beliefs are schooled out o f voluntarist interpretations o f  
the principle o f fairness and we lack the attitudes o f  active participation which, if  it existed, 
a scheme o f social cooperation would cultivate. See also Simmons 1996, pp.33-34.). We are 
not asked whether we can satisfy such principles in other ways, whether we can have other 
social arrangements and attitudes, whether we can have the benefits in other ways (the 
assessment o f the costs and benefits to be balanced is itself understood differently when we 
take into consideration the alternative o f  realistic nonpolitical societies: Simmons 2001, pp.37- 
38). When people are asked about their obligations they are not asked on the basis o f a 
more fundamental question regarding all the possibilities o f addressing them, other than and 
beyond the state. I discuss how the lack o f this approach characterises the debate on political 
obligation as a whole and the significance o f  this phenomenon as indicated by the anarchist 
criticism in the following chapters o f this thesis.
77Simmons 1979, p .139; 2001, chs.l and 2.
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operative schemes show, once more, that the principle of fairness fails to 
establish a general obligation to obey political institutions.
These considerations simply state that existing political institutions fail to 
incorporate the kinds of interaction that characterise genuine schemes of social 
co-operation and thus cannot claim political obligation on the basis of 
fairness. Partly, they are based on empirical claims, which remain the subject 
of controversy.78 Yet, the main aim of my discussion of the idea of social co­
operation is to indicate its value. This idea helps to clarify the character and 
importance of horizontal relationships. It highlights the way in which forms of 
interdependence which involve participation, reciprocity and co-operation stand 
in opposition to hierarchical relationships. In the former, citizens are seen as 
equal agents who create, determine and support their social world in continual 
interaction with one another. They are equally the legislators and the subjects 
of the social terms of their interaction. Every claim arises from an individual 
and is balanced by those arising from the other participants rather than being 
dictated from above. The presence, needs and actions of each participant are 
themselves part of how social aims and changes are conceived and pursued. 
And any contribution or achievement on the part of an individual is directed 
to the other members. Expressions of freedom, obligations and projects take 
place by reference to the rest of those who compose the social scheme. Each 
individual acts directly on the basis of proper limits in relation to others. 
They don’t do something which would undermine others and which would 
reflect circumstances where others can undermine them. Such a background 
becomes an explicit reminder of the fact that societies are made up by 
individuals and characterised by their interrelations. In hierarchical structures, 
on the other hand, this sense of interdependence is absent. Rights and duties 
are regulated from above. One group of individuals becomes the exclusive and 
authoritative designator and co-ordinator of social aims and interactions, the 
legislator and the ruler. Individuals understand their relations in terms of 
hierarchy and their obligations are directed to those who rule rather than to 
each and everyone of the fellow-citizens with whom they inhabit society. The
78In notes 55 and 76 above I attempted to give a stronger defence o f these claims. Yet, this 
defence invites further discussion in order to convince opposing views.
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social background becomes one within which relations of inequality are 
established and encouraged, dismissing the fact that they apply among free 
and equal human beings. Social relations become a network of subordination 
and unequal dependence. It is this framework that the idea of schemes of 
social co-operation challenges and is meant to replace. As such, it is a 
valuable idea for existing social organisations to aspire to.
The preceding argument relates to the fact that political institutions have 
a distinctive character, indicated in Chapter Two. As explained on the basis 
of Hume’s view in that chapter, the exclusive and inevitable character of 
political institutions does not invite the kinds of attitudes and interactions 
involved in consent. Nor, as we see in the present chapter, does it so with 
regard to fairness. Their assessment should be informed by this special 
character. Any justification of political institutions should be developed in 
view of the importance of these elements for political obligation and of the 
fact that the nature of political institutions excludes them. The authority of 
political institutions cannot be justified in terms either of consent or of the 
forms of acceptance and co-operation involved in fairness, and those 
institutions must be evaluated in light of this defect and through a kind of 
justification which is compatible with their nature. Thus, if their existence is 
to be justified we need to search for the expression in them of values which 
make their exclusive and coercive character moral. Since they cannot be social 
schemes of a cooperative character, political institutions need to be shown to 
involve in some other way the kinds of values which would make them 
necessary and acceptable.
4.4.The implications of the anarchist criticism of the principle of 
fairness.
The results of the preceding discussion can be summed up in the 
following points:
(1) While justice is not integral to considerations of fairness, the 
importance of its demands poses a serious constraint on the application of the 
principle of fairness as an account of political obligation.
(2) The notion of acceptance, conceived properly by appeal to subjective
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facts, is necessary to an understanding of the principle of fairness and re­
introduces the value of voluntariness. It also represents an attitude which 
clearly satisfies the particularity condition of political obligation. Nevertheless, 
it involves many theoretical and practical problems, which have to do with 
the disparity among individuals’ attitudes to benefits and the resulting 
controversial status of their participation within society. Most importantly, it 
does not save the principle from the difficulties it faces with regard to the
generality condition of political obligation.
(3) Existing societies are not schemes of social co-operation and, in this,
they fail to provide the feeling of reciprocity which the rationale of the
principle of fairness requires. Thus, they both lack the desirable features of 
the idea of political communities as large co-operative schemes and fail to
combine satisfactorily accounts of political obligation based on the principle of 
fairness with the generality condition.
Bearing in mind our concern with the contribution of critical 
philosophical anarchism to the debate on political obligation, it is necessary to 
draw out the implications of these results.
Firstly, the justice of an institution continues to be morally relevant for 
the evaluation of theories of political obligation. This relevance is coherent 
with the ideal of legitimacy described in the previous chapter on the basis of 
the anarchist criticisms of the natural duty of justice. And it preserves in the 
discussion of fairness the position about the role of institutional morality 
derived from the previous chapters of this thesis: that is, that considerations 
regarding quality continue to affect significantly evaluations of political 
constraints, but they need to take the form of more specific features o f social 
interaction in order to provide grounds suitable to the actuality of political 
obligation.
Secondly, through the notion of acceptance and its role in the evaluation 
of the principle of fairness, the desirability of voluntariness recognised from 
the perspective of the anarchist ideal in Chapter Two is confirmed. Although 
not in the form of deliberate undertaking, a voluntary form of involvement 
(active participation) retains all its significance. And this is a strong evidence 
of the central role that specific interaction plays in the creation of political 
obligation.
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Finally, the idea of communities as co-operative schemes becomes an 
element of great importance for an ideal of political legitimacy. It provides a 
picture of social lives which departs from the institutionalised coercion which 
existing states exemplify (and are mainly criticised for, at least from the 
perspective of political anarchism) and which can guide their improvement. 
Also, it constitutes the conception of social relations preferred by the 
anarchist.
The idea of reciprocal relationships among individuals, reflecting a spirit 
of co-operation and mutuality in the public activities, retains an alternative 
picture of the ‘political’: as a sphere within which social life is organised on 
a wide scale but, at the same time, within which such regulating efforts are 
not defined in terms of centralised and monopolised coercion. Social 
interdependence takes the form of horizontal relations of equal responsibility 
and benefit. Also, this picture is a central feature of anarchist social visions, 
something which inspires theoretical defences of their possibility as well as 
empirical efforts towards their realisation. The implications of these matters 
will be discussed in the conclusion of this thesis. At this point, I restrict 
myself to two preliminary observations. Firstly, the anarchist proposals for 
societies composed by free co-operative organisations oppose institutionalised 
coercion and to this extent they do not face the problems created by the 
moral elements of the ideal of legitimacy for polities which display 
institutionalised coercive structure. Secondly, the anarchist rejection of political 
obligations as the core of a conception of our social relationships suggests 
that anarchist proposals can be defended to meet the required moral demands 
without having to meet the four traditional conditions which only a theory of 
political obligation has to satisfy (since, as argued in the previous chapters, 
these conditions reflect the political nature of that obligation in its traditional 
conception).
Both acceptance and the idea of schemes of social co-operation provide 
paradigmatic ways of expressing self-governance. Individuals should be capable 
of thinking and acting for themselves in order to survive and to live 
meaningful lives. The two elements distinguished by the discussion of fairness 
make explicit the value of participation and the form of participation 
appropriate for this capacity. The constant and explicit expression within a
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society of a willing involvement on the part of individuals in its aims and 
services, which acceptance exemplifies, is a direct application of self- 
government and the kind of active citizenship necessary for it. And a sense 
of horizontal relationships of a reciprocal character, as involved in schemes of 
social co-operation, cultivates proper social relations, within which self- 
government is enhanced. Defenders of political constraints need to attend to 
these elements and their value for assessing political institutions.
To conclude: in this chapter, the anarchist perspective is made explicit 
through an insistence, in the language of fairness, on the values of active 
participation and actual reciprocity as the proper features of the kind of a 
particularised moral relationship which would generate political obligation. And 
such an advocacy on the part of the philosophical anarchist of the kind of 
acceptance which would form active participation is also an expression of the 
fact that this anarchist perspective goes together with an ideal of legitimacy, a 
prior vision of what an application of proper social relations would be like. 
This latter is expressed further in the anarchist insistence on the idea of 
schemes of social co-operation as the defining structures of social life. The 
failure of the fairness defence of political obligation justifies these claims. 
And, in turn, these points suggest the following: first, that political obligation 
constitutes an actual and particularised relationship such that needs to be 
detected in the specific practices of political institutions and their interaction 
with individuals. Secondly, the fact that such a relationship, in this case 
through the elements of fairness, is very difficult to exist in our societies 
shows something important about political institutions. They lack an aspect 
which would justify the claims they make on individuals and this affects their 
character and acceptability. In view of the absence of political obligation and 
the kind of active participation it would reflect, it becomes more crucial to 
ensure that political constraints have a character such that makes them morally 
justifiable. For this, they need to be justified on the basis of fundamental 
moral values and in the light of an ideal of legitimacy which they fail to 
satisfy. The centralised, monopolistic and coercive character of political 
constraints creates inappropriate social relations. In order to be justified, 
political constraints need to be shown to respect constantly the values on the
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basis of which they are claimed to be defensible in the first place - values 
such as security and peace, justice and fairness and even freedom itself. This 
provides an alternative way of enabling active participation within political 
societies, and the acceptable relations it generates, given the absence of
political obligation. One which involves and motivates a more critical and
demanding approach to political institutions. The principle of fairness, as one 
such value, can be used as a way of characterising social interdependence 
within existing political societies. It is a good principle to look at with regard 
to some obligations to others and to define the character of social procedures,
although it does not establish the exclusive enforcement by the state of such
duties that we might have.79
79An earlier version o f this chapter was published in the Review Journal o f  Political 
Philosophy, V ol.l, University o f  Sheffield, 2003.
Chapter Five. Where Friends of Political 
Institutions and Anarchists Are in the Same Boat.
In this chapter I collect together and elaborate on the results of the 
preceding discussion and demonstrate the value of critical philosophical 
anarchism within the debate on political authority. The aim of the chapter is
to show the contribution that critical philosophical anarchism makes to
evaluations of political institutions; and to argue that, whether or not one is 
an anarchist, there is a distinctive and indispensable insight within this
anarchist position and this should affect the framework of the debate on 
political obligation and be accommodated by other perspectives on the 
justification of political institutions.
I begin, in the first part of this chapter, with a summary of the negative 
points of the anarchist criticisms of theories of political obligation found in 
each of the previous chapters. Then, I describe and analyse the positive points 
of these criticisms. Also, I anticipate the programme of work that awaits
political thought as a result of the challenge of critical philosophical 
anarchism. In the second part of the chapter, I provide the main analysis of 
the contribution o f critical philosophical anarchism, especially as it is 
involved in the positive points of this position elaborated in the chapter.
5.1.Negative and positive points resulting from the anarchist 
criticisms.
5.1.1.The negative conclusions.
The negative conclusions as derived from the anarchist criticisms of 
different theories of political obligation above are as follows:
In chapter two, the anarchist critique showed that the voluntary 
undertakings of individuals, which constitute the core of consent and contract 
theories of political obligation, cannot be satisfactorily combined with the 
generality condition in a way that preserves the political nature of that 
obligation. The problem of agreement remains unsolved and no version of
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voluntarism establishes a form of undertaking that actually binds individuals to 
the state to a sufficiently general extent. Thus, voluntarist theories fail to meet 
the basic conditions of a comprehensive account of political obligation. This
failure is explained on the basis of their most central commitment.
The conclusion of chapter three maintains that, whilst the Rawlsian 
natural duty of justice does not in principle violate the particularity condition 
of political obligation, it does not establish actual political obligation. The just 
character of an institution does not provide sufficient ground for such an 
obligation. Whilst the demands of justice form moral criteria for the
acceptability of institutional organisations, they are not derived from the 
essentially political nature of those organisations. But an acceptable moral 
defence of the authority of the state demands that political obligations derive 
from precisely that feature of public institutions.
The principle of fairness discussed in chapter four fails to satisfy the
generality condition of political obligation. This inadequacy is related both to 
the notion of active participation necessary to capture the essential rationale of 
the principle and to the idea of society as a scheme of social co-operation 
which the principle involves. Both these elements form distinctive proposals of 
the fairness account and make the principle theoretically attractive. Yet, their 
detachment from real, political circumstances disqualifies the principle of 
fairness as a general ground of authority.
These conclusions show that there is no general political obligation and 
that critical philosophical anarchism provides a perspective from which the 
limitations of defences of political obligation can be seen clearly. This 
viewpoint allows for an accurate exposition of the aspects in which each 
theory would have to be refined in order to account satisfactorily for political 
obligation and informs the theorist about deeper difficulties that such a demand 
for refinement designates, which are discussed in the rest of this chapter.
5.1.2.The positive conclusions.
The positive upshot of the critical philosophical anarchist critique is 
reflected in its incorporation of ideals o f legitimacy and, most importantly, in
167
the perspective it proposes to approaches to political institutions and to our 
conception of political relations and lives.
As claimed in the previous chapters, the anarchist ideals of legitimacy 
correspond to accounts of what a successful attempt to justify political 
authority would look like and represent paradigms of political legitimacy which 
existing states must, in order to be legitimate, exemplify. They thus relate to 
both the features of what Simmons offers as a more comprehensive part of 
philosophical anarchism.1 The first feature is found in the different anarchist 
ideals themselves, which are offered as prior visions of the appropriate social 
relations that existing societies must realise in order to be legitimate. The 
collection of the moral ideas which have been derived from the anarchist 
criticism and shown to be indispensable criteria of morally acceptable authority, 
or social organisation more generally, is already incorporated into ideal
accounts of their actual and specific application within societies. The role of 
these standards in evaluating political institutions preserves the best possibility 
for assessing their legitimacy. The second feature is found by the anarchist in 
the combination of the moral ground proposed by each theory with the four 
formal ‘conditions of political obligation’ adopted in this thesis - namely 
generality, particularity, bindingness and content-independence, which together
express the nature of the political as presented in the four ‘theses on the 
political’.2 The debate on political obligation concludes that attempts at this 
combination are unsuccessful.
The arguments examined in this thesis provide three moral forms of the 
anarchist ideal of legitimacy. The first is ‘the ideal o f  voluntariness’. It 
involves a recognition of the substantial role of voluntariness. That is, the ideal 
focuses on the conditions of free deliberation and choice as vital features of 
participation in the public sphere, which would found a morally significant 
relation between political institutions and each of their subjects if they actually 
applied; it expresses in this sphere the political analogue of self-assumed 
obligation and free agreement (chapter two). The second is ‘the ideal o f
justice’. It concentrates on the centrality of justice as a necessary feature of
’See Simmons 1996, p.36, note 9. For a presentation o f  these features, see my introduction 
section 2.
2See introduction, section 1.
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public institutions, which, in order to ground political obligation must be 
represented in the specific practices of such institutions and characterise their 
particular interaction with their citizens; it must also be compatible with an 
extent of efficiency in order for these practices to be feasible and meaningful 
(chapter three). A third anarchist proposal of an ideal of legitimacy is found in 
'the ideal o f social co-operation’. This ideal depicts, as the most suitable 
implementation of actual and morally significant social relationships, a political 
community which exemplifies purely and effectively the characteristics and the 
spirit of a scheme of social co-operation. Such a scheme gives rise to a more 
fruitful conception of the ‘political’, found especially in the horizontal 
relationships and the ethos of reciprocity, co-operation and mutual aid among 
individuals which are its central features. Fundamentally, it reflects the value 
of voluntary participation (chapter four). Meanwhile, in terms of the traditional 
defences of the state, all these versions of the ideal preserve the demand that 
any defence of that kind should make clear that the four traditional conditions 
of political obligation are satisfied.
The function of the anarchist ideals of legitimacy just described 
corresponds to two main aspects of the anarchist perspective itself, as reflected 
in the results of the anarchist critique presented above. This perspective 
imposes the satisfaction of the conditions of political obligation as a 
precondition of any theoretical defence of the legitimacy of political authority. 
This test concerns all and only the attempts to justify political authority and 
the existence of political obligation. Furthermore, the anarchist perspective finds 
in the moral requirements which it demands be met by both defences of the 
state and anarchist visions of stateless societies, moral principles which must 
be embodied in the actual, specific interactions that characterise these social 
structures mostly in order for them to be legitimate.
Voluntariness remains a desirable feature of a valid justification of 
authority. Most importantly, it is a valuable expression of the capacity for self- 
governance. That is, the ability, responsibility and right of individuals to 
determine their own lives and act accordingly. The anarchist conclusions in 
chapter two indicate that the problem with theories which appeal to 
voluntariness is the element which these theories try to justify and their use of 
voluntariness for such a justification: the desirability of voluntariness verified
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by the anarchist highlights the problematic nature of the notion and existence 
of political obligation. This, in turn, suggests that voluntariness be seen as part 
of an understanding of our public lives which calls into question appeals to 
principled defence of authority, rather than as part of such a defence.
The recognition of the value of justice in chapter three provides another 
part of a proper idea of what a satisfactory organisation of public life might 
involve. It thus accepts the appropriateness of the theoretical appeal to this 
ideal, and yet highlights the shortcomings of accounts which make the 
justification of political authority the focus of social organisation. Once more, 
the appeal to a desirable moral value issues in the failure of defences of 
political obligation and, in this, suggests a revision of our understanding of 
political relationships and lives. Significantly, the discussion of the principle of 
justice indicates more clearly difficulties which arise from the very nature of 
political constraints.
Finally, the idea of societies as schemes of social co-operation in chapter 
four, supplements the proposed revision of our view of the political with a 
comprehensive example of what political life understood in opposition to a 
principled appeal to authority would be like. Again, since existing institutions 
do not exemplify such schemes, a defence of their authority in terms of the 
principle of fairness becomes problematic. The idea of reconstructing social life 
along these new lines, however, remains appealing, since it can perhaps be 
implemented without appeal to authority and the centralised functions of the 
state.
The question remains, however, whether anarchist social visions have 
better prospects as forms of public organisation. This question is motivated by 
the thought that such visions are not offered as representations of legitimate 
political authorities but rather of alternative forms of social life. Their 
legitimacy, then, might be established only on the basis of the suggested moral 
ideas and without satisfying the four traditional conditions which only an 
account of de jure political authority needs to satisfy. It is interesting to 
examine whether anarchist social structures substantiate schemes of social co­
operation of the kind which anarchist ideals of legitimacy exemplify. To 
examine, that is, whether anarchists can meet their own standards in defence 
of an alternative view of social life.
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The value of the anarchist perspective and ideal of legitimacy is affirmed 
in that the moral ideas which they highlight as criteria of acceptable forms of 
social organisation are derived from the anarchist criticism itself and constitute 
positive features of it. They are the result of the arguments preceding the 
conclusions of each chapter, which were presented so as to be open to critical 
evaluation. The acceptability of these conclusions and the moral conditions they 
sustained as criteria then explains the acceptability of the anarchist perspective 
and ideal of legitimacy. The fact that the anarchist criticism is based on
general intuitions about freedom, equality, justice and the value of co-operation, 
and that the anarchist challenge reflects an insistence on the importance of 
these values, shows that this challenge aspires to moral reasons which 
everybody can accept. In articulating acceptable moral beliefs, the substantial 
moral standards preserved by the anarchist perspective open the way for
expressing suitably and perhaps meeting the motivations3 which gave rise to
the problem of political obligation.
This latter point depends on another central feature of the anarchist
perspective. That is the position that within the debate on political obligation 
such moral values cannot become bases of this obligation when they are 
offered in an abstract, theoretical form, nor when they are translated into 
general moral qualities and accomplishments of political institutions. Their 
respect within an account of appropriate social relationships can be shown only 
in a direct and particular application of them in our political reality. To the 
extent that this demand is not satisfied, defences of political obligation fail. 
But such a position about the role of moral values within the debate on 
political obligation retains a further function for them. It suggests that, 
nevertheless, in their more general applications, these values continue to 
provide indispensable criteria for the acceptability of political notions, doctrines 
and institutions. This observation re-defines the tasks of political theorists. It 
provides the basis for a more informed, far-reaching and comprehensive 
evaluation of constraints, one which transcends the boundaries of the debate on
3A s explained in chapter two, section 2.2., these motivations constitute a worry on our part 
about suffering an unquestioned, unqualified and unlimited imposition o f political requirements 
and their consequences upon us, which then gives rise to doubts about the very idea o f being 
obliged in the first place and to a demand for an explanation and justification o f such 
requirements.
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political obligation although is still motivated by it. For all these reasons, the 
anarchist insistence on a moral grounding of authority and on the seriousness 
of the failure of theoretical defences of state-authority becomes theoretically 
relevant and, perhaps, indispensable. These points provide the core of the 
evaluation of the contribution of critical philosophical anarchism advanced in 
this thesis and will be developed in the second part of this chapter.
The anarchist perspective and its adherence to certain ideals of 
legitimacy, as well as the new light under which they promote the relevant 
moral values, show that the accounts of the state examined earlier in this 
thesis fail to prove that existing states respect the relevant moral ideas in the 
way the problem of political obligation demands. The anarchist criticism of the 
state rests primarily upon the following claim: since all human beings are free 
and equal such that no one has, in principle, the right to decide for and 
command the others, only a form of ruling which satisfies the four conditions 
of political obligation, or, which actualises within particular interactions 
principles which express the recognition of the above moral ideas as generally 
acceptable moral reasons, would be legitimate.4 Defences of the political 
institutions fail to meet these requirements. This presents a strong reason for 
questioning the possibility of their legitimacy.
The above claim expresses two central and related anarchist concerns, 
which give rise to the anarchist challenge. Firstly, the anarchist focuses on 
freedom as an ideal and a characteristic of the status of human beings which 
cannot be compromised easily. In view of this ideal, political constraints 
remain a problem, even when they are necessary. If they are claimed to be 
necessary and legitimate, political institutions must prove to be so in terms of 
that very idea. They must provide a form of freedom which, even if different 
from the freedom belonging to human beings outside political structures, is 
equally substantive and valuable,5 and they should apply it constantly in their
4This is also a reaction to pluralist, or supplementary, accounts o f political obligation, such as 
those suggested by W olff 1995b and Gans 1992.
5A form o f freedom which still involves the capacity for self-preservation and a direct 
assertion o f morality as responsibility and successful decision, which freedom in its most 
basic form is (for this, see the final section o f  chapter two, especially note 93 based on 
Rousseau 1762, book 1, ch.6). In the end, the state must be proved to be a self-imposed 
constraint on the part o f individuals - or, that within it they remain free - in order for it to
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practices and in their interactions with each and every of their subjects. 
Alternatively, they must respect and concretise other values which are 
important enough to counterbalance losses of freedom, or, the implementation 
of which can itself be seen as promotion of freedom, or compatible with it. 
Justice, equality and community are such values and they are stressed by the 
anarchist perspective and its ideals of legitimacy. But then the state must show 
steadily that it actually applies and preserves such values, in order to justify 
the constraints that it imposes. The problem of political obligation concerns 
one area where political institutions are shown not to do so. The anarchist 
stresses this failure and its importance. Still, such a demand on political 
institutions concerns wider justifications of constraints. The anarchist position 
within the debate on political obligation motivates a focus on more careful 
attempts in that direction.
Secondly, the anarchist concern with freedom is related to the 
fundamental anarchist concern with achieving appropriate social relations,6 and 
highlights its importance. The anarchist does not worry merely about the 
problem of subjecting individuals to the interests or the will of other 
individuals, but sees the ‘problem of subjugation’, namely of subjection of one 
person to another, as primarily one ‘of the relations between one person and 
another’, which, to be proper, should involve equal power, ‘mutual respect, 
reciprocity’ and fair co-operation.7 In social reality this would be expressed 
properly only in the attainment of active, substantial participation, such that all 
members of a society see social affairs as their own and are in control of 
them.
The aspects of the anarchist perspective just analysed incorporate and 
reflect a commitment to two fundamental anarchist arguments against political 
authority. The first concerns self-government. The anarchist critique developed 
in chapters two and four indicated that the voluntarism involved in consent 
and other attitudes of willing participation is a substantial expression of self- 
government. Self-government creates the proper conditions for individual self­
be justified to them (for this fundamental demand, see the discussion in chapter one, sections 
1.1., 1.2. and 1.4.; and the discussion in section 5.2. o f  the present chapter).
6This concern can be expressed otherwise as a claim that anarchism is ‘..about the quality o f  
relations between people’ (Taylor 1982, p.3).
7See Raz 1990, pp. 16-17 and the discussion o f his theory in chapter one, section 1.3.
173
realisation and for proper relations between persons as free and equal agents. 
The enhancement of this capacity within social life is achieved by the 
cultivation and establishment of active participation and this is why social 
structures must enable such forms of interaction. The voluntary commitment to 
and participation in social life becomes an actual and effective way for 
individuals to express their freedom, to determine their own lives and social 
world and to act on these determinations. Ideal, participatory ways of social 
interaction form a reminder of the kinds o f demands individuals have the 
responsibility to themselves and to one another to impose on their social 
world.
This argument relates to the second central argument involved in the 
anarchist position. This is the argument about the undesirability o f political 
constraints. The philosophical anarchist criticism of political obligation indicates 
one aspect in which political institutions are defective: they do not function on 
the basis of a morally justified relationship with individuals. And this defect is 
rooted in the very nature of political constraints and draws attention to it. 
Although self-government might involve and indeed need constraints, it 
involves constraints which one puts on oneself - through the careful 
consideration, choice and implementation of commitments that the individual 
himself decides that can help build his personality and should determine his 
life - not external constraints. But political constraints have an exclusive and 
authoritative character. They establish a framework within which some are 
ruled by others. This opposes self-government and constitutes inappropriate 
personal relations. The failure to ground political obligation on the basis of 
voluntary participation and ideal schemes of social co-operation which enhance 
individual responsibility and equal interaction highlights this defect. And, in 
turn, this defect initiates a different approach to political institutions. The 
fundamental moral values affirmed within the debate on political obligation 
have a central role to play here. They function as the criteria on the basis of 
which we can see a new way of evaluating political institutions. The general 
idea here is that political constraints need to be evaluated in view of the 
special character they have and its defects. This character makes them unable 
to meet the conditions of the relationship of political obligation. But it is 
compatible with an evaluation on the basis of the fundamental moral principles
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which their defenders claim that political institutions incorporate. This provides 
an alternative way of ensuring meaningful participation, given the absence of 
political obligation. And it initiates a more demanding kind of institutional 
evaluation. Significantly, it reflects the central claim of the anarchist position: 
that it is very difficult for any state to be legitimate. These points were 
already suggested in the previous chapters and will be fully elaborated in the 
second part of the present chapter.
The negative and positive aspects of the anarchist critique are expressed 
more directly in the subversive campaign of philosophical anarchists.8 That 
campaign’s work is to demonstrate, through the criticism of the state, that the 
non-existence of a general political obligation affects in general our thinking 
and acting in the public sphere. This is the immediate role of the anarchist 
criticism. Such criticism exposes the difficulties involved in attempts to defend 
political obligation and ‘removes any presumption in favour of obedience’.9 
Thus its results ‘force us to view the position of man in political society in a 
different way’.10 And the anarchist perspective and ideals of legitimacy insist 
on a set of generally acceptable moral standards for us to adopt in order to 
conceive and apply adequately political ideals in an attempt to construct 
political institutions. Thus, they function as a principled reflection of the 
seriousness and the implications of an attempt to justify political authority. The 
anarchist position already cultivates the critical attitude suggested by its 
subversive campaign11 and it already constitutes a strong basis for a deeper 
understanding and improved conception of our political relationships and lives. 
Yet to understand the ultimate strength of these aspects of the anarchist 
position, in fact the real extent of the effects of the anarchist enlightening 
campaign itself, we need to examine and understand the fundamental demands
8Miller 1984, p. 18. For a fuller presentation o f this campaign, see my introduction, section 3 
and chapter one, subsection 1.4.2.i. For representative bibliography, see: W olff 1970, pp. 11 
and 18-19; Smith 1973, pp.969-973; Simmons 1979 pp. 191-201; 1987, pp.275-279; 1993, pp. 
263-269.
9Simmons 1979, p.200
10Ibid.
nThis is the different attitude towards the activities, demands and position o f  political 
institutions which the removal o f a presumption in favor o f  obedience generates. For more on 
the anarchist campaign, the attitude it cultivates and its radicalism, see chapter one, 1.4.2.i.
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underlying them. This is the central rationale of my discussion of the 
contribution of the anarchist position over the course of this thesis.
We may conclude from the discussion of the negative and the positive 
points of the anarchist challenge that within the debate on political authority 
anarchism provides a constant awareness of the limitations of arguments for 
political authority, which entails the need for their refinement and, possibly, 
their abandonment altogether as well as a change in our attitude towards 
political society. In turn, this affects further justifications of constraints and it 
must have an effect on real institutions.
5.1.3.The implications of the anarchist challenge for political thought and 
practice.
In the next few paragraphs, I discuss the tasks of future approaches to 
political institutions, as these are suggested by the preceding discussion.
The anarchist perspective and its ideals o f  legitimacy are to function as a 
shared normative horizon for both the defender of political institutions and the 
anarchist. The two opponents can continue their dialogue on a better basis. 
They can challenge one another and criticise their own beliefs in a non 
question-begging way. They will have to respect the conditions of political 
obligation which an account of political authority needs to satisfy and, most 
importantly, the moral requirements as expressed in the relationships suggested 
by the ideals of legitimacy and which are provided as the ultimate criteria of 
morally acceptable forms of social order.
For friends o f the state, the main effect of the argument from the 
anarchist perspective is that their victory against philosophical anarchism is not 
assured. It has been argued in their favour that the standpoint from which the 
state is criticised by the anarchist is unfairly biased.12 Anarchists fail to 
shoulder any part of the burden of proof, demanding that friends of the state 
defend it against the anarchist critique whilst not demonstrating that they can 
solve more effectively the problems of social order and cooperation which 
worry those defenders. However, in the light of the results of the debate on
12 W olff 1995b; 1996b.
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political obligation, anarchists do not seem to occupy a privileged position 
unjustifiably. They can say, in response, that by failing to take seriously some 
of the problems which form the core worry for anarchist theorists, defenders of 
the state have won an unstable victory. If they did take these criticisms 
seriously they would have to do more by way of argument. The anarchist 
perspective involves an insight that every political theorist needs to share. It is 
this claim that I will elaborate in the second part of this chapter.
Thus, the anarchist position now at hand provides the philosophical 
claims which need to be taken more seriously by friends of the state and 
which determine how their efforts must be directed in the future as regards the 
problem of political obligation. It indicates how each theory of the state fails 
significantly to satisfy one or more of the four conditions of political 
obligation and how this violates the demands of central moral principles for a 
plausible account of political legitimacy. The arguments for political authority, 
then, need to be refined on the basis of the negative and the positive 
conclusions of the anarchist criticisms applied to each. The defenders of the 
state might win a more stable victory, if they manage to reconstruct these 
arguments so as to meet the indicated demands. But the greatest value of these 
instructions lies in their more far-reaching implications for attempts to justify 
constraints (especially in what they tell about the very status of political
authority), which, in turn, may affect other areas where such defences apply.
For political anarchists, on the other hand, the work to be done is to 
address the challenge advanced on the part of the defenders of the state. They 
should show, that is, that the social vision of political anarchism lives up to 
an ideal of legitimacy in a way that proves not only its desirability but also 
its feasibility. This is the route for them to follow in order to show that they 
can refine their own accounts in accordance with the demands that they
themselves raise. But this is not my task in this thesis. However, I will
anticipate attempts in this direction in (the second part of) the conclusion to 
the thesis.
In both directions, the tasks of the theorist reflect an approach that is 
also the responsibility of every individual to adopt and which affects directly 
our position and behaviour within social reality. The dialogue between
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defenders and anarchists is one that can be entered by the wider population 
and its results are to affect social life for us all.
The rest of the discussion of this thesis is based on the first of the two 
directions in which the anarchist contribution can be demonstrated, to wit, on 
the significance that the position of critical philosophical anarchism might have 
for the evaluation and improvement of defences of political institutions. The 
role of the discussion so far was to provide a clearer view of the nature of 
the anarchist critique in order to derive the elements which characterise it most 
and which can be used for a more comprehensive evaluation of the anarchist 
contribution. These elements are the anarchist perspective, especially as 
represented in the arguments about self-government and the badness of political 
constraints, and the provision of ideals of legitimacy.
5.2.The contribution of critical philosophical anarchism.
In the rest of this chapter, I provide an argument which elaborates on 
aspects of the positive side of critical philosophical anarchism as presented 
above (in section 5.1.2.). This argument shows the steps through which the 
criticism of political obligation leads to a different and more radical approach 
to political institutions, and the way in which the anarchist arguments about
self-governance and the undesirability of political constraints are combined with 
and underlie this process. My aim is to give a clearer demonstration of the 
implications of the anarchist perspective and thus of the positive role of the 
anarchist position and its contribution to evaluations of political institutions.
5.2.1.The anarchist perspective.
The preceding arguments lead the anarchist to certain claims about the 
approach characterising the debate on political obligation on the whole. The
anarchist criticism reveals that the moral principles which are offered as bases 
of political obligation are valid requirements. Also that when they express
general qualities which characterise political institutions, they provide important 
reasons for seeing these institutions as acceptable social structures. But that for 
political obligation to be established, such qualities need to be actually
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incorporated in the specific instances of interaction between individuals and 
their political institutions. This latter demand is shown to not be satisfied so 
far, and the results of the examination of defences of political obligation 
express exactly this fact. This conclusion, in turn, affects our attitude towards 
political institutions.13 Furthermore, and correspondingly, the critical anarchist 
offers ideal accounts of what social structures which incorporated the required 
relationships would be like, which can be used as standards for existing 
institutions to aspire to. And the arguments from self-governance and the 
badness of political constraints play a central role in this discussion. My claim 
is that these aspects of the anarchist view comprise a unified position, which 
has been missed by approaches to the role of anarchism in the philosophical 
debate, and I argue that this position reflects a very valuable perspective. It is 
this perspective that I attempt to defend in the rest of this chapter.
The aforementioned aspects of the anarchist criticism are most important 
because they reveal a deeper problem regarding the approach to the issue of 
political obligation characteristic of its defenders.14 Take, for example, the
13This effect is typically claimed to be what is involved in the subversive campaign o f  
philosophical anarchism. In the present part o f chapter five I attempt to provide a deeper 
explanation o f the importance o f this campaign, as well as o f the importance o f the rest o f  
the anarchist claims presented in this paragraph.
14T o  remind the reader, the debate on political obligation involves two main features: a) the 
distinctively ‘po litica l’ character o f such obligations and the institutions to which they are 
owed; and b) the requirement for a moral basis o f these obligations which is necessarily 
linked with their political character (see introduction section 1). Voluntariness, justice and 
fairness are such bases. The main elements used to demonstrate and determine this important 
link between the political and the moral feature are the four conditions imposed by the 
anarchist and used traditionally in the debate: to wit, ‘generality’ (Raz 1979, chapter 12), 
‘particularity’ (Simmons 1979, pp.34-35; Green 1988, pp.84 and 227-228), ‘bindingness’ and 
‘content-independence’ (Green 1988, pp.225-226). Generality means that political obligation 
should apply to most o f  (or: to a sufficiently general number of) the people who belong to 
the society which the relevant political institutions govern. Particularity requires that 
justifications o f political obligation should provide a basis for the particular relationship 
between political institutions and each o f their own citizens, a basis for obeying particularly 
one’s own government as it itself determines the conditions o f  membership within its 
territory. Bindingness and content-independence mean that political commands are authoritative 
as such, in the way they themselves require and independently o f the content o f specific 
instances o f them; that justifying political obligation means justifying the obligation to obey 
the law as it requires to be obeyed. The main difficulty for theories o f  political obligation is 
to connect these conditions with the moral ground provided by each such theory. Particularity 
constitutes the crucial obstacle to this effect especially because it is the element most 
indicative o f the need for political obligations to be actual and specifically related to all 
affected parties. The particularity condition is also central to the distinctiveness o f the 
anarchist approach. For these points, see introduction and chapters two to four.
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approach of consent theorists.15 As a representative defender of political 
institutions, the social contract theorist focuses on the idea that justification 
should proceed from individuals; that political authority should be voluntarily 
accepted if it is to be binding. With this in mind, he concentrates on a need 
for political institutions and asks the question: which form of government 
would merit a duty to obey it? The idea of the contract is used to produce 
answers to this question. On the basis of actual contract, the theorist aspires to 
say that because you have agreed to a certain form of government, it is 
therefore legitimate and you should obey it. On the basis of hypothetical 
contract, the theorist wants to show that because from a position of equality (a 
‘state of nature’ in the absence of government) and after careful deliberation 
you would agree to a certain form of government, it is thereby legitimate and 
any instances of this form should be obeyed.
The anarchist follows step by step the arguments in terms of different 
forms of consent and of contract.16 Actual consent would be a satisfactory 
justification of political authority because it represents an actual connection of 
individual will with the conditions of political obligation. But it is hardly 
proved that this combination has ever been the case. That is, this form of 
consent has never taken place to a sufficiently general extent, either in a 
historical or in a personal form: there has very seldom been an original 
contract, the conditions of valid choice rarely take place in real life and most 
of us have never had the experience of such a choice with regard to our 
relation to our governments. Also when instances of tacit consent are offered 
as implicit though actual signs of consent, they either require detailed 
disclosure and specific application at the empirical level, which can hardly be 
generalised so as to acquire normative significance, or are usually products of 
illegitimate inference. The implications for the commitment of future
15In the following paragraphs, I will use voluntarism as representative o f the defenders with 
whom the anarchist enters a dialogue. As shown in the previous discussion, the anarchist 
criticism and its results about political obligation as well as the present anarchist claims apply 
with regard to the other theories o f political obligation which are the object o f this criticism. 
Thus these claims concern the debate as a whole. And a demonstration o f their importance 
affects all the relevant theoretical accounts, as it will be further explained later in this 
chapter.
16For a detailed analysis o f the following points, see chapter two. For representative 
bibliography, see Horton 1992; Simmons 1979; Raz 1979 and W olff 1996.
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generations of the difficulties with all these forms of actual consent are quite 
obvious.
As an alternative, hypothetical consent constitutes a thought experiment. If 
taken to be detecting the possible results of our deliberations and seeing them 
as having literal implications regarding our obligations, this needs to be 
asserted as positively as the actuality of personal consent and thus faces 
similar difficulties to those confronting the latter, as just explained above. If, 
on the other hand, it is taken as a heuristic device for detecting principled 
demands on reason then it is hardly relevant to the concern with actual, self­
assumed acquisition of obligations characteristic of the voluntarist tradition. 
Such a heuristic device works as a moral route of conception of what ought 
to be a subject of agreement and agreement ceases to work as a literal 
expression of voluntary undertaking. The result is that it can be valuable when 
used as a framework for testing the legitimacy of principles for existing 
institutions on the basis of individuals’ capacity for self-governance but not as 
a way of motivating political obligations in the first place. According to this 
understanding, the idea of reasonable agreement as the subject-matter of
contractualism functions as a heuristic device for the formulation of legitimate 
moral principles which might then be applied to existing political institutions 
as they actually function and develop and determine their acceptability. This 
perspective gives a new direction to the role of social contract in relation to
political institutions. The aim is not to prove a general obligation to obey the
law but to find and to justify principles. This form of contractualism does not 
see its role as arguing for actual obligations. Actual obligation could only
result in the (improbable) case of absolute coincidence between actual 
institutions and ideal principles. In general, it is a matter of practice: of 
whether the form and activities of actual institutions provide a proper 
application of legitimate principles, which involves centrally that these 
institutions stand in interaction with their citizens, who are able to change 
them if they do not satisfy their demands. Therefore, contractualists who make 
this use of hypothetical contract,17 in contrast with those who use it as a basis 
for obligation, are immune to the anarchist accusation that their starting point
17For example, Scanlon 1982, 1998.
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is illegitimate. Instead of saying that we need political institutions to escape a 
state of war, as the voluntarist defenders of political obligation argue,18 they 
say that we have institutions anyway and must decide what to do with them. 
Hypothetical reasonable contract is, in their hands, a form of reasoning applied 
when we examine the legitimacy of the activities of political institutions from 
within and apart from an establishment of their bindingness. It functions only 
within the scope of the content of legitimacy.19
Hence, the overall result of the above considerations is that voluntarism 
establishes no general political obligation. These conclusions lead us to the 
deeper problem with the defenders’ accounts. Taking the hypothetical contract 
theorists, the problem lies in that their use of the idea of hypothetical contract 
connects directly the existence of coercive structures with their bindingness in 
one and the same move.20 Acceptability and obligation become through contract 
two inseparable parts of such methods of defence. The argument goes like this: 
defenders take it that if one can show that from a position of equality 
(depicted in the procedure of reasoning represented by the contractualist device 
of agreement) we would choose (contract to) a certain form of government, 
which therefore merits to exist, then we should obey a government which took 
this form. They start from the idea that we need institutions in order to escape 
an undesirable state of endless conflict, instability and danger. They aim to 
demonstrate how we can get out of this situation as quickly as possible, in 
order to show that what are good reasons for escaping it provide a basis for 
considering the alternative state of political organisation necessary and thus 
obligatory. Good ideas about how to avoid a state of war are provided as 
good reasons for obligation to the political alternative.
This approach conflates two separate questions. The first question is: 
what principles should a government be bound by in order fo r its existence to
18For the anarchist criticism o f this illegitimate move, see the following paragraphs.
19For elaboration o f these points, see chapter two o f this thesis.
20For theories o f actual consent this is not a real problem. Due to its actuality (and as 
characterised by the conditions o f validity presented in chapter two) this form o f consent 
would succeed in connecting existence, legitimacy and obligation in one move if  and 
whenever it took place: regular actual consent to governments would make them both 
acceptable and obligatory. Yet, actual consent theorists might be taken to join other defenders 
o f political obligation in missing the point which, as I explain below, anarchism tries to 
stress, because they too start from the idea o f consenting to already existing form s o f  
political institutions and they do not take seriously the constant demand for their justification.
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be morally justifiable? This is a question of acceptability. The second question 
is: do we have a duty to obey such forms o f government? This is a question 
of obligation.21 The perspective of these political theorists is one which 
conflates these two different questions and deduces an answer to the second 
from an answer to the first. That is, good reasons for abandoning the state of 
nature become in their eyes principles of acceptability which also bind 
individuals to the form of government which meets these reasons. Thus they 
take it that by giving some answer to the question of justifiable existence they 
also prove the existence of political obligation. And the issue becomes an 
explanation of the acquisition of political obligation and not of ‘the very 
possibility of obligations’.22
But should this be so? Does not the collapsing of two distinct questions 
obscure the significance of each of them? The importance of the anarchist 
arguments and their results is primarily that they reveal the effects of this 
conflation and of the obscurity it creates for the debate on political institutions. 
The results of the anarchist criticism of voluntarist theories of political
21T o  an extent, this argument coincides with Simmons’ view that the task o f justification o f  
the existence o f political institutions, which is also challenged by the anarchist, is different 
from the task o f justifying political obligation and that the defenders usually commit the 
mistake o f collapsing the two (1999). But my argument does not advance this distinction and 
my aim is to transcend it and show that the anarchist aims are unified. In fact the challenge 
to the very existence o f political institutions is the most characteristic anarchist position, 
although not the one obviously shared by all forms o f  anarchism. As explained in the
introduction o f this thesis, it is the challenge to the authority o f the state, namely to political 
obligation, that is shared directly by all anarchists. In echoing Simmons’ distinction at this 
point o f the argument, I want to specify the different aspects o f  evaluation o f political 
institutions that philosophical anarchism helps notice and clarify (it is the distinction between 
different kinds o f evaluation that I share with Simmons, as it becomes obvious in my 
arguments in chapters one to four). But my final position is that the anarchist challenge to 
the acceptability o f political institutions and the anarchist challenge to political obligation are 
linked in a way such that they show the anarchist position to involve a consistent and
unified perspective. And that the distinctions observed by the anarchist are part of, rather than 
an obstacle to, this effect.
22Ripstein 1992, p.219. Ripstein attributes this latter approach to Rousseau. So Rousseau is 
presented to be concerned with exactly this question while the above outlook is more
prominent in Hobbes and, under certain readings, in Locke. On the other hand, Rousseau
might be interpreted as not to be accounting for the problem o f political obligation at all. 
And in a preceding paragraph on hypothetical contract, I refer to a contemporary development 
o f that form o f social contract influenced by Rousseau’s idea o f the ‘general w ill’ which is a 
promising improvement within this tradition and yet the task o f which is distinguished from 
the problem o f political obligation. Nevertheless, within the context o f the debate on political 
obligation it remains possible that a development o f  Rousseau’s own use o f the general will 
could establish the possibility o f political obligation and do so as part o f a justification o f  
the existence o f political institutions, because his main outlook seems to connect the two in a 
way that addresses the anarchist challenge (see: Ripstein 1992; Habermas 1994, section III).
183
obligation reflect exactly what is missing in their approach: the failure of all 
forms of contract to ground political obligation on the very idea that they 
adopt shows that in fact they have taken too much for granted. From the 
anarchist point of view defenders of political institutions proceed from an 
inadequate starting point. They assume what they should seek to prove.
The anarchist instead separates the two questions and gives proper 
attention to the way a fundamental question underlies each of them. The 
question to be asked is not whether from a position of equality we would or
would not contract to a form of political institution so as to show it
acceptable and on this basis obligatory. Rather, the fundamental question is of 
whether we should have institutions at all: what contract would we make as to
the existence or not of political institutions if we started from a position of
equality?23 This question lies at the heart of the anarchist position. In the case 
of political obligation it can be translated as a question about the very 
possibility of such an obligation. It is this question that the anarchist criticism 
of theories of political authority vindicates. Hence, the anarchist enters the 
political debate with a unique perspective. In the following two sections I 
analyse the process which grounds these claims.24
5.2.2.The significance of the question of obligation.
The anarchist criticism shows that by focusing, through the device of the 
hypothetical contract, on good reasons for creating political institutions - 
qualities such as justice or their accomplishments such as the provision of 
valuable goods - the defender does not prove the relationship needed for 
political obligation. He does not create a moral basis which characterises the 
particular interaction between each and every individual and the institutions 
which govern the society where these individuals live. He merely provides 
reasons for wanting them when these institutions have these qualities and 
which would generate political obligation only if such qualities were constantly
23This question relates to what would be an accurate account o f how things would he without 
institutions, which is what the hypothetical contractualists’ representation o f  the state o f nature 
lacks. For this point see my analysis below.
24The following analysis is introduced in the first chapter o f the thesis. The role o f the 
present chapter is to give a detailed and complete examination o f  these arguments in order to 
establish the position o f this thesis as outlined in chapter one and defended in chapters two 
to four.
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proved to be translated into the specific practices of institutions and their 
interactions with each and every citizen. So the defender fails to prove general 
political obligation and this is reflected in the way each theory fails to meet 
the four conditions characteristic of the nature of the organisations they are 
offered to support. Once he enters the debate on political obligation, it is this 
criticism which the defender needs to understand and to adopt this perspective 
to the problem, in order to address it properly.25
This problem is related to the special nature of political constraints, as 
indicated by the anarchist argument about their undesirability. They are 
exclusive and authoritative. They involve the kind of coercion, centralisation 
and hierarchy which is characteristic of a situation where some are ruled by 
others. They are the external constraints which define relationships of unequal 
power and subordination. That they can be evaluated on the basis of moral 
virtues that they demonstrate shows that their existence is defensible. But it 
shows only this. It does not show that they stand in a legitimate relationship 
with their citizens. And it does not show that they can be justified once and 
for all. Rather, the limited defence which their very nature allows, shows the 
defects involved in political institutions and the difficulty created for their 
justification by those defects. It is the character of justification appropriate to 
them and the limitations of their justification that the anarchist criticism 
indicates.
The result of the defenders’ failure to ground political obligation is that 
institutions lack a very central feature of their existence, namely the special 
relationship which is to characterise their coexistence with individual citizens. 
This result has an immediate influence in changing our attitude to our position 
in political reality and thus it already affects significantly political institutions.26 
But, and through this influence, it also motivates a further question: how can 
institutions, even if we still need them, exist and function when they lack any
25These considerations, as analysed in chapters two to four, provide a detailed way o f
advancing the anarchist complaint that the arguments o f  the defender are based on previous, 
unproved assumptions about what our basic moral duties are and what the best way o f
discharging these duties is (for this complaint, see Simmons 1999, pp.766-769).
26Again, this is what characterises mostly the anarchist subversive campaign, as explained by
philosophical anarchists themselves (e.g. Simmons 1979, pp.200-201).
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special relationship which characterises them as political?27 This question 
becomes the first sign of how the challenge to political obligation might 
translate into a more general challenge to political institutions. If political 
institutions lack the relationship of political obligation, why aren’t they seen as 
maybe desirable yet optional social organisations? And if their political nature 
(especially their coercive, monopolistic and centralist character) does not allow 
them to be so, why have them at all? These considerations throw light to an 
argument about how the question of political obligation generates a challenge 
to the existence of political institutions. The anarchist criticism presses the 
defender to account for the very possibility of political obligation and the 
results of this perspective vindicate a doubt about the very possibility of 
political institutions themselves. The question we begin to ask is whether there 
is anything at all about political institutions that merits our support. Below I 
explain this argument.
In attempting to justify the existence of political institutions, the defender 
is on the same terrain as the anarchist: he accepts that the necessity of 
political institutions needs to be proved and sets to provide arguments for 
exactly this matter. But, in the way in which he develops his arguments he 
does not address what he means to address. Through the arguments from the 
state of nature, the defender demonstrates merits of the institutions which make 
them desirable, but he does not depict their defects too.28 He does not account
27Because to direct, coerce and be obeyed, which the justification o f political obligation would
give them the right to do, is to be political.
28Hobbes argues that the state solves the problems o f  conflict and coordination which the 
state o f  nature creates. For Locke, people in the state o f  nature fail to know what the moral
laws demand and when they know it they fail to enforce it, so they need the state. For
Rousseau, they come to a situation where natural freedom cannot be secured anymore and 
where a higher kind o f freedom is needed, which can be established only in civil society. 
The way Rousseau sets to develop his arguments for civil society however tends to remain 
valid because he conceives from the beginning and remains faithful to the demand that 
political institutions can be justified only in terms o f a very valuable thing that we loose in 
abandoning the state o f nature, namely freedom, and that they should be shown to be doing 
very well in this respect. That constraints take freedom away might never be justified unless 
they offer something which corrects this loss. This approach does take into account the 
demand that w e attend to the defects o f  political institutions and not only to their merits. 
This comes also from the fact that Rousseau guards against socially affected readings o f  the 
state o f  nature and he sees the less pre-social attitudes which create war as the features o f a 
situation which is an intermediate stage between the state o f  nature and political society (see, 
e.g., 1762, book 1, ch.6). Nevertheless, it is more likely that Rousseau’s project concerns a 
conceptual analysis o f the form o f justification which would legitimise institutions as they 
already exist rather than a justification o f  their existence (see note 22 above).
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for the fact that in themselves constraints are undesirable - they take away 
freedom and create relations of unequal power - and thus the merits which 
might motivate them need to be considered in the light of this defect. They 
need to be considered in the light of situations which lack constraints and to 
be constantly asserted. Characteristically, he fails to present what a genuine 
pre-social situation would be like. And he does not present fairly in the state 
of nature the non-political, social alternatives in terms of equally important 
merits which they might involve, nor does he compare political institutions to 
them in view of such merits. Ultimately, there is no proof, no conclusive 
explanation on the part of the defender that the state of nature ends up in a 
state of war.29 The defender addresses only those who have learned to need 
political institutions and learned to desire them anyway.30 What his argument 
really achieves is to show that once we are convinced that we need them 
political institutions can sustain this conviction, and it presumes that they merit
29It is indicative that although the anarchist is justifiably invited to prove whether social order 
and cooperation would be possible in the absence o f coercive structures, the arguments o f the 
defender o f the state, characteristically in game theory, preclude this possibility rather than 
explaining the failure by taking into account both the difficulties and the advantages involved. 
Defenders have not provided yet a convincing explanation o f  why political institutions are the 
only viable and desirable solutions. For example, the descriptions o f  the problem o f scarcity 
and o f human motivation in the imaginative state o f nature are presuppositions o f the theorist 
which favour the state rather than explanations o f  universal facts or universally accepted 
beliefs about human situation. Descriptions which are favourable to non-political solutions are 
excluded for no decisive reason (for relevant arguments, see Kavka 1983 and Sanders 1996, 
pp.264-265). Very importantly, this is rooted in traditional theories (for example, in how 
Hobbes failed to use his methodology o f hypothetical contract correctly) in a very basic way 
(although Hobbes attempted to avoid this failure and did better than others on this): these 
theories depicted in the state o f nature aspects o f human behaviour which are more the 
effects o f socialisation, o f  institutions as we live them and o f  what becomes “ natural”  within 
them, rather than o f a pre-social situation; they added to it more facts about human nature 
than they should have (for such an argument, see Rousseau 1762, book 1, ch.2). Only a clear 
view o f what a pre-social situation would be like could lead to valid conclusions about
political institutions. Such a view would throw light to both their merits and their defects. 
And even if  anarchists might also make their own assumptions under the influence o f
socialisation, their views are by their own character more likely to facilitate a proper 
description o f  a neutral situation; and the present argument removes a very important burden 
to an assessment o f their views which also applies to this assessment equally. Most 
importantly, the fundamental question which the anarchist perspective reveals already reflects
the significance o f  this argument and shows the anarchist to concede to it in a way that the
defender does not. For this latter point, see the rest o f my analysis in the present chapter.
30T o  ask accurately how things would be without institutions means that we need to go 
beyond the hypotheses we make about political institutions when we are already affected by 
them and to try to see what is really natural. The assumptions o f the defenders fall short o f  
this and the fact that they focus only on the merits o f institutions and not also on their 
defects reflects this weakness. Also, these failures are already represented within the debate 
on political obligation itself, by the failure o f  theories o f  this obligation to transform general 
qualities into specific interactions.
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it once and for all. The anarchist demand on the defender is to do instead all 
that is required from him once he enters the terrain of the justification of 
political institutions. And in this respect the anarchist perspective is one that 
needs to be shared by every theorist. In the debate on political obligation this 
demand becomes explicit and, as I argue, this helps redirect the defender to 
the proper approach.
Political obligation is a relationship which is normative, enduring and 
exacting. An adequate defence of it overrides ideas merely about what we 
have and what it would be good for us to do. It concerns the difficulty of 
particularising the relationship of government through an actual relation to 
political practices on the part of the individuals affected by them. And this 
process extends beyond a demonstration of the merits that certain forms of 
political order might initially have.31 Some defences of political institutions, 
which are central in political philosophy, move on too quickly. It is these that 
I am concerned to apply the anarchist perspective to. We should see the role 
of the anarchist not in a tendency to refute all and every evaluation of the 
state, not as adopting the position of the sceptic and waiting for offers to 
reject. There are evaluations of governments, those which do not examine the 
problem of political obligation and do not attempt to motivate their existence 
in the first place, which might preserve the possibility of a satisfactory 
account. But the role of the anarchist is significant in her addressing only 
those who engage with the fundamental worry represented by the anarchist 
scepticism and in saying that the relevant theorists have not confronted the 
implications of such an endeavour.
When the defender claims that we need the state as an exit from a state 
of war he enters a territory which involves a very demanding approach. He 
invites the question of the very possibility of institutions and by this he 
embarks on the anarchist boat. Once he embarks on the anarchist boat he 
cannot leave it easily. When the theorist claims to defend political obligation, 
he undertakes the task of establishing whether or not there can be such a 
bond. But the form that his claims take shows that he has dismissed in one
31These states might ‘merit our support’ but this ‘is not at all the same as saying that they 
have a right to direct and coerce us, which we are bound to honor’ (Simmons 1999, p.70). 
And, as we shall stress below, they are not guaranteed to merit support once and for all.
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impatient movement a worry that does not go away. Rather than adopt the 
assumption that we need political institutions, and then try to assert their 
merits and derive our obligation from them, he needs to deal with the prior 
question o f what it is that institutions demand o f us and whether these 
demands can themselves be justified.
By showing that the theories of political obligation do not establish the 
particularity which would guarantee the ideal of active participation, the
anarchist criticism indicates that political institutions lack, in one fundamental 
way, the ability to generate and protect this important practice. This is already 
a defect and, in turn, it reveals and advances a fundamental demand: the real 
challenge is to show whether political institutions are any answer at all to the 
concern with proper relations within social life. And for this purpose, it is not 
satisfactory to show them to be good enough as the most directly available 
social possibilities. Theorists are invited to realise that they should start to 
view political institutions as minor evils, as possible solutions to social
problems which nevertheless carry their own problems and thus remain
disputable.
The anarchist argument about the importance of self-governance plays a 
crucial role in supporting this approach. The capacity to determine their life 
and act on self-imposed constraints is indispensable for the survival of and 
proper relations between individuals. Within social life, it can be realised and 
expressed through active participation. The absence of political obligation under 
any comprehensive account of it indicates the absence of such a participation 
within existing political societies. The main defect of political institutions is 
that their coercive character establishes and cultivates exactly the kind of 
relations which make equal, active participation impossible: those who rule 
participate actively and determine the constraints imposed on them and on 
others. Those who are ruled do not participate and suffer external constraints. 
That institutions do not function on the basis of morally justified political
obligations opens the way for us to see what they seriously lack: the kind of 
participation which activates self-governance and the relations of equal power 
which this presupposes. This is a pressing problem to take into consideration 
when we try to evaluate them.
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The anarchist perspective applies to the other theories of political 
obligation - of which theories of hypothetical consent have been used in this 
part of chapter five as a representative example - in the following way. 
Defenders of the state who implement the criterion of justice and the idea of 
reciprocity involved in the principle of fairness take the existence of 
institutions for granted and rush to base the legitimacy of certain forms of 
them on their preferred moral ground, justice or fairness respectively. Theorists 
infer a perspective of legitimacy by asking what the principles for just or fair 
institutions are, they deduce obedience from the justice- or fairness-based 
general character of the forms institutions might take. But anarchist arguments 
against these theories show that success is far from secured, and that this does 
not lie in the falsity of the criteria chosen but in the very thing that is 
supposed to be defended on the basis of them, to wit, in political obligation. 
Firstly, general ideas about the character of political institutions cannot base a 
special relationship to them. Secondly, even when such arguments base certain 
claims about the desirability of political institutions, the results of the debate 
on political obligation show that in the way these claims are promoted they 
cannot decide the existence of political institutions and to motivate their 
acceptability once and for all. In contrast with the perspective of such defences 
of political institutions, the anarchist makes the question of whether we need 
institutions at all a persistent demand and appeals to consent, justice or 
fairness to solve this problem.
5.2.3.Justification as an endless process.
It is a crucial feature of the anarchist perspective, concomitant with the 
primacy of the question of obligation which this perspective suggests, that the 
anarchist insistence on the question of obligation shows that even if a theorist 
proves the state to be justified once, the task of justification does not end 
here.32 It is in this respect that, under the influence of the anarchist position, 
the debate on political obligation puts any justification of political constraints 
on a new basis. The anarchist may grant that the defender has given a good
32This is a point already involved in the preceding argument. My aim here is to highlight its 
special force within that argument.
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reason for creating political institutions, that they help us avoid serious social 
problems and this can out-balance their defects. But this justification is limited
by the very fact that it is given only once. Since the defender grounds the
state on the basis of certain values - such as peace and security, justice and 
ultimately freedom itself - he should be able also to account for it whenever it 
violates these values. The moment when institutions threaten the values with 
regard to which they are first proved to be acceptable, their validity ceases. It 
is this possibility of illegitimate constraints that concerns anarchism most.33 
This means that the demand for justification is constant.
The way in which the anarchist attention to illegitimate constraints is 
advanced through the question of political obligation helps vindicate this 
demand. Political obligation requires an actual relationship the particular aspects 
of which need to be constantly affirmed, applied and renewed. The question of 
obligation is distinctive and valuable in that it arises at every point. This 
throws light to the fact that, in a similar manner, the anarchist attention to 
illegitimate constraints makes the need for justification persistent more 
generally. Constraints are not desirable in themselves. They always take
something away. External constraints remove our freedom to determine our 
own lives. So they need to be continually defended in terms of the values 
they are held to be protecting, to counterbalance what they take away and thus 
respect our status as reflective human beings.34 This is an alternative way of 
ensuring active participation. Political institutions are to be always viewed as 
evils, even minor ones: they might help us to avoid certain social problems 
but they continue to carry their own, the unaccountable imposition of which
needs to be guarded against. The moment they cease to serve their duties they
are no more wanted. They simply limit our ability to determine our own lives 
and thus they exist on the basis of inappropriate interpersonal relations. The 
defender of political institutions might say that there are mechanisms for
testing their activities. But it is here that the anarchist has the privilege to
press the interrogation further, to insist that the theorist should bear this in
33It is their presence that undermines the quality o f relations between people, which is the 
focus o f  the anarchist challenge in the first place.
34They can thus be seen as compatible with the situation appropriate to persons, namely as 
beings determined by self-imposed constraints.
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mind and apply the test regularly. It is then that every theorist must realise 
that he has not engaged sufficiently with the process of justification and that 
the work that awaits him is not easy. Once you embark on the anarchist boat 
and you want to complete the journey, you have to remain in it as long as 
the destination requires.
At this point, a summary of the process through which anarchism 
contributes to the debate on political obligation and raises a new demand with 
regard to the justification of political constraints might be helpful. In the 
process of providing arguments against accounts of political obligation the 
anarchist establishes a horizon within which opposing claims about our relation 
to political institutions are weighed against each other. The result of this 
dialogue as derived from the anarchist criticism is that no defensible principle 
of political obligation can be reasonably accepted and thus so far there is no 
general political obligation. This alerts the defender of the state, not only as to 
the failure of his account, but also as to the very instability of an aim to 
establish constraints in terms of political obligation. The failure of any general 
principle of political obligation to heed the moral criteria which the defenders 
of the state use and which anarchists themselves stress, is alarming. The 
instability of defences of political obligation which this failure reveals, 
highlights the importance of confronting the fundamental question of whether 
we should have political obligation at all.35 Thus the anarchist’s demand, 
implicit in her criticism in the first place, to understand the real implications 
of this question for political institutions and to ask it properly, comes to the 
fore. The arguments of the defenders of political obligation and the counter­
arguments of anarchists need to be assessed in this light.36 Also, the anarchist 
criticism confirms that the moral criteria used in accounts of political 
obligation are not themselves flawed. Voluntariness, justice and fair 
participation survive the failure of these accounts. This motivates the idea that
35The result o f anarchist criticism reveals the difficulty o f  defending political obligation and 
shows that ‘[o]bedience remains as much in need o f justification as disobedience’ (Simmons 
1979, p.200; 1996, pp.38-39, note 30). This, in turn, redirects us to the fundamental question
that motivates the anarchist in the first place.
36Having in mind the fundamental question about the very possibility o f  political institutions, 
the philosophical anarchist does not neglect but rather concedes to the demand that anarchists 
provide and defend their own ideas and social alternatives. And her prior picture o f  ideals o f
legitimacy is offered in interaction with (political) anarchist replies to this demand.
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they can continue to be used in further attempts to decide the nature of our 
social relationships.37 And even if it is proved that the existence of political 
institutions is necessary,38 this necessity is not firm and such moral 
requirements may still be applied in deciding the forms of imposition that are 
enough to motivate it. The demand for justification remains constant and in the 
face of the importance of the question of obligation and the failure to answer
it which the anarchist challenge establishes, as well as of what this shows
about the character of political constraints, it becomes more pressing and more 
difficult for the defenders of any operative forms of imposition - institutions, 
laws and policies - to address.
Hence, there is a way in which everyone should start from the anarchist 
question: what is the point of having institutions and what is it that they 
demand of us? And from this to pressingly ask regularly whether our 
institutions are justified in terms of certain values.
5.2.4.The anarchist ideal of legitimacy.
The anarchists always focus on what institutions take away and not only 
on what they have and give. This focus is necessary for every theorist who 
wishes to obtain justification. And it is what makes the task of justification 
harder. By asking whether there is any point in having constraints at all, the 
anarchist advances the question of whether there is any constraint which it is
37These criteria are demands that cannot be reasonably rejected  by, and thus are appealing to, 
the rest o f us. They thus retain their validity as standards within the very process o f  
argumentation during which different reasons interact towards a delivery o f  a common basis 
o f  justification with regard to the problem o f  political obligation. In other words, they can be 
seen as general principled conditions within the framework o f  the debate. As I explain in the 
first part and in the following paragraphs o f this chapter, these criteria constitute central 
elements o f ideals o f legitimacy which are implicit in the anarchist perspective and motivate 
the anarchist criticism in the first place. The anarchist enters the debate with a positive and 
comprehensive view o f the demands it involves (and this remains her own proposal whether 
or not the rest o f us would agree to adopt these criteria). Furthermore, and importantly, the 
anarchist criteria can apply as tests in any further justification o f  constraints, still in the light 
o f the implications o f the debate on political obligation.
38This does not mean that the question o f obligation is answered. As argued in this chapter, 
theorists cannot build their defences on the basis o f a presupposition that we need political 
institutions, because the relationship o f political obligation overrides demonstrations o f  
institutional merits. Thus a proof that we need institutions does not establish that the 
relationship o f government is justified (i.e., that we have general political obligation) nor that 
we need them once and for all. It rather raises the demand that, in the absence o f such 
justification, every form o f institutional constraint needs to be motivated regularly in terms o f  
legitimate principles or other applications o f moral conditions.
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unreasonable to reject. This makes the question of justification a persistent 
process of interrogation. The anarchist perspective then represents an
indispensable and unified position which re-introduces a very pressing demand. 
In the following paragraphs I attempt to make the implications of this
challenge clearer.
The anarchist position prevents people from inventing political institutions. 
The anarchist’s twofold aim is, first, to show the illegitimacy of political 
institutions (which is exemplified in the philosophical anarchist arguments 
against accounts of political obligation and in the political anarchist additional 
detection of the evils of political institutions) and second, to work for their 
removal (which is distinctive of political anarchism). I remain agnostic as to 
whether this latter is an achievable aim. This is a substantial question to put
to anarchism itself and I will discuss it in the conclusion of this thesis. But
even if the anarchist does not succeed in sustaining her contention against 
political institutions, even if, that is, we conclude that we need some form of 
political coercion, the role of the anarchist challenge does not disappear.
I explained in the preceding sections that the need to prove the existence 
of an actual obligation arises constantly. And that by stressing the question of 
obligation, the anarchist alerts us to the demand that the need of justification 
of forms of imposition is continual. That we might need to have institutions 
does not mean that any form of constraint is enough to motivate them. What 
we need then is a proper test for deciding what forms of imposition are 
legitimate. This aspect of the contribution of the anarchist challenge establishes 
the demand that every constraint is in need o f justification39 and thus any new 
form o f institution should pass a test o f legitimacy in order to be accepted.
39In terms o f  the very thing that it is said to protect (more often than not), basically 
freedom. Freedom is indeed the primary anarchist concern when the anarchists stress the 
importance o f  focusing on what institutions take away. That institutions provide order and 
cooperation, security and peace, might never be enough to compensate for the loss o f  
freedom they involve (for a manifest observation o f  this difficulty see Rousseau 1762, esp. 
book 1, ch.6). Ultimately only a form o f  society which offers its services while 
simultaneously preserving freedom would be justifiable (ibid.). A very good reason for giving 
freedom such priority is that in its most basic form it is the capacity for self-preservation 
itself (ibid.).
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The question of legitimacy40 thus becomes more pressing when the defender of 
political institutions returns to it via the anarchist challenge.
The anarchist provides such a test of legitimacy. Throughout my account 
of the anarchist criticism of theories of political obligation, I explained how 
anarchist ideals of what a legitimate state would look like are involved in it. 
How the moral criteria which define the relations that these ideals describe are 
characteristic of the very concern that initiated the anarchist challenge in the 
first place. That criticism, far from being merely negative involves attention to 
these requirements as part of it. The anarchist perspective itself - the questions 
it raises, the process of argumentation it offers and the results it delivers from 
the dialogue about political obligation - involves inherently these criteria. In its 
development the anarchist criticism clarifies that the values used in theories of 
political obligation if successfully combined with the conditions of political 
obligation, would offer acceptably complete accounts of this duty. And such 
accounts are translated by the anarchist into ideal pictures of proper social 
relations between institutions and individuals and between citizens themselves. 
Voluntariness, justice and fairness are strong and generally acceptable 
requirements. They have been used in the form of general principles for 
evaluating the character of political institutions. And the anarchist indicates that 
they need to continue to be used in such a way with regard to every function 
of institutions. Also that they can be used to determine social relationships if 
transformed into actual features of the specific interactions they are meant to 
characterise.
Thus the anarchist ideal o f legitimacy lies at the centre of the positive 
character of the anarchist argument. It is the normative horizon established by
40In this context, ‘legitimacy’ continues to designate the aspect which is correlative to political 
obligation and thus to determine assessments to this problem. But, more importantly here, it 
acquires an additional use: it applies according to the idea that even when we accept the 
existence o f institutions, in the absence o f  political obligation we need to show that any 
arising forms o f  coercion are not arbitrarily imposed on us but are rather compatible with 
acceptable moral values. This idea was analysed in the preceding paragraphs and it is 
explained further in this final part o f chapter five. This latter sense o f  legitimacy functions 
among the various senses o f  it used in political debates which are distinguished from the 
problem o f political obligation, and it can be effected through, or be identified with, some o f  
them. Such senses are, for example, that the government is legitimate because o f  its good 
qualities, or when ‘it has acquired its political power in the proper way (e.g., by free election 
... ) ’ or, in an international context, ‘if  it is recognized as legitimate by other governments’ 
(Simmons 1979, pp.40-41 and 197).
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the debate on political obligation as defined by the anarchist criticism. That is, 
it functions in the form of ideal accounts of social interaction which constitute 
normative standards that determine the considerations we put forward when we 
seek to justify forms of social organisation as a common basis of our 
responsibilities and actions.41 These standards, in the light of the failure to 
justify political obligation, help further evaluations of institutions by imposing 
the relevant moral criteria as principled conditions on existing and newly 
arising forms of coercion.42
Hence by stressing the question of obligation, anarchism ends up 
affecting a more general approach to political institutions. It offers a proper 
test to be applied to and determine any defence of constraints. Even if 
political institutions are proved to be wanted, the criteria of legitimacy which 
anarchism supplies provide a standard by reference to which defenders of those 
institutions can attempt to maintain their desirability: we examine what 
demands are put on political institutions, what is needed to motivate them in 
every instance and in view of what is owed to particular individuals. The 
anarchist versions of an ideal of legitimacy provide a new horizon for political 
argumentation and make legitimacy exigent because it is difficult to see how 
institutions can meet their requirements.43 Through this, the ideal of legitimacy 
reaffirms the force of the question of obligation: the more difficult it is for 
existing institutions to satisfy this standard, the more the anarchist concern with 
the possibility of obligations is strengthened.44 The anarchist perspective is once
41 As explained at the beginning o f this chapter, this involves that the test applies to anarchist 
social visions too, which do not have the nature o f the ‘political’ and do not involve the 
relationship o f  political obligation but still need to be assessed in terms o f the voluntariness, 
justice or fairness that the social interactions characteristic o f them are meant to exemplify; 
and which, more generally, need to be proved to be morally acceptable social forms.
42T w o  possible ways o f ensuring that political constraints attend to these values are that such 
conditions function either as legitimate general principles with which those constraints should 
be proved to be compatible, or as ‘enabling conditions [...] for the legal institutionalization o f  
[...] discursive processes o f opinion- and will-formation through which’ we can authorise 
constraints (for the latter idea see Habermas 1994, pp. 12-13). The extent to which these 
models become appropriate ways o f heeding the demands o f  the ideal o f legitimacy and the 
idea o f active participation it represents depends on the implementation, structure, regularity 
and efficiency o f  the mechanisms we establish for their realisation.
43The anarchist ideals are probably unattainable and even if  existing institutions were at some 
point entirely guided by them the continual need to verify this application would make this 
fact unstable. Still, this allows to remain meaningful the also difficult task o f  ensuring that 
institutions are constantly assessed by and tend to approximate to these ideals.
MIn the end, the anarchist insists on and gives new force to the realisation that the task o f  
the theorist o f  political institutions becomes meaningful and valuable when identified within a
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more vindicated: political institutions cease to be viewed as lovable and they 
need to be tested on the basis of the problems they create. Furthermore the 
anarchist ideal explains the link between philosophical and political anarchism: 
it reminds us of the enduring deficiency of the state as a position which is 
initially shared by both forms of anarchism; and the moral conditions involved 
in it as part of philosophical anarchism are aspired to be inherent in aspects 
of the society which political anarchism seeks to realise.
Finally, the anarchist perspective brings together Raz’s argument about 
how political institutions can be compatible with freedom and an insistence on 
the special role of choice in sustaining self-imposed constraints as the only 
ones appropriate to human freedom. In chapter one we explained the difference 
between two distinctive views for respecting autonomy in political societies. 
The one was that freedom can be allowed in a government which serves good 
reasons even when this government is not autonomously chosen. The other was 
that individual choice is indispensable to freedom. Raz’s position that autonomy 
is respected when government serves reasons which apply to individuals 
themselves represents the first view. And the way of assessing political 
institutions defended by the anarchist results in Raz’s view. Yet, as also 
argued in the first chapter, this view does not alone address the concern with 
freedom which underlies the demand for justification. For this, the role of 
choice needs to be asserted: it is important that through government we remain 
free. Through the anarchist criticism of theories of political obligation we 
understand that this demand involves recognising the importance of the 
question of political obligation and of the difficulty of addressing it. This is a 
way of asserting the importance of choice for securing self-government. And it 
directs to an alternative way of respecting choice. Recognising in light of the 
absence of political obligation that constraints need to be assessed and be 
justified on the basis of the values of the ideal of legitimacy as it traces 
harms to particular individuals is a way of affirming choice without facing the 
difficulty which accounts of political obligation based on choice face - a 
difficulty which Raz himself has pointed out correctly. It thus is a way of
background o f accounts o f  ‘limited government’ (Raz 1990, p. 12). And such a background, as 
explained throughout the thesis, involves centrally a focus on quality rather than quantity as 
far as the acceptability and implementation o f the demands o f the state are concerned.
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returning to Raz while sustaining the fundamental role of individual choice for 
political justification. Such a justification is based on the idea of self-imposed 
constrains, which removes the appearance of a paradox in the relation between 
constraints and freedom.45
5.3.Conclusion.
The distinctive perspective of critical philosophical anarchism is that it 
revives the question of whether we should have political institutions by 
questioning our obligation to them. The criticism of accounts of political 
obligation that it provides and the results of that criticism raise this question, 
which has been overlooked for too long in discussions of political authority. 
Rather than promoting a duty to justify constraints, anarchism makes 
compelling a duty not to accept illegitimate constraints: it focuses on what 
constraints take away and thus on the need to account for the point of their 
very existence. Critical philosophical anarchism makes us think what freedom 
and its loss imply for the way we want to defend political institutions and 
helps us re-establish our methods of justification. It offers an indispensable 
outlook: it re-assesses the very approach to political authority that has 
incorrectly been used hitherto as a starting point for the debate and offers a 
clear view of the character, possibilities and problems of political constraints 
which points out and corrects for this approach. It thus establishes a new 
horizon of argumentation, where the possibility of political obligation and the 
need for justification remain a persistent concern and are harder to obtain. This 
perspective constitutes the core of the anarchist contribution to the 
philosophical debate on political obligation. And it is in this respect, namely in 
adopting this perspective, that, I claim, political theorists need to acknowledge 
the terrain they share with anarchists. At the same time, the anarchist position 
preserves its authenticity. It is not about putting limits on political institutions 
out of a concern to preserve them. It does not put emphasis on the 
justification of the legitimacy of the state. The anarchist is motivated by the
45For this seeming paradox see chapter one, section 1.1.
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problem of subjugation, the way in which improper relations between people 
undermine them. The defect of political institutions detected through the 
anarchist criticism of political obligation is that political constraints, by their 
very nature, tend to accept, cultivate and establish that subjugation. In the end, 
the anarchist position is rather about how difficult it is to substantiate political 
legitimacy.
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Conclusion.
In this chapter I provide concluding remarks in terms of an overview of 
the preceding discussion, which further demonstrates the distinctive 
contribution that critical philosophical anarchism advances in the debate on 
political obligation. I also examine the implications of this contribution for 
anarchists in general. There are two main parts to this examination. In the 
first part, I provide some considerations about the tasks of political anarchism
in relation to the contribution of critical philosophical anarchism. Second, I
discuss what the view of critical philosophical anarchism proposes for 
addressing concrete dilemmas within existing societies governed by the state.
6.1.Overview of the results of the thesis.
The examination of theories of political obligation from the anarchist 
perspective issued in the following key conclusions:
1) None of the most comprehensive theories of political obligation, nor their 
combination, provides a persuasive account of such a relationship. Thus 
there is no general political obligation as a special political bond which 
determines the relationship between individuals and the governments of their 
countries of residence. This, in turn frees our view of political institutions
from a presumption in favour of obedience and encourages a critical
approach to their construction and specific demands, which represents a
different outlook to political reality and our position in it.
2) Part of the above outcomes (in point 1) is an emphasis, through the
anarchist criticism, on the importance of establishing the existence of 
morally important features of actual, specific interaction between 
governments and each of their citizens as the only proper and satisfactory 
basis of political obligation, as well as on the difficulty of such an 
endeavour. These are the aspects which the accounts examined fail to 
provide for, something that is reflected at the theoretical level by their
failure to meet one or more of the conditions of political obligation, which 
together are expressive of the political nature of such bonds. But the
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character itself of the relationship required indicates the inevitable instability 
of such accounts: the resulting failure reflects and highlights the endlessness 
of a process set to discover and maintain particular and morally acceptable 
interactions which establish authority within a world of nation- and 
multination-states with extensive government over huge and variable
populations. This in turn suggests that support of political institutions should 
probably move towards a different direction.
3) Another part of the anarchist criticism and its results, concomitant to the 
preceding one, is that they verify and maintain the importance and 
desirability of the moral standards which are offered as bases of political
obligation. These uncontroversial grounds are the central elements of ideals 
of legitimacy which constitute paradigmatic demonstrations of the relations 
which would characterise a legitimate society and its active citizenship, and 
which existing societies do not meet. But these values also work as general 
moral criteria which the ideals of legitimacy force on the assessment of 
political constraints as they exist and arise in the absence of political
obligation.
Chapters two to four provided a detailed discussion of the anarchist
criticism against leading positions within the debate on political obligation. This 
discussion reformulated their central claims and offered the elements which 
may be used as the defining features of a more comprehensive and positive 
position involved in the challenge of critical philosophical anarchists. My 
discussion sought to challenge the view that the theoretical project of critical 
philosophical anarchism is a merely negative and academic position. The 
discussion in chapters two to four anticipates a more complete reply to this 
accusation, not only with its supply of the elements which are the main factors 
of such a reply but also in being a genuine representation of the deepest 
anarchist concerns. Its revelation of the particular character of the debated 
relationship as well as of the difficulties that this creates, represents and 
justifies the primary commitment to freedom and hostility to coercion, which is 
at the heart of anarchism, as well as its corresponding attention to a creation 
and protection of proper relations between persons within social reality. Finally 
the discussion establishes a new horizon for the continuation of political 
dialogue, one involving a fresh starting point and carefully specified demands
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both in the direction of the defender of political institutions and in the 
direction of anarchism itself.
Chapter five followed with a direct demonstration of the significance and 
value of the above picture. This demonstration is concentrated on the 
distinctive contribution of critical philosophical anarchism in the direction of 
defences of political constraints. The central elements of this contribution are 
found in the special perspective which characterises anarchism and the ideal of 
legitimacy which it involves as already detected in the discussion of the 
previous chapters. In this chapter these elements are elaborated as follows:
1) The anarchist approach to political obligation reveals the mistake made by 
traditional theorists of attempting to derive it from general positive qualities 
of political institutions which may be used to account for their existence 
and desirability. Anarchism reveals that theorists begin from a wrong starting 
point and make very quick moves towards a justification of political 
obligation: they are guided by an assumption of the necessity of the state 
and focus on its possible merits in a way that neglects its defects and 
reflects an inaccurate depiction of what life without political institutions 
would be like. And they attempt to derive political obligations from these 
merits. But they pay no attention to the particularised and enduring character 
of political obligation, which, being at the heart of their failures, itself 
shows that they have not asked properly the fundamental question that needs 
to be asked, namely of whether we should have political institutions at all. 
Thus they rush to defend political obligation in a way that leaves behind 
the prior and essential basis of any possible defence. The failure of their
accounts and the specific aspects of this failure, which the anarchist
criticism reveals, redirect the defenders to the root of the weakness of their 
theories and to a perspective that they all need to share.
2) This approach is carried to wider evaluations of constraints. The attention
given to the question of political obligation and the accompanying 
clarification of the demands and difficulties that it involves shake the 
grounds of other supports of political institutions. First, the view of political 
relations which the results of the debate on political obligation force on us, 
already changes our approach to political institutions. Second, the absence of 
political obligation itself constitutes a serious gap in the status and function
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of these institutions and thus by itself it makes us question their validity 
and viability. But third, and most importantly, the attention given to the 
issue of political obligation shows it to reveal a demand that underlies more 
generally our view of political constraints. Through the question of political 
obligation the fundamental question of whether or not institutions should 
exist and the initial view of political institutions as enduring evils which it 
represents become the starting point and determining basis of any attempt to 
evaluate them. Thus when we try to show the desirability of political 
institutions in terms of general qualities and accomplishments or to justify 
their particular activities, the only way to understand the real force of these 
aspects is to apply them within a background defined by the fundamental 
question. In this respect the demand for their justification becomes harder.
3) The anarchist is concerned with the imposition of illegitimate constraints. 
Political institutions exist and there might be no point in attempting their 
removal. And philosophical anarchists need not be, and are often not, 
committed to overthrowing institutions. But the fundamental question that the 
anarchist reminds us to ask throws light to the fact that even when political 
institutions remain necessary despite the absence of political obligation, the 
defects of political coercion can be counterbalanced only if its arising 
instances are shown to serve the values which they are claimed to serve in 
the first place. But for this to happen, every existing and every arising form 
of constraint needs to be shown to actually respect these values and to 
continue to do so in every instance of its social function. Political obligation 
is a relationship which is enduring and exacting because of its actual, 
particularised and normative character, which reflects the implications of the 
fundamental political question. This is what makes its justification an endless 
and probably unattainable task. This fact might not condemn political 
institutions to non-existence but, in the light of the failure it involves, their 
assessment itself becomes a more difficult and a persistent process. Thus the 
demand that we pay attention to the defects of political institutions 
represents the central concern with preventing illegitimate constraints and so 
carries with it the demand that we assess these institutions regularly in 
terms of the merits on the basis of which they can be acceptable forms of
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social organisation. The general anarchist message that it is very difficult to 
justify political institutions is now evident and pressing.
4) Given the reasserted demand for justification, the anarchist ideal of 
legitimacy acquires a newly formulated and important role. In its function as 
a paradigmatic depiction of the form of societies where political obligation 
would exist, it works now also as a reminder of what it is that the 
defences of political institutions need to do as long as societies fail to 
assimilate this picture. It becomes a test on political constraints in terms of 
the central values of voluntariness, justice and fairness which it provides as 
criteria for their assessment. Thus, in addition to the reformulation of the 
demand that it establishes with regard to justification, anarchism provides a 
proposal of how to apply this demand. And this proposal is one that applies 
to the anarchist too: despite their lack of institutionalised coercion and of 
political obligation as the bond which characterises their social relations, the 
general character of the visions of political anarchism and the social 
interactions which they are offered to involve should reflect the moral
values of the anarchist ideal. This relates to the problems with coercion and 
stability which anarchism itself faces and which I discuss in the final part 
of this chapter.
5) The appearance of the paradox, that we are ruled because we don’t want to 
be ruled, with which the anarchist challenge to defences of political
institutions began, disappears, since the new test of legitimacy shows a way 
in which political constraints become constraints that individuals put on 
themselves and are expressive of their own participation. As anticipated in 
chapter one and explained in chapter five, the anarchist insistence on self- 
government results in the view defended by Raz, which asserts the
realisation of autonomy through the application by the state of reasons
applying to individuals themselves, yet via an establishment of the important 
role of choice as affirmation of self-government. Such choice need not have 
the form of actual particular consent (and the failure of defences of political 
obligation shows that this cannot be achieved), but it needs to be affirmed 
in the existence of constraints which are of a quality such that reflects an 
authentic participation on the part of individuals in the workings of 
government. In this way, the approach of political theorists ceases to look
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paradoxical, because they can show that the political constraints which (they 
claim) we (should) accept are part and indications of our very willingness 
not to be externally and arbitrarily constrained.
6) Thus every theorist needs to share the anarchist perspective. The anarchist 
versions of an ideal of legitimacy must become a general testing ground for 
every evaluation of constraints. This throws new light on the subversive
campaign which advocates of philosophical anarchism are committed to. The
different perspective of our position within political society which this
campaign establishes and the corresponding removal of the habit of
compliance, at which it aims, become an expression of an innovative
position. As philosophical anarchists themselves argue, these changes do not 
lead to widespread disobedience and chaos since the absence of political 
obligation does not destroy other assessments of institutions and since it 
does not eliminate the existence of other important moral reasons for
support of them. Also any change of political reality that they encourage is 
gradual and part of a large series of careful, well organised and patiently 
applied efforts. Yet the perspective and demands which critical philosophical 
anarchism is shown to involve, imbue the anarchist campaign with a 
radicalism which has not been detected by its advocates. The fundamental 
question which the anarchist critique of political obligation exhumes and 
advances and the process of justification this question entails show that the 
presumption removed by the anarchist enlightening campaign and the critical
attitude it cultivates are indications of a more drastic challenge to political
institutions. That this challenge and attitude function within a framework 
which makes appropriate the support of government only to the extent that 
it does enough to protect us; and are themselves expressions of a constant 
reminder of the enduring diffidence of the state, of the unacceptability of 
illegitimate constraints and of a project towards actual social changes. With 
the demand for the limitation of political power to aspects which reflect 
moral quality, the insistence on the importance of choice for self-government 
and a view of political constraints as acceptable to the extent that they are 
compatible with this capacity of human beings and the reasons with which 
it is expressed join together into an insurgent perspective. Eventually critical 
philosophical anarchism meets political anarchism. It follows political
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anarchism in becoming a constant guardian of the corruptive tendencies of 
the state which political anarchists stress1 and it throws attention to, and 
facilitates the construction and support of, the social proposals involved in 
that form of anarchism. Critical philosophical anarchism is representative of 
a position which mostly characterises anarchism on the whole.
6.2.Political anarchism.
So critical philosophical anarchism constitutes a very comprehensive 
position, which represents an indispensable outlook to approaches to political 
institutions. But what about the other direction which the anarchist contribution 
can take? What about its implications for political anarchism itself? How does 
the critical stand with regard to the state which the philosophical anarchist 
position shares with political anarchism relate to the tasks of the advocates of 
the latter?
6.2.1.The tasks of political anarchists.
As explained in chapter five, in the light of the framework established 
with the help of philosophical anarchism and the normative horizon of the 
anarchist ideal of legitimacy, anarchists themselves have to undertake their own 
tasks. In order to address concerns of the defenders of the state and in order 
for their proposals for social organisation to be taken seriously, political
'This is a crucial part o f the political anarchist criticism o f the state, which goes beyond the 
detection o f the failures o f justifications o f it. See, e.g., Bakunin 1867. See also, Proudhon’s 
famous exclamation: *[t]o be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction, 
noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, 
admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the pretext o f  public utility, 
and in the name o f the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed,
exploited, monopolized, [...] robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of
complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, [...] sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to 
crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; 
that is its morality’ (1851, p.294). For a contemporary example o f this line o f criticism, see 
Colin Ward’s attack, which indicates that the state stands in a reverse relation with the rest 
o f society, occupying and formalising at the expense o f the latter any space unused by social 
participation: e.g., ‘[t]here is an inverse correlation between the two [namely, the libertarian 
and the authoritarian tradition]: the strength o f one is the weakness o f the other. If we want
to strengthen society we must weaken the state. Totalitarian o f  all kinds realise this, which
is why they invariably seek to destroy those institutions which they cannot dominate. So do 
the dominant interest groups in the state [..]’ (1973, p.24, emphasis mine). For a very recent 
philosophical criticism o f the state in terms o f political anarchism, see Carter 1999.
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anarchists have to show that their own social visions live up to the moral 
criteria of the ideal of legitimacy in a way that proves both their desirability 
and their feasibility and viability. This will also weaken the force o f arguments 
to the effect that we need the state and will make the call of political 
anarchism to demolish it more understandable and intuitive.
As mentioned in the introduction, the anarchists focus on the social 
character of human life and on the ethos of voluntary co-operation, which is 
fairly represented by communal anarchism. So this anarchist position qualifies 
as a political position paradigmatic of what anarchism proposes as a social 
alternative. However, this form of anarchism has difficulties in providing an 
answer to the question of how to achieve and sustain stable, harmonious, 
social co-operation without coercion. This problem with political anarchism lies 
in the fact that, in its commitment to social co-operation, it is bound to 
recognise the necessity of forms of social order, social conventions and 
obligations, which are hardly defined without ‘an element of coercion’.2 Social 
criticism and pressure, especially in small communities, can have strikingly 
coercive effects on individuals, not to mention their inefficiency in large cities.3 
Given that communal anarchists accept a degree of coercion in forms of social 
order necessary for the survival of anarchic communities, it follows that, for 
those anarchists, the issue of political obligation becomes problematic (since 
they either ‘reintroduce’ political obligation or appeal to proposals which are 
open to objections similar to those that anarchists themselves make against 
institutionalised coercion).4 What becomes crucial then, is to find a way to 
incorporate consistently with the political anarchist view the explicit arguments 
against political obligation provided by philosophical anarchists.
It is on this terrain, then, that communal anarchism, and any other 
positive proposal which is charaterised by its advantages and disadvantages, 
needs to be tested under the auspices of an ideal of legitimacy.5 Anarchism
2Horton 1992, pp. 120-123. See also my introduction, note 43.
3For similar points, see Miller 1984, pp. 174-177.
4Horton 1992, pp.122-123.
SA demonstration o f the compatibility o f political anarchist social visions with the perspective 
and ideals o f legitimacy shown in this thesis to be provided by philosophical anarchists, and 
their proximity to them, would achieve this and would establish a continuity within the 
anarchist ideology. It would provide a combination o f a diagnostic o f  what goes wrong with 
coercion with an explicit positive horizon o f harmonious social relations without the state.
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must prove that the social visions it proposes can deal effectively with the 
problem of achieving co-operation, order and safety without coercion. This 
demonstration could best be effected through the elements already implemented 
within the anarchist tradition. That is, by a more complete development of the 
theoretical anarchist arguments concerning the prisoners’ dilemma, public goods 
and morality and by empirical observation and cultivation of its manifestations 
within real societies. Further, although anarchist visions do not have to meet 
the conditions of political obligation, since they reject it,6 this demonstration 
must proceed in ways compatible with the moral criteria that the anarchist 
position sustains.
This thesis does not undertake the tasks of political anarchism. It is 
probably the work of social and political science to do so. But a brief 
discussion of elements which political anarchists might use in order to address 
their problems might provide illumination and be a first step in this direction.
There is a continued development of theoretical arguments in defence of 
anarchy, which are customarily advanced in the political debate and stand in 
interaction with the anarchist work on social structures. Anarchists advance 
solutions to the prisoners’ dilemma7 and to the argument from public goods,8 
in order to address the problems of co-ordination of activities, co-operation and 
social order without appeal to institutionalised coercion and formal law. Also, 
they argue for the possibility of relying on generally accepted moral reasons, 
in order to show that anarchism need not lead to widespread unrest, and thus 
to counteract criticisms which appeal to the impossibility of a unifying moral
6Except perhaps particularity as needed to characterise the relationship o f  an individual with 
others and to a cause within a co-operative effort, to determine the extent to which they all 
are and conceive each other as participants in a common enterprise whenever this opportunity 
arises.
Solutions such as suggesting iterated forms o f the prisoners’ dilemma: depicting the game in 
a number o f times so as to allow repeated interaction among the parties provides great 
possibility for the emergence o f strategies which result in cooperation (see Axelrod 1984 and 
Taylor 1976; 1987). Another solution involves ‘experimental arguments’, which support these 
theoretical possibilities by providing examples o f  cooperative behavior and o f  support o f  
voluntary associations evidenced in real life (see Harriott 1996, pp. 131-134). Along these 
lines, the most important anarchist claim is that, by realising the highly abstract and 
unrealistic construction o f the dilemma as far as its various features are concerned and by 
relaxing some o f  them, the possibility o f  cooperation on a voluntary basis becomes more and 
more obvious (see Sanders 1996, pp.264-265). A successful application o f the anarchist 
structures and practices plays a primary role to this effect.
8For an explanation o f the prisoners’ dilemma and the argument from public goods, along 
with representative bibliography on these issues, see my discussion o f  social contract in 
chapter two. For public goods see also chapter four.
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view.9 Furthermore, many of them aspire to a gradual10 and stable
reconstruction of social life envisaged as a social scheme of co-operation, one 
end of the spectrum of views that has, at its opposite extreme, the 
institutionalised coercion of states.
Anarchists present us with a picture of uncoercive and equal social
relations. These are reflected, in the anarchist work on social structures, in a 
social background constituted by a multiplicity of decentralised, voluntary 
associations, which are realised by a variety of groups, organised on human 
scale, are of all forms and degrees and involve many important practices and
goals (social units such as local communes, different kinds of co-operatives
and contemporary movements serving a variety of causes regarding various 
areas of life); and which are confederated with each other in order to apply, 
co-ordinate, improve and expand the relations among them and between them 
and the surrounding system.11 These features, as actual implementations of the 
ideals of freedom, equality, co-operation and solidarity, should be tested by the 
provided moral standards, and by experience.
9This criticism is present in W olff 1996a, pp.52-53, where it is claimed that the difficulty o f  
making everybody to share a common set o f moral principles generates infinite disagreement 
which makes anarchism unattractive. Also see Kavka 1996, where the writer offers a variety 
o f reasons for proving that even perfect moral agents (angels) would need the state as the 
most effective solution to moral disputes. The anarchist practices for social order and a 
reflection o f central anarchist values in them (values such as decentralisation, participatory 
democracy, egalitarianism, self-sufficiency, ecology) as well as o f the ultimate ideals o f  
freedom, equality and solidarity which underlie these values, constitute the most essential 
elements for replies to this criticism. Also, the position o f  critical philosophical anarchism is 
already shown to involve, and to redirect us towards, generally acceptable moral reasons.
10 For replies to the criticism that ‘instant anarchism’ has adverse effects, see Sanders 1996, 
pp.271-274 and Ward 1973, pp. 131-133. A central tenet o f anarchism is that it is through the 
implementation o f  pre-figurative social structures and experience within them that individuals 
will cultivate the attitudes and abilities o f trust and cooperation required for an alternative 
construction o f social life and which life in states has made us lose (the anarchist idea o f  ‘a 
‘prefigurative’ model o f  revolution’: see Cahill 1989, pp.235-236 and Carter 1999, pp.266- 
276). Such a structural preparation applies a characteristic anarchist belief, namely that the 
means towards social change should be the same as, or, compatible with, the ends forming 
this change (Cahill 1989, pp.235-236 and Joll 1964, chapter IV). Although these ideas 
propose immediate changes, they do not contradict the proposal for gradual social 
reconstruction. Rather, they reflect the anarchist position that the application o f this 
reconstruction should be directly and consistently o f the kind that the anarchist envisages and 
explain the forms which comprise it.
HOn the whole, these schemes and their federation constitute a culture o f  ‘pre-figurative 
forms’ or o f ‘cooperative autonomy’ (Carter 1999, pp.266-276 and Bookchin 1980; 1997; 
1998).
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‘Whole communities’12 - such as the traditional communes constructed 
around the world, especially in the form of the ‘secular family commune’ they 
took in the 1960s13 and its more contemporary development in the 1980s14 - 
might acquire a very valuable character if  developed in accordance with 
Bookchin’s political program of ‘Libertarian Municipalism’.15 Bookchin 
characterises Libertarian Municipalism as ‘an explicit attempt to update the 
traditional social anarchist ideal of the Federation of Communes or “ Commune 
of communes” , that is, the confederal linking of libertarian communist 
municipalities in the form of directly democratic popular assemblies as well as 
the collective control or “ ownership” of socially important property’.16 He 
argues that for a promising alternative social framework there should be an 
immediate sphere of popular self-management where co-operation and 
commitment to community come to the fore. This is the democratic 
municipality. He sees the municipality as the ‘authentic unit of political life 
[...] where as a whole, if it is humanly scaled, or in its various subdivisions, 
notably the neighborhood’.17 The neighborhood becomes the vital space for 
discussions of political, cultural and economic issues. His claim is that the 
immediate spheres for learning to be familiar with ‘the political process’ and 
units of an alternative culture should be: ‘the villages, towns, neighborhoods, 
and cities in which people live on the most intimate level of political 
interdependence beyond private life’.18 Bookchin’s vision is one of a society 
where people are actively involved in public matters through interaction within 
municipal assemblies whose members meet constantly for a direct discussion 
and decision-making on every matter of their lives; and which are further co­
ordinated by delegates who represent them in ‘local confederal councils’ and 
‘who are rotable, recallable, and above all, rigorously instructed in written 
form’ about their position on the issues discussed in the councils.19 This 
process extends at every level, creating thus a confederal network which
12Taylor 1982, p. 169.
13For an excellent survey o f these social units, see Abrams and McCulloch 1976.
14For this, see Pepper 1991.
15For this, see Bookchin 1997; 1998.
161998, p .l.
I71997, p.175.
18Ibid.
19Ibid. p. 177.
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interlinks municipal assemblies through local councils, all organised from the 
bottom up.20
There are four recurrent themes running through Bookchin’s vision which 
are extremely important for the organisation of social life in anarchist terms 
and in line with the anarchist commitment to equal, active participation and its 
new view of the political. The first is Bookchin’s concern to revive citizenship 
through appeal to municipal politics, where he conceives politics in its Greek 
meaning, namely as the self-management of the community, or ‘popular ways 
of managing the city’, as evidenced in and inspired by the Greek ‘polis' and 
other cities of the past.21 With this idea Bookchin highlights an alternative to 
the ‘political’ as conceived so far, which may be constituted upon anarchist 
lines both as a replacement of the practices characteristic of the state and for 
cultivation of a new kind of collective action which may socialise us into, and 
help us arrive at, social change. The second interesting theme is Bookchin’s 
distinction between policy-making and administration, according to which he 
considers the former as the practice of individuals qua citizens within the 
assemblies, as their main political function, while the latter as the job of those 
appointed and working in each specific area of society,22 which frees citizens 
from time-consuming preoccupation with administrative details. This distinction 
applies also at the federal level with regard to assemblies and councils: the 
former involve policy-making while the task of the latter is co-ordination and 
administration.23 This idea helps anarchist organisations to preserve participation 
while achieving the required co-ordination of activities which would make them 
viable and effective as well as able to extend to the larger society. Another 
theme characteristic of Bookchin’s project is ‘the municipalization of the 
economy’, according to which property should be in the custody of the 
community and economy arranged on the basis of the decisions of citizens in 
the municipal assemblies with regard to both production and distribution.24 In
20Ibid. pp. 178-179.
211998, p.5. As more recent examples o f the form o f  institutions to which he aspires, 
Bookchin indicates the town meetings o f  the colonial New England (1989, p.268), the 
assemblies o f revolutionary Paris and the community life during the Spanish revolution (1987, 
pp. 189-192).
221997, pp.177-178.
23Ibid. pp.178-179.
24Ibid. 184-186.
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this way individuals control the economy as citizens within the assemblies and 
in their decisions they are guided by the needs of the community while as 
workers they concentrate on specific tasks without concern for management of 
the particular economic units in which they work (for example, the factory).25 
Bookchin thinks that this idea is essentially liberatory for the workers and that 
it provides an improved conception of the notion of ‘worker control’ (which 
within anarchosyndicalism has been connected to the direct management as 
well as ownership of the economic units by workers): he thinks that it helps 
workers ‘escape the tyranny of the factory, rationalized labour, and planned 
production’, thus giving them free time and freedom from an abuse of labour; 
and that, at the same time, it avoids the privatisation of economy and the 
competitiveness it entails, which he sees to be involved in the 
anarchosyndicalist idea of ‘collectivized enterprises’.26 This idea can apply to 
any profession within contemporary societies, as a new way of organising work 
environment. A final theme in Bookchin’s politics is the interaction between 
and independence of communities through confederation, as a way of avoiding 
inefficiency, isolation and a narrow parochial outlook. And, as a way of 
arriving at his ‘ultimate agenda’, that is, his vision of a world in which the 
state is replaced by ‘a confederal network of municipal assemblies’ and which 
involves the future task that we ‘radicalize the democracy we create [namely 
the democratic municipalities within which we are to preserve and expand 
freedoms], imparting an even more creative content to the democratic 
institutions we have rescued and tried to develop’.27 With confederation 
Bookchin aspires to carry the ideas of decentralisation and small scale to their 
ultimate expansion.
All these central ideas can apply also to the form of ‘partial community’, 
namely ‘a wide variety of cooperatives, collectives, neighboorhood associations 
and other practices and projects of direct action, mutual aid and self­
management’.28 And the specific practices29 included within these social
25Ibid.
26Ibid. pp. 185-186.
27Ibid. pp. 194-195.
28Taylor 1982, p. 169. For forms o f  ‘partial community’, see Ward 1973; Cahill 1989; Carter 
1999, pp.274-275. ‘Direct action’ originally applied as a political tactic adopted by anarchists 
and other radicals for creating an immediate effect on situations and on the range o f  choices
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structures of the counterculture are of central importance for testing its 
acceptability and viability.
But these aspects of the anarchist project, although promising, are still 
incomplete30 and to this extent the difficulty with coercion which anarchism 
faces remains. This difficulty can be expressed in a more challenging form in 
light of the framework shown in this thesis to be established by the anarchist 
position. Anarchism wants a society where there is imposition of no 
imposition, where the imposition of some on others is prevented. But here the 
concern arises with how there can be an imposition of no imposition such that 
the former differs from the latter. If anarchists promise us a land of no 
constraints, how are they to sustain this land with no use of constraints? The
o f the individuals affected, e.g. involving actions such as sabotage and strikes. Today it is 
conceived and used in a more sophisticated and inclusive way, as a social practice through 
which individuals directly intervene in, participate in and manage social affairs. It covers a 
wide range o f activities: it encompasses non-violent resistance to authority through various 
campaigns, movements and affinity groups as well as the organisation of, and work within, 
cooperatives and other pre-figurative forms (for an account o f forms o f  direct action, see 
Carter 1999, pp.229-130, 233, 241, 268-260, 281, 316). For an extensive development o f the 
idea o f ‘mutual aid’ and an exemplary vision o f society as a unit organised on the basis o f  
it, see Kropotkin 1902.
29For anarchist practices for social control and equality, such as reciprocity, democratic 
participation, distributive justice, public pressure, socialisation and ecology, see Taylor 1982; 
Pepper 1991; Ward 1973; Bookchin 1989; Carter 1999. For a virtue-based conception o f  
‘practices’, see MacIntyre 1985, chapters 14-17. Although MacIntyre is not an anarchist, his 
theory might help for an improved understanding and application o f  the ‘internal’ values,
rationale and workings o f social practices adopted by anarchists.
30Four serious problems which anarchist structures face and which their development aims at 
solving if  they are to qualify as core units o f social change are those discussed by Pepper 
with regard to whole communities (for the following analysis, see Pepper 1991, pp.59-62 and 
200-203). Firstly, these structures suffer a gap between principle and practice. This means that 
their members fail to live up to the principles they profess to adopt. This in traditional 
communes is mainly due to the communards having compromised original ends to a 
pragmatist concern with efficiency. Secondly, there is lack o f ideological clarity, namely o f  a 
clear and shared vision o f principled perspective and purposes. This is because there is
nowadays less talk about principles and more about direct practical issues concerning day-to- 
day survival and comfort, which helps avoid conflicts among the participants but also 
facilitates the gap between principle and practice. Thirdly, communards lack contact with a 
wider audience through effective outreach. That is, they fail with their ideas and practices to 
reach the larger population through keeping connections with other social movements and with 
the rest o f society. This is both due to lack o f ideological clarity and person power within 
the communes and due to concentration on personal relations at the expense o f organised 
collective action and outside political activity. Fourthly and finally, communes suffer a tension 
between ‘the private’ and ‘the public’. Their members see the personal to be less a part o f
more general and common concerns which help cultivate solidarity and a union between
individual freedom and communal reciprocity. My focus on Bookchin’s proposal aims at 
solutions to these problems. Also federation and an initial adoption o f  a clear view o f how to 
oppose the system while at the same time using it in a way that addresses the social reality 
within which both itself and the counterculture work, play a central role to this effect. But 
these are still proposals which need actual and patient implementation and expansion.
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anarchist proposals for social organisation do not yet qualify to solve this 
problem. Also even if people desire a non-coercive world, they will still 
disagree with anarchists and among each other about how to sustain a non- 
coercive order. The anarchist plan of socialising people to structures which do 
not involve institutionalised coercion is not accepted by all and this itself 
creates a ground for further conflicts and the need for their resolution, which 
in turn reintroduces an appeal to constraints. Ultimately, anarchists have to 
think of institutions such that prevent the emergence of constraints in a way 
that makes this prevention both sustainable and characteristically anarchic. 
Sustaining constraints is not anarchism. Sustainability without constraints has 
not yet been proved successful. This is a serious dilemma for anarchism, a 
very challenging conception of the central philosophical and political problem 
which it faces. In view of this difficulty, the anarchist claims that we should 
abolish the state and can live without it remain weak.
Yet, the perspective of critical philosophical anarchism argued for in this 
thesis has a very valuable thing to offer in the direction of political anarchism. 
It provides the latter with a general proposal for how to look at social life 
and set to organise it which both constitutes a fresh outlook and may guide 
the specific proposals of political anarchism to more fruitful directions in view 
of the specific problems that their defences face and, more importantly, of the 
main dilemma which haunts anarchism. Critical philosophical anarchism has 
been shown to represent a view which does not start from a duty to justify 
constraints but rather expresses an aversion to illegitimate constraints and 
defines a duty not to harm others. This, I argued, is the core feature of the 
anarchist perspective forced on defences of political institutions and now it is 
the key to understanding the tasks of political anarchism. In light of this 
challenge, when the anarchist is asked to provide an account of constraints to 
no constraints he can begin to build his reply on this basis: we need some 
constraints, but only those which prevent the emergence o f illegitimate 
constraints. Such are those that it would be unreasonable for us to reject.
This position gives every value to the anarchist’s initial concern with the 
question of whether we should have institutions at all. If no constraint can be 
reasonable then the anarchist is justifiably pretty unconvinced, if there can be 
reasonable constraints then we need to prove in each case that it is only those
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that apply. The distinctive focus on the quality of constraints, involved in the 
perspective proposed by philosophical anarchism, is central in this idea. The 
anarchist attack on the state becomes grounded and acquires new force. Also 
this position throws light to the acceptable moral criteria which the anarchist 
test on legitimacy imposes: these values may be seen as the reasonable 
constraints that anarchism itself can adopt consistently and the basis of any 
constraint that is deemed reasonable. Finally, and importantly, it is a view 
which when applied to anarchism’s own proposals neither repeats the 
traditional method of designing utopias and then struggling to prove them to 
be possible nor is a defence of ‘minimal state’.31 Rather, the defences of 
alternative social structures such as those discussed above are first to be 
guided by the newly established and more realistic demand that we prevent the 
imposition of illegitimate constraints and anarchists are to apply the relevant 
practices as parts of an effort to redeem this demand. Thus the classical 
anarchist propositions remain promising and proper ways of completing the 
anarchist project. But to secure that anarchists take a sustainable course in 
dialling with the problems that these propositions involve and in providing 
them as social solutions, and that they work consistently in this direction and 
compatibly with their attack on the existing social reality, they need always to 
be guided by the proposal offered by critical philosophical anarchism. Like 
this, their propositions are newly motivated. And, on the whole - in a way
31For such a defence, see Nozick 1974. In this respect there is a rather salient yet significant 
connection between anarchism and socialism. As Carter argues, economic equality is an aspect 
regarding which anarchism, as a theory o f ‘no state’, is closer to ‘more state’ than to ‘less 
state’ (1999, pp.258-260): to the extent that equality is highly valued in anarchy (something 
that my thesis supports), versions o f less state such as the ‘minimal state’ are opposed; this 
is because the minimal state, in being confined to ‘providing security, enforcing contracts and 
preserving property’, fails to provide welfare with its egalitarian implications (ibid. p.259, 
n.10); and ‘[i]n failing to provide welfare, it would most likely require a massive coercive 
apparatus to protect the inequalities that would inevitably arise’, something which makes it 
‘more coercive’ and thus ‘all the more objectionable to anarchists’ in general (ibid.). Hence, 
although anarchism is distinguished by its critique o f the state and although it involves an 
attack on the institutionalisation o f  welfare (for this, see, e.g., Ward 1973, chapter XII), 
functions o f the state which are not rooted in the ultimate causes o f it as a paradigm o f  
institutionalised coercion (these causes being the real object o f  the anarchist attack), are not 
necessarily rejected. Among such functions is egalitarian distribution, the institutionalisation o f  
which may be preferred by anarchists if  less state or monarchy are the only alternatives. 
Thus the characterisation o f theorists such as Nozick as anarchists is refuted, a refutation 
about which I am in agreement with Carter (1999, p.259). But most importantly, the present 
explanation o f the anarchist opposition to minimal state highlights more specific aspects which 
make the perspective o f  critical philosophical anarchism incompatible with such a structure.
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that philosophical and political anarchism are united - the anarchist project 
continues to be the characteristic anarchist position against the state and its 
demanding approach to justification retains the radicalism appropriate to the 
anarchist outlook while, at the same time, it maintains a perspective which is 
shown to be needed to be shared by all sides and which is first and foremost 
applied to its own terrain.
In these terms, my suggestion is that if it can combine its positive view 
of society with a description of how co-operation without coercion can obtain, 
all within the boundaries of the ideal of legitimacy, anarchism looks like the 
most appealing position. But for this to be achieved, there is work to be done. 
The theoretical discussion conducted in this study is only a first motivating 
step in this direction.
6.2.2.Anarchist approaches to concrete dilemmas.
As long as the perspective of critical philosophical anarchism is offered 
in a world where there is a state, what is such an anarchist committed to in 
such a world? This is the final important question to put to the anarchist. 
How does the anarchist ideal of legitimacy help address concrete dilemmas? 
How does the anarchist help us meet the claims that others make on us? More 
precisely, what is the anarchist position on police, on health-care and education 
and on helping strangers in need? If we don’t want the minimal state and if 
the anarchist ideal supports our demands on the state in terms of shared 
ethical concerns on the basis of which we judge its quality, how is this 
translated into an answer with regard to the issues just mentioned?
I believe we can answer these questions in the lines of the solution 
outlined and proposed in the above paragraphs in defence of political 
anarchism. The anarchist subversive campaign represented in the criticism of 
political obligation encourages a critical attitude towards political institutions. 
This means that we attend to the fact that the state is not itself a source of 
ethical concerns and so any function of it which it claims to be for our own 
good needs to be tested whether it is so, to be traced by reference to concrete 
harms to individuals. So, for example, when the state claims that it needs 
support of the army and the police in order to protect us, we should see
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whether on the basis of acceptable moral reasons these functions of it are 
appropriate. Since we have no political obligation, we need to test both if 
these services are acceptable on their own and if there are other, acceptable 
alternatives to them. This means that as long as we live within the state 
apparatus and is very difficult to suddenly replace its institutions, we need to 
see which ones of them do a proper job.
The police is a typical and immediate way of providing civil protection. 
So we cannot suddenly make this institution disappear. But we can demand 
that they exercise their duties in a legitimate way, namely that they interfere 
without excessive use of power, without insults, use of physical force or 
weapons, and only where and when it is necessary. The right to restrict or 
punish on the basis of ethical duties that we owe to each other belongs to all 
of us but we need to agree on acceptable and common ways of discharging 
these duties, and an administration that already exists might be an efficient 
means for that. Again, it is not that we should be against even strong aspects 
of the state, but they have to be traced back solely by being justified in terms 
of the ideal of legitimacy and the way in which it traces harms back to 
particular persons. At the same time, given that we know that the police is 
not an institution based on distinctive moral demands but just can function in 
compatibility with independent such demands which we need to make sure it 
respects, we can work towards establishing alternative ways of providing 
protection, which gradually might replace the police. Political anarchists talk 
about civil militia. This and other forms of group-based, non-hierarchical 
administration might not be accepted by all citizens and my claim is not that 
the anarchist should impose such a task on us. Yet, given the view on 
coercion which anarchism reminds us that the lack of political obligation 
justifies, such attempts are motivated and thus appear now as totally acceptable 
available alternatives which we can learn to apply within the state.
The same applies to health-care and education. The state can be seen to 
justifiably provide for these on the basis of legitimate ethical concerns. That is, 
it is a good way of helping discharge our relevant obligations towards one 
another in a fair manner. So the anarchist perspective does not lead 
immediately to a demand for withdrawal of these functions of the state but 
rather makes it more critical for us to test their specific rationale and
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justification. To check and criticise specific laws and practices on education 
and health, to demand replacement of illegitimate and inefficient ones, which 
create harm, and to resist efficiency if it is exploited as a name for 
arrangements which represent interests other than the ones meant to be served 
in these areas (for example, we should consider what the real motivations are 
for gradual replacement of state-functions by private companies in co-operation 
with the state - privatisation of public institutions). At the same time, the 
anarchist perspective motivates, for those who want to try them, attempts 
towards replacement of the state-institutions in these areas by non-centralised 
organisations. The visions of partial community that anarchists suggest - in the 
form of groups functioning at the level of neighbourhood, deciding within 
assemblies, co-ordinating by confederation and administrating by rotation, for 
various purposes (from organising alternative educational schemes to 
campaigning for the rights of children and old people and against the 
institutionalisation of mentally ill individuals) - are available alternatives which 
can gradually develop and expand with considerable force.
Finally, states have external relations to and duties towards other states 
and the world as a whole. They need to protect themselves from foreign 
attacks, support distant peoples who are treated unjustly and in general to co­
operate with other states for just purposes. What is the position of the 
anarchist in relation to these issues? The lack of legitimacy shows that we 
have no obligation to help the state preserve itself or see its provisions for 
helping other people as the only ones that are applicable and justifiable. This 
does not mean removing the army suddenly but it does mean that the 
anarchist perspective makes its support completely optional and supports its 
eventual removal. The army is a very characteristic means through which the 
state-agents serve their own interests and through which relations of power are 
cultivated and expanded. Anarchists are in complete opposition to this 
phenomenon. Their attack on the legitimacy of coercion is primarily motivated 
by this situation. We have no reason to help the state serve purposes of its 
preservation and domination (no reason to support coercion and hierarchy in 
themselves). Yet we have reason to accept international institutions for co­
operation among the states, since the latter exist and to the extent that such 
organisations provide ways of reciprocal checking on the part of the states in
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international affairs, and to evaluate them in the same way we evaluate the 
states, now at the international level. Also, and more importantly, we want to 
help other people in need. In this case the anarchist perspective grounds a
view encouraging participation in international organisations for peace and 
contribution to the needy (especially the independent ones) and the constant 
creation, co-operation and expansion of affinity groups all over the world for 
these purposes (so as for us to discharge our duties to such others as 
individuals and as citizens of the world). An anarchist will not join the army, 
will not go to war and will not contribute to the preservation of such means 
of supporting policies, practices and aims. This is an area where the critical 
outlook towards the state finds a very direct expression.
Thus, the basis for answering these questions is the critical outlook 
supported by philosophical anarchists such as Simmons. But it needs to be 
stressed that this does not extend only to demands for privacy and 
independence against the state when it interferes with harmless private 
behaviour and demands high taxes. It applies to every area and it is
accompanied with responsibilities and demands for work on our part. As long 
as taxes are for the purpose of helping the poor and funding health and 
education, they are a legitimate sacrifice to be made by us until we find 
alternative ways of helping people. We cannot, as anarchists, insist that we are 
free to escape that within the state which frustrates our individual pleasures
but also to enjoy in it what we find nice. We must take the good with the 
bad. We must have freedom as well as responsibility. As I have been arguing 
in this thesis, these are two sides of the same coin. Again, the critical
approach on the basis of shared ethical concerns which the ideal of legitimacy 
represents is applied: in the light of the knowledge that the state is no 
exclusive source of ethical concerns, at every instance we have the 
responsibility to consider carefully whether and why what the state requires, or 
does, is acceptable, or whether it creates harm. This is the way of tracing 
harms back to individuals and distinguishing reasonable from illegitimate 
constraints. Those accepted are those which have been tested and deemed 
appropriate. Thus in the hands of critical philosophical anarchism the challenge 
to political obligation has more pressing implications than the advocates of this
219
anarchist position have thought. In this case, it becomes a positive and widely 
applied position about our attitudes and moral duties.
Conclusively, in either direction of its contribution the anarchist position 
sets a fundamental demand. And by setting it, everything changes. Even if we 
cannot abandon institutions and cannot escape constant determination by them, 
we are still inspired by, and accommodated to, a different perspective. We get 
to newly assert an old and unjustifiably forgotten position: that we ask every 
time institutions to become better and that we participate in this. Even when 
the state is good, it has a morally problematic existence and we should not 
put too much trust in it but rather be critical towards it. Our arguments are 
fragile and present a temporary victory. No one wins. We need to help each 
other. We have to apply this position. In the end, everybody has to actually 
and persistently ask the anarchist question. When we complain that we are 
harmed, we should remember that first it is us who have responsibility for the 
elimination of this evil. We have to do this because it is the best affirmation 
of our freedom which we are truly able to uphold. We owe this to our selves 
to the extent that we want to be free.
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